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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTIONS

DOUG BLAZE: I'm Doug Blaze, the Dean of the UT
College of Law. I want to welcome everybody here today
to this incredible program on the politics of protecting
children. A symposium like this really represents the best in
our law school and what we're trying to do. What we're
about is trying to connect the theory that our students learn
in the classroom through their textbooks and apply it in a
real world setting, or at least explore with folks from the
profession what's going on in terms of what they've learned
and how it actually applies in real life. We do that through
our clinical programs; we do it through field placements;
we do it through our simulation classes; and we do it
through symposia like this. I think that's a wonderful way
for our students to see what's going on. It's also a wonderful
way for the law school to bring folks together to talk about
what I consider to be a vitally important issue. Most of you
probably know that our clinical program and various
faculty members for years have been involved in these
issues, and so we're very pleased to welcome you.
I applaud the Tennessee Journalof Law and Policy
for having come up with this particular topic and idea. It's
also a great collaboration between the Tennessee Journalof
Law and Policy and the Center for Advocacy, so I want us
to thank the Center for Advocacy, Corinna, and particularly
the incomparable Professor Penny White for helping to put
this together. I want to applaud and thank the editor-inchief, John Evans, who you'll hear from in a second, and
especially the symposium editor, Jessica Van Dyke, for
putting this together. I also want to thank all the panelists,
the rest of you in the audience, and the students for being
here. It is a terrific day. I think it will be great. So let's get
started.
JOHN EVANS: Thank you, Dean Blaze. I'm John Evans.
I'm the editor-in-chief of the Tennessee Journal of Law and
170
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Policy. We're just absolutely thrilled that you're here. We
came up with this topic a while back and our biggest worry
was that people might not be interested. But, if you look
around, obviously it's a topic that means a whole lot to this
community and people across this state. We have
wonderful presentations from a variety of different
speakers today, so we hope you're here for the whole day if
you can, and ask as many questions as you like. Again,
thank you so much for coming. Now Jessica Van Dyke is
going to introduce our first panel.
JESSICA VAN DYKE: Good morning. I'm Jessica Van
Dyke. I'm the Symposium Editor for the Tennessee Journal
of Law and Policy. I think any symposium about child law
has to start with a little bit of Dr. Seuss. He said, "The more
that you read, the more things you will know; the more that
you learn, the more places you'll go." For us sitting here in
this room today, there is a good chance that we have fond
memories of our parents reading from this or another of Dr.
Seuss's books to us as children. But as we all know too
well, not all children have these opportunities. That's why
we're here today. I am thrilled that so many practicing
attorneys took time out of their schedules to sign up and
attend today's symposium. I think the numbers say very
promising things about the future of service to children in
the state of Tennessee.
This Dr. Seuss motto really guided the Journal as
we planned and orchestrated this symposium. The motto
that, as future attorneys, the more that we know and the
more that we read, the more places we can go in protecting
children in the future. I have to say the very best aspect of
planning this symposium has been the enthusiasm and the
dedication of the individuals asked to sit on panels or for
their input, and of those who simply just said, "We're so
glad you're having this symposium today." The feedback
we have received over the past several months has been
incredibly positive, with individuals from the legislature,
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the legal field, nonprofits, academia, and social services all
supporting our efforts to put together a day where
advocates could really discuss what has already been done,
what worked and what didn't, and what should be done in
the future. Today, we have some outstanding speakers for
you. I'm so excited. I think it's going to be a great day. At
the end of each session we're going to have a question and
answer period, and I would encourage each of you to ask
questions and to share your thoughts with the panelists,
because the more we learn, the more places we can go.
Thank you so much for being here.
Let's move on to panel one. We have a great line-up
today. We have Ms. Jennifer Evans Williams, who joins us
from Springfield, Tennessee, and she is a certified child
law specialist. We have Ms. Elizabeth Sykes from the
Administrative Office of the Courts in Nashville,
Tennessee. And all the way from Memphis, we have Ms.
Lucie Brackin of the Landers Firm. She is on the Rule
40A l work group for the Tennessee Supreme Court. So
thank you all so much for being here and I'll turn it over to
you.
PANEL DISCUSSION 1:
TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT RULE

40A

Elizabeth Sykes
Lucie Brackin
Jennifer Evans Williams
ELIZABETH (LIBBY) SYKES: Thank you very much.
My name is Libby Sykes. I'm the director of the
Administrative Office of the Courts in Nashville, and it is
my pleasure to be here today. We're going to talk a little bit
about Rule 40A, which governs the appointment of
guardians ad litem in parenting cases. When we were
'TENN. SUP. CT.

R. 40A.
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talking about the program and how we wanted to present it
today, it was decided that I was not as much the expert on
the day-to-day application of the rule as Jennifer and Lucie
are, so I will start with a little bit about the evolution of this
rule and how it got started.
On August 27, 2007, almost four years ago now, I
was in my office. I had several staff members who were
attending a hearing before the General Assembly's House
Children and Family Affairs Committee, and I remember
when the phrase "impeaching a judge" came up, I thought,
"Well, I guess I'd better go across the street and see what
all is going on." I knew that we were having a hearing on
the use of guardians ad litem. There were probably four
women testifying from Shelby County, and all of them
were going through very high-conflict divorces. All of
them had had guardians ad litem, or in some instances
attorneys ad litem, appointed in their cases. They all had
some common complaints about the role of a guardian ad
litem, the duration of appointment, and the cost. All of
them had guardian ad litem fees in excess of $30,000, and
one was far in excess of $100,000. They all complained of
instances where they were assessing the guardian ad litem
fees as child support. They also talked about the use of the
guardian ad litem reports. In one instance, there was
actually an attorney at litem appointed to represent the
guardian ad litem.
One of the parties was a woman by the name of
Mrs. Susie Andrews, who was going through a divorce in
Shelby County. At that time her divorce had not been tried.
Several months after this hearing, the case was tried by
Senior Judge Kurtz from Davidson County, who was
brought in to hear the case. Dr. Andrews was a physician,
and he and Mrs. Andrews had been married about eleven
years and had one child. They decided they were going to
get a divorce, and I don't know what all that transpired
before that, but during this case Dr. Andrews asked that a
guardian ad litem be appointed.
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Before I start reading from some of the orders that
Judge Kurtz entered relating to this, I wanted to say, first of
all, that Judge Kurtz said in this order there was no
criticism of the efforts of the guardian ad litem or the
attorney ad litem, and that they both conducted themselves
in a highly professional manner and performed the role
they assumed. The issue was not whether their intentions
were good but, rather, did they exceed the boundaries
drawn by the law for their respective roles? Now I'm going
to go back and look at this opinion, 2 because it talks about
the role of the guardian ad litem and how the role of the
guardian ad litem was viewed in the culture of Shelby
County. It said that on December 17, 2008, the guardian ad
litem and attorney ad litem filed a motion to set and assess
fees. As near as the Court can compute, the guardian ad
litem had already been paid fees in around $71,000 and
contends she is owed another $99,400, for a total of
$170,000. The attorney ad litem has already been paid
around $30,000 and seeks an additional $69,800, for a total
of about $100,000. 3 He also writes earlier in this opinion
that the attorney fees, the guardian ad litem fees, and the
attorney ad litem fees all were in excess of a million dollars
in this divorce of an eleven-year marriage involving one
child. 4

I would also like to mention that in this divorce,
both the parties agreed to the appointment of both the
attorney ad litem and the guardian ad litem. So it's not the
initial appointment order at issue, but rather while the case
was pending, what the role of the guardian ad litem was.
Judge Kurtz said in his order that while the case was
pending, the guardian ad litem served as mediator,
arbitrator, and decision-maker and attempted to dissolve
2

Andrews v. Andrews, _ S.W.3d _, 2010 WL 3398826 Aug. 31, 2010,
appeal
denied Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2011.
3
Id. at *15.
4
1d. at * 11.
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disputes between the parties. It describes how the guardian
ad litem interviewed twenty people and ultimately
submitted a report that with the exhibits and other things
that were attached was almost 300 pages long.5 In his
order, Judge Kurtz cites to a previous opinion, Toms, 6 that
talks about what the proper role of a guardian ad litem is,
and he concludes that some of the cases in Shelby County
had far exceeded what a guardian ad litem's proper role is.
Judge Kurtz wrote that during the hearing on what fees
should be awarded to the guardian ad litem, there was an
affidavit from an attorney in Shelby County who was often
appointed as a guardian ad litem who said the role that the
guardians had actually assumed speaks to an expectation
which does not appear in any court order and expresses a
role beyond what is authorized by legal authorities
referenced. 7 He also writes that it also appears a legal
culture had developed in the 30th Judicial District, in
which the guardians ad litem assumed authority beyond the
parameters set forth in case law.
However, he says, when push comes to shove, law
must trump culture. He talks about the guardian ad litem in
the case, and says that she became an active participant in
the poisonous dynamic between the parties, that she
became a mini judge, and that her relationship with Mr.
Andrews was so estranged that she had to procure her own
attorney because she, for all practical purposes, became a
third party to what was a two-party divorce. 9 He ultimately
reduced her fee and awarded her an additional $7,500, and I
think gave the attorney ad litem $5,000.10
These were some of the things that the parties were
speaking of during that hearing on August 27, 2007. As I
5
Id.
6

at *7.
Toms v. Toms, 209 S.W.3d 76 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
7
Andrews, 2010 WL 3398826 at *12.
8
The 30th Judicial District of Tennessee encompasses Shelby County.
9
Andrews, 2010 WL 3398826 at *5, *14.
"Id. at *14.
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said, this divorce had not been tried at that time; this order
had not been entered. After that hearing, during the 2008
legislative session several bills were introduced basically to
prohibit the appointment of guardians ad litem in these
types of cases. There was considerable discussion about
impeaching judges. We knew that wasn't going anywhere,
and that it was just a lot of discussion, but members of the
Supreme Court, I remember particularly then Chief Justice
William Barker, met with the chairman of the House
Children and Family Affairs Committee, Mr. John Berry
from Memphis, and asked Representative Berry if he would
allow the Supreme Court to implement a rule rather than
the General Assembly just passing a law that basically did
away with the court's discretion to appoint a guardian ad
litem.
After that session, they allowed the Court that time.
After numerous meetings with judges and other parties, the
first Rule 40A was filed on April 1, 2008, for public
comment. That public comment period ended on June 30,
2008. On May 1, 2009, almost a year later, the first rule
went into effect." That rule was a provisional rule,
meaning it had a one-year application. On April 30, 2010,
the Supreme Court entered an order extending the effective
date of that rule until December 31, 2010. 12 Also, on
August 2, 2010, the Supreme Court entered an order
appointing the Rule 40A work group that Ms. Brackin was

"1 See In Re: Order Establishing Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 40A, Appointment of
Guardians Ad Litem in Custody Proceedings, M2009-01926-SC-RL2RL (filed Feb. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/rule_40a-order-2-17-09.pdf
(hereinafter "Order Establishing").
12In Re: Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 40A, Extension of Effective Date, M200901926-SC-RL2-RL (filed Apr. 30, 2010), availableat

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/order-extendingcomment_
period and expdate of rule40a.pdf.
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on. 13 The court set another comment deadline of November
30th, 2010. On December 15th, 2010, the work group
submitted its report. 14 On January 21st, 2011, the Supreme
Court published the work group's report for public
comment and also extended the effective date of the
provisional rule which was filed on May 1st, 2009, until
further orders of the court. 15 They also put in another
public comment period on the work group's report, which
ended on March 14th, 2011.16 We would anticipate in the
next few months that the Supreme Court will act on the
work group's report.
So that is the evolution of this provisional rule. I'd
like to turn it over to Lucie Brackin. Lucie was a member
of the Rule 40A work group, which was chaired by
Professor Janet Richards from the University of Memphis
School of Law, and I think that Lucie is going to go
through the rule and some of the changes the work group
has suggested and some of the concerns that they had with
the original rule that was filed.
LUCIE BRACKIN: Thank you, Libby. It was such an
honor to be asked to participate in the work group. I've
been in private practice in Memphis since 2002, and I have
served as a guardian ad litem and as an attorney who was
appointed a guardian ad litem, so I was quite honored to be
asked to serve along with two other private practice
attorneys and several judges and magistrates from across
Tennessee. I think the point in the makeup of the group was
to get representatives from all across the state. I know that
all of the ladies that testified at the August 27, 2007 hearing
13See In Re: Tenn. Sup. Ct. Rule 40A, M2009-01926-SC-RL2-RL

(filed Jan. 21, 2011), availableat
http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/rule_40a._finalcomment a
nd extension-order. 1.21.11 .pdf [hereinafter 40A Work Group].
1d.
151d.
161d.
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were related to Shelby County or our area, and so I know it
was important for the committee to have representatives
from Shelby County. I was on there, along with Chancellor
Arnold Goldin, from our county.
First, I want to talk about the process we used to
formulate our proposed rule. Before I did this, I had no idea
what went into something like this. One of our first
meetings was in August, and we decided that we would set
up regular conference calls monthly so that we could make
sure and stay on track to get everything done by December.
But, you know lawyers: you set your pretend deadline and
then you have your real deadline. With each conference
call, we would all put in our suggestions. We decided that
we would go through the provisional rule section by
section, make our modifications to it, and then submit that
as a proposal to the Supreme Court. There was a wonderful
lady at the courts, Mary Rose, who did a lot of the typing
up of our meetings and doing the different drafts and
circulating them around, and everyone would review them
before we had our next call. The result was the order that
we proposed to the court.
We tried to go back to our respective bars and get
feedback from our members. Particularly I had some
friends that worked within a work group within the TBA,17
and they did an excellent job with their suggestions. I was
sort of a liaison to let the committee know what they
thought should be changed. I also had individual one-onone discussions with the members of the bar about the real
problems. The majority of the feedback was that we should
have guardians ad litem limited to licensed attorneys. We
wanted all the ethical obligations that went along with
being an attorney to apply to those serving as guardians ad
litem. The other big problem was in Section 9,18 which was
the "Participation in Proceeding" section that detailed what
17Tennessee Bar Association.

1STENN. SUP. CT. R. 40A, §9.
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the guardian ad litem was supposed to do. There was a
discrepancy between what Section 9 used to say and what
other sections of the provisional rule seemed to say. I
thought I might go through the rule and explain where we
got the changes that we wanted to make. In Section 1,19 our
big change was to limit the definition of a guardian ad litem
to a licensed attorney instead of a CASA volunteer or
another professional who the court could appoint, because
that was a big change that the provisional rule made. We
also put a commentary in there that the same attorney who
was a Rule 4021 guardian ad litem could also be a 40A
guardian ad litem.
One thing that we felt in Section 222 was extremely
important was what was going to happen to ongoing cases.
At the time that the new rule would go into effect, we
wanted the court to be able to reappoint a guardian to serve
under the new rule rather than the old rule. I know that
from my bar, people are waiting to see what happens before
they appoint or seek to appoint a guardian ad litem. I have a
case right now that I have put on hold, and I'm not going to
seek a guardian ad litem appointment until the new rule
goes into effect, because I feel right now a guardian is
powerless and can't even get any information to the court
unless one of the parties calls them as a witness. One of my
good friends in Memphis right now is a guardian ad litem.
She has done an investigation and has made internal
recommendations to the attorneys. Well, neither side likes
the recommendations, so that guardian is not going to be
called. She has done this work, put in all this effort, and
can't even get her information to the judge. I think that's a
real problem.

19TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40A, §1.

20
2

Court-Appointed Special Advocate.
R. 40.

'TENN. SUP. CT.

22

TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40A, §2.
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We also wanted to change the language in Section 3
under the appointment section, in paragraph (c), to "the
court should consider" and not "shall consider., 23 Not all
of these factors are applicable to each situation, and we
wanted the court to have the discretion to consider what the
court wanted. Also, in several of the comments, we needed
that catch-all paragraph at the end: "any other factors
necessary to address the best interest of the child." You just
can't plan for everything, and we wanted to have that as a
way for the judge to consider something that you couldn't
have foreseen.
We took out paragraph (d) of Section 4,24 because if
the guardian is going to be an attorney, there are ethical
rules that have to be followed regarding any sort of conflict
of interest, and it was no longer necessary. We took that
section out, and we made (e) the new (d).25 What we really
worried about, particularly from Shelby County, is a
situation where a guardian is agreed to by both the parties
and the guardian does an investigation, puts all this work
in, interviews witnesses, and then at the end a party says
there was a conflict or comes up with all these complaints
about the guardian because they don't like the final result.
That's why we put "raised without delay" and "should be
addressed,, 26 because we've had situations where at the end
of the case, a new attorney becomes involved, and they say
there was an issue with the guardian. Well, if they didn't
raise it in the beginning, then they shouldn't be allowed to
raise it in the end-unless, of course, there is a conflict
between the new attorney and the GAL; however, this
should have been raised before or when new counsel
substituted in. So that's why we wanted that to be in there.
23

TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40A, §3(c); see also 40A Work Group, supra note
13,
App. at 2.
24
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40A, §4(d); see also 40A Work Group, supra note
13,
25

App. at 4.

See 40A Work Group, supra note 13, App. at 4.
261d.

180
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Next under Section 6, "Role of Guardian Ad
of the main complaints out of Shelby County
was that the guardians were assuming judicial roles in the
parties' situations and were arbitrating. We know now that
there cannot be any arbitration of parenting issues because
of Tuetken, 28 which I believe cert has been filed to the
United States Supreme Court on that case. Under this
proposed Rule 40A, we put under (b) that "the guardian ad
litem shall not function as a special master for the court or
29
perform any judicial or quasi-judicial responsibilities,
because there were a lot of complaints that the guardians
had too much power. Under Section 7,30 regarding access
to the child, you might have thought that it was a no-brainer
that the guardian would be able to talk to a child without a
parent being present. Well, there were parents who were
insisting on being present. We put in here under
subparagraph one that the guardian should have access to
the child "without the presence of any other person unless
otherwise ordered by the court,, 31 so that the court can be
involved if that was an issue.
Under Section 832 we wanted to include the duties
and responsibilities from Rule 40. Also, we thought the
way that Section 8 was set up was confusing and paragraph
(c) was unnecessary, so we redid the way that was
organized. Also, under new subparagraph (c) of that
section, we wanted to make it clear that there was no
33
authority for an appointment of an attorney ad litem.
Before the Andrews case 34 came down from Judge Kurtz, it
Litem, ' 27 one

27

TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40A, §6.

28

Tuetken v. Tuetken, 320 S.W.3d 262 (Tenn. 2010), cert. denied, 2011
LEXIS 3645 (U.S. May 16, 2011).
U.S.
29
See 40A Work Group, supra note 13, App. at 4.
30
TENN.SUP. CT. R. 40A, § 7.
31
40A Work Group, supra note 13, App. at 5.
32
TENN.SUP. CT. R. 40A, §8.
33
See Rule 40A Work Group, supra note 13, App. at 5-7.
34
Andrews, 2010 WL 3398826.
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was the accepted practice in Shelby County that if a
guardian ad litem was being attacked by one of the
attorneys, the guardian ad litem could have the protection
of an attorney ad litem to defend and represent them. There
was a situation where a guardian was deposed, and it was
ugly. That really is more of a civility problem than a
problem within the rule, but in response we wanted to make
it clear that there would be no authority for the appointment
of an attorney ad litem. For situations where the child's
preference was in contrast to what really was best for the
child, there had been an argument to allow in section (c) the
appointment of an attorney ad litem to represent the
preference of the child and then a guardian ad litem to
represent the best interest of the child. We felt that just
wasn't necessary, and that the guardian could outline for the
court what the preference of the child was as well as well as
advocate for the best interest of the child.
Section 935 was the other biggie. Once we decided
that we wanted to limit who could be a guardian ad litem to
an attorney and said that the guardian ad litem could take
all actions that an attorney could, we eliminated most of the
language in Section 9 and just said "all rights and privileges
accorded to an attorney." 36 But one thing that we definitely
wanted in there was for the guardian ad litem to be able to
participate in every hearing and in alternative dispute
resolution proceedings. I have found that a guardian ad
litem can be instrumental in formulating a settlement, and
nine times out of ten it is in the best interest of the children
for a settlement to be reached. That's an important part of
what a guardian ad litem should do: if a settlement could be
facilitated and that guardian is in a position to help, then
they need to and should do that. Under the commentary, we
specifically wanted to state that the guardian ad litem may
not be a witness or testify unless there are extraordinary
35

TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40A,

36

§9.

See Rule 40A Work Group, supra note 13, App. at 7.
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circumstances, and that there wouldn't be a report and
recommendation to the court. In lieu of that, the guardian
may file a pretrial brief or memorandum. There has to be a
way to get the information to the court, and so we wanted
to do that through a pretrial brief or memorandum. We
didn't want there to be any ambiguity, so we just stated
definitively in subparagraph (3)37 that the guardian would
present the results in the same manner as a lawyer presents
a case-by calling witnesses, submitting evidence, and
making arguments. That was a big change that we made
from the provisional rule.
Of course, the fees and expenses section also had to
be addressed.38 I would invite you to read those opinions
that ultimately came out in the cases of the ladies who
testified, and you will see there were a lot of problems.
Those cases were extremely unusual and extremely
39
acrimonious. If you look at the Andrews case, you can see
the fees that the guardian and the attorney ad litem had are
only a drop in the bucket compared to the fees that were
spent on the attorneys in that case. We wanted to give the
court a way to monitor fees, and we had a lot of discussion
on that issue. There was a suggestion that the guardian
should have to submit a fee request each month to the court
to get paid. I felt like that would add even more time,
because the guardian ad litem would have to file a motion
or present it, give notice, go to court and argue it every
single month, and that would just escalate fees
unnecessarily. What we decided to do was to have an initial
retainer paid. We had discussion about whether the retainer
should be paid to the court. Well, if it's paid into the court,
you've got to go to the court to get paid. So if the parties
agreed to put that in the guardian ad litem's escrow account,
after the retainer was depleted, the guardian would have to
37
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go back to the court to address getting an additional retainer
at that point. Of course, the order has to lay out the manner
of payment, the hourly rate, the dates of deposit, and also
whether periodic payments would be drawn from that
account, and the guardian has to give notice to the parties
of every withdrawal.
I was shocked to even imagine that a guardian
wouldn't submit a monthly bill. I would think that would
have been a completely regular occurrence, but surprisingly
not. In the order we've included that the guardian has to
give notice to the parties of a withdrawal, a statement of
services supported by an affidavit, and also give the parties
time to object before a withdrawal would be made. We also
wanted to make sure in paragraph (f) 40 that we added that
even if an objection is not made, at each monthly or
periodic payment withdrawal, a party could still address the
reasonableness of the guardian ad litem's fees at the end of
a case. It may be that a party doesn't realize until the end
that a guardian is doing way too much work or overbilling,
and we wanted to put in here that there could be an
objection made at the end of the case.
We had a lot of discussion about Section 12,41 about
appeals by a guardian ad litem. We talked about whether a
guardian ad litem could initiate an appeal. If a parent is not
initiating an appeal, then we didn't feel a guardian should
initiate an appeal of a court decision. We did want the
guardian to have the ability to appeal if there was a ruling
on fees or the reasonableness of fees, and we referred back
to Section 4(d) and Section 11 (h).42
After we submitted our rule, the court made
relatively minor suggestions, and one of them was to leave
the effective date blank for the court to fill in. That's what
went into the committee's suggestions to improve 40A.
40
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Now, Jennifer, if you would like to talk about some of the
problems that you had operating under this rule, I think that
might be a little more interesting.
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: Thank you all for being
here. My name is Jennifer Evans Williams. I'm a certified
child welfare law specialist here in Tennessee. I practice
mainly in the upper middle counties of Tennessee:
Davidson, Cheatham, Montgomery, and Robertson. I
started as a DCS 4 3 attorney under Ms. Mary Walker, who is
one of our panelists later, and in the last eight years I've
been in private practice primarily doing guardian ad litem
work. One of the first things they asked me in law school
was, "What do you want to do?" and I wanted to protect
abused and neglected children. That's what I've done with
my career, and that's what I intend to continue to do:
represent children. I do adoptions, I do some post-divorce
custody work and child support, but mainly I do guardian
ad litem work. So when the provisional rule first came out,
I got a little hot under the collar about the changes that
were drastically different in the practice as a guardian ad
litem versus Rule 40A.
What I see in listening to the presentation here
about Rule 40A's history and how we got here is that the
mistakes of a few have almost ruined the work of many.
That was my opinion when I first got 40A. I was very
upset. I was so upset that I made two comments. The first
one was, "Please don't do this. Guardians ad litem who
practice in juvenile court need the same standards that we
have when we're going to practice in divorce court, so
please don't do this." I wrote a brief, one page letter. Then,
when I got the provisional rule with all the changes, I wrote
a long letter that was very passionate and professional
about how I felt that I could not protect children under Rule
40A, and that it would keep me from doing my job. In fact,
43Tennessee
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I met with my judges and said, "Don't give me any more of
these cases, because I can't protect children if you're going
to tie my hands as a lawyer and make me just an advocate
and not a lawyer."
That didn't work. They kept giving me cases,
because there were children that were in need of guardians
ad litem with experience, who know this kind of law, and
know what they're doing. If you're working as a guardian
ad litem, it's because you care about children. You don't do
this work to make a lot of money. You use other cases to
supplement your income, and you do this work because you
love children. Should you be compensated? Yes, you
should. But making sure that the child's interests are taken
care of is the reason why you're here.
I'm going to go through both my concerns with the
current provisional rule and some of the things I actually
like about it, as well as what I think about the working
group's provision, which is not yet law. The provisional
rule is still in effect until the Supreme Court considers
adopting the working rule, which is a really great idea and
is really going to fix a lot of the issues. When I'm done
here, we'd like an open discussion from you all.
I'll start with a positive note about the current
provisional rule's Section 3, where it indicates that the
judges shall appoint guardians ad litem "sparingly.",44 That
sounds a little odd, but the reason why I think that's
appropriate is there aren't enough of us who do this work.
If every single divorce required a guardian ad litem, there is
no way that we could get the work done. Those of us that
do this know that it's great work, but not every lawyer acts
as a guardian ad litem. So limiting the scope of which cases
would take guardians ad litem relieved me, because I'm one
of the few guardians in my counties and I can't do them all,
and "sparingly" limits it to the cases that are more severe.
The judges in my region often say, "Children can survive
44TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40A, §3(b).

21

7.2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 187
divorce, but they cannot survive the conflicts of divorce." I
think that's one of the biggest reasons why judges appoint
guardians ad litem in these cases: when there's extreme
conflict, extreme violence, drugs: what they call the really
hot button issues. One of the judges tells me that I'm his
guardian ad litem in a lot of his cases because I "speak the
language." I used to be a DCS attorney, and I know what
risk of harm is and what threats to children are. Judges like
people that have had those kinds of experiences and are
willing to use that experience to protect children. So that
limitation was one of the things I liked about the rule.
One of the other things I liked was in both Sections
445 and 846 where the rule specified the tasks of a guardian
ad litem and the expectations of the court and the litigants
for the guardian ad litem. When I'm appointed on a case, a
parent will meet with me in my office, and I'll ask, "Do you
know why you're here, and do you know why I am
appointed on your case?" They say, "No. Why do I have to
pay money to the court for you when I've got a lawyer?" I
explain to them that I'm not their lawyer, I'm not the other
side's lawyer, but that I'm there for their child, and it is my
job to make sure that their child is protected. Sections 4 and
8 of the order are really clear in explaining our role to the
lawyers and the court, so they know that we can't do
everything and what our tasks and our rules are. I like that
section.
Section 5 talks about the duration of our
appointment, which is fine because it tells us that when the
case is over, our role is over.4 7 Here is a practical tip from
me: I want an order of withdrawal. We all should know that
when the litigation is over, we're done. But the parents may
not know that, and the children may not understand that.
When I'm relieved, that doesn't mean I'm going to stop
45
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talking to that child. I tell all the children who I represent
that in the event there are questions or problems a year or
so down the road and they need to call me, they can call
me. I tell them I'm not their lawyer in court and I may not
file the actions that need to be filed for them, but I'm here if
they have questions or concerns. But I want an order saying
that I don't have a legal and ethical responsibility to
continue to visit that child and check on that child.
I think Section 1148 addressing our fees is
reasonable. The reason I think it's reasonable is because it's
in line with the regulations for what those of us who take
guardian ad litem appointments in juvenile court are paid.
Is it enough? No, it's not. Are there limits, and are we going
to go over our caps? Yes, we are. But the reason why you
do this work is because you love children, not for the
money. It should be the same in Rule 40A: there need to be
limits and set parameters so that cases like those in Shelby
County don't mess this up for the rest of us.
The things that I like about Rule 40A are brief,
because I have more concerns with the provisional rule.
One of the problems that I had with the provisional rule is
Section 1, which Lucie has addressed, and how it originally
applied to non-lawyers. 49 This provisional rule applied to
you CASA advocates too, and you're not lawyers. You've
had a lot of experience and probably know the things a
lawyer is supposed to do, but this rule applied to you too.
This rule made a big open door for just about anybody that
the court or lawyers felt would be appropriate to be
appointed as a child advocate, and I was concerned that it
applied to more than just lawyers.
Under Section 8, the provisional rules originally
said a guardian ad litem is not a party to the suit. 50 How are
we not a party to the suit if we are the advocate for the
48
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child? It makes no sense to me. Everyone knows that when
there's the sequestration of witnesses, if you're not a party,
you're out in the hallway. So you, the guardian, are going to
sit there all day while witnesses are being called to testify
about what's going on in the child's life that you are there to
protect, and you can't hear what's going on. Could you have
interviewed that person? Yes, and you should have, if you
knew about that person. But how many of us know when
you interview a person, what they tell you then is the exact
same thing they're going to say when they get to court
under oath? I think a lot of us know that that doesn't
happen. So that concerned me, even though it hasn't
happened to me yet, honestly. I've been called as a witness
under this provisional rule, and I have not been sequestered
by the rules. My judges have determined I wasn't going to
be under the rule of sequestration. Even though I may not
be considered a party under the provisional rule, they
wanted me in the courtroom and wanted me hearing what's
going on with my child. Thankfully, the judges allowed me
stay in, because it's been eye opening to see some of the
witnesses in court.
I think the biggest problem under the provisional
rule is Section 9,51 and the working rule really resolved my
concerns. 52 I don't see how as a guardian ad litem you can
be an advocate for your child if you are not allowed to act
as a lawyer. We all went to law school, or are going to law
school, for our law degrees, and we should be allowed to
use them. Why are we going to be appointed for children if
we're not going to be able to use that law license to protect
them? If you are not allowed to act as a lawyer, you're not
allowed to file motions, you're not allowed to file
pleadings, you're not allowed to call witnesses, and you're
not allowed to introduce exhibits. There is no way that you
can protect the child that you're appointed to represent if
51

TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40A, §9.

52See

40A Work Group, supra note 13, App. at 7-9.

24

7.2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 190
you're not able to act as a lawyer as your law license allows
you.

I have several children that I represent. When I first
got the cases, I sent a letter of appointment to the lawyers
explaining my role, asking for permission to meet with
their client, and requesting information about what's going
on in the case. I included a restraining order that says "we
are restrained and enjoined from speaking to the child
about the litigation, about custody, about visitation, and
about the guardian ad litem's role." Let's keep the child out
of the middle of this, because as I stated earlier, the
adjustment of divorce is hard on children, but it's the
conflict that's the main issue. So I wanted a restraining
order that said everyone was going to use common sense
and keep the child out of the middle of this high conflict
situation. Nine times out of ten, they would all sign it. If
Mom is going to sign it, Dad's going to sign it, or if Dad's
going to sign it, Mom's going to sign it, because they both
want to look good to the judge and this guardian ad litem
by saying they're putting their child's interest first. There
are quite a few cases I had that the parents actually wanted
that, but sometimes you have these cases where they just
want to get the leg up on each other. So I would have those
restraining orders signed. Then if I ever went to visit the
child and the child told me about how badly Mom is
bashing Daddy, or Dad is bashing Mom, or Stepmom is
saying this, I would do a motion for contempt or a show
cause order to say, "Judge, they're putting this child in the
middle, and preventing this is exactly the reason why you
appointed me."
Well, under the provisional rule, I can't do that. I
can't file pleadings. I can't file motions. I can't do show
cause orders. I can't protect my client from the actions of
these parents. It reduces me to sending a strongly-worded
letter to their lawyers asking them to please make them
stop. But for parties that are already acting unreasonably,
what good is a letter going to do? When parties are not
190
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listening already and are already not doing what they're
supposed to, my letters are going to be in vain. Is it going
to document that I'm doing my job? Sure. But is that
protecting my child? No. All that will happen is the parent
will get that letter from their lawyer and then go to the child
and say, "Why are you telling this guardian ad litem what I
said? You need to keep your mouth shut." That's going to
make it harder on that child. That part of the provisional
rule prevented me from protecting children, so that was one
of my main issues.
Another issue that affects practitioners who
represent litigants as well is 9(c) of the old rule. 53 It said a
guardian ad litem may communicate with a party who is
represented by an attorney unless the party's attorney has
notified the guardian ad litem in writing that such
communication should not occur outside the attorney's
presence. What have we learned in law school 101? If a
party is represented, you don't speak to them without the
permission of their lawyer. To me, it is a direct violation of
ethical considerations to go talk to that mom and that dad
without telling the lawyer who represents them. As a
litigant's attorney, that's very concerning. If I was
representing someone, I wouldn't want a guardian ad litem
talking to my client. A lot of us know that clients
sometimes are their own worst witnesses, and they need to
be protected from themselves from saying things that are
not appropriate. They may have the best of intentions, but it
comes out wrong and hurts their case. That was a big
concern for litigants. As a practical matter, I still get
permission from the litigant's attorney to go speak with the
client or offer to have them present while I speak with and
interview the client. To me, that's just what is ethical: you
don't talk to another person's client without permission.
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The biggest problem with the provisional rule is the
(f) subsection about calling us as a witness.5 4 Major
problem. How can we protect our children if we are the
witness and not the lawyer? In fact, it hurts really the
litigants, because I've been called already four times over
the last year as a witness in cases that I represent, and what
the judges are saying is: "You enter at your own risk,
because I'm going to let her say whatever she wants to
when she gets on this stand." So I get to talk like an expert:
get in hearsay, give my opinion, and say whatever I want to
say, and then I'm cross-examined. It's been a bit odd. For
those of you who have not been called as a witness, it's a
lot more fun to be at the podium than it is to be in the
witness seat.
LUCIE BRACKIN: I agree.
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: I don't really care for the
witness seat, but at the same time, I do what I need to do to
take care of the children. It's worked out just fine, but I'm
just not able to call the witnesses that I need to call,
because I'm just saying what someone else has told me.
When I first met with the judge to tell him I didn't want to
take these cases under the provisional rule, I asked him,
"How is it going to work if I'm a witness? I don't have any
firsthand knowledge. I'm not living in these people's home.
I'm interviewing kids, interviewing witnesses, and talking
to school professionals." He said, "I'm going to treat you
like an expert, and let you testify about anything that you
relied upon to make your opinion." I don't know how many
litigants' attorneys are going to like that continuing,
because it really hurts their cases as much as it hurts ours.
Those were my main concerns with regards to the
provisional rule. One of the things that I think is good in
the working group's provision is that it is lawyers only
54TENN. SUP. CT.
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under Section 1.55 If you're a guardian ad litem in a
dependency and neglect case in juvenile court, and there's
some kind of action that goes to circuit court, juvenile court
by authority transfers that under 37-1-103,56 and you can be
the guardian ad litem in whatever new action is going on.
That consistency is important for a child, because the child
doesn't understand who guardians ad litem are and why
you're here now but not here later.
Lucie went over access to children under Section
757 well, but I just wanted to briefly mention that it's very
important. You would be surprised if you haven't done this
work how difficult it is to get access to the child that you
represent, and I've had to put in orders to see the child. The
schools are protective, as they should be, but when I get
there they say they'll have to call the parent and get
permission. That really defeats the purpose of me coming
to the school to talk to the child alone, because I want to
make sure the parent is not telling the child what to say to
me. So the addition by the work group of "without the
presence of any other person ' ' 58 is extremely important.
Now, if it is passed where we are lawyers and are not called
as witnesses, I like to get a social worker or guidance
counselor in there with me, so that they can be my witness.
Then, I call them to the stand and ask what the child said
when we met, instead of me having to give that
information. It's very important to have the second part of
the provisional rule there that talks about our discovery. It's
hard sometimes for schools to release records without
permission from the parents, and I'm glad they're
overprotective, but a lot of times if they've not worked with
guardians ad litem before, schools don't realize what your
authority is and what your role is.
55
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LUCIE BRACKIN: One thing that we did as part of the
committee was put together a Rule 40A discovery order
that I think would help in addressing that as well, Jennifer.
It's very short: fabulously, a bunch of lawyers and judges
were able to put together an order that's a paragraph long. It
just says, "For the purpose of preparing for the adjudication
and disposition of matters pending before the court, the
children's guardian ad litem,

, shall have

access to all documents and records pertaining to the
children, including but not limited to all records of the
Department of Children's Services and any other medical,
educational and/or psychological records. The guardian ad
litem is further authorized to interview any individuals
having contact with or providing services to the child, work
products of the Office of the District Attorney and counsel
for the Tennessee Department of Children's Services, the
open criminal investigative files of the police department,
and the identity of persons making reports/complaints to
the Tennessee Department of Children's Services are
excluded from this order for discovery." Then we have a
way to modify it and tailor it to your situation. That order
was something that we were going to suggest for people to
use to have that access to the information that needs to be
in an order.
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: I think it's essential. In
juvenile court, we've got rules to give us discovery, and
we're allowed to get the records. We should have the same
liberties and abilities in chancery and circuit courts when
we're doing this litigation, because we've got to have access
to these records to be able to fully advocate for the
children. My strongest reason for praying and praying that
the Supreme Court will adopt the working group's rule is
that it makes us lawyers again. I think Rule 40A's first
provisional rule took that away from us. And how it is that
we can protect children if we're not lawyers, I have no idea.
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That's what we need to do if we're going to represent
children. CASA is an awesome organization. I've been on
the board of directors and I'm the current trainer in
Robertson County, and they do a great job as non-lawyers.
That's one thing I commented: if you're going to
keep this rule as is, then apply it to them. Take the funding
that you're going to pay guardians ad litem and put it in
their not-for-profit organization so they can recruit more
volunteers to be advocates and witnesses for children. But
if you're going to regulate guardians ad litem in postdivorce litigation, let us do our jobs and let us be lawyers.
So that's what my practical experience has been on
the front line, working under the provisional rule in cases
where that's made it difficult or impossible for me to
protect children. Now we'll just open this up to questions.
ROBERT ROGERS: My name is Robert Rogers. I practice
here in Knoxville. I mostly practice in juvenile court here
in Knox County. It appears there's been a lot of labor and
effort put in to crafting Rule 40A and working on these
provisions, but all the while there was Rule 40 that appears
to work very well every day in juvenile courts across
Tennessee, and it does a very good job of outlining the
duties and responsibilities of GALs. I'm wondering, why all
this effort to create this hybrid of a social worker and an
attorney in Rule 40A, and why didn't they just expand the
scope of Rule 40 to include these cases?
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: I've had the same
thoughts, so I'll have to let one of you ladies see if you can
help with that.
ELIZABETH (LIBBY) SYKES: My memory is a lot of the
discussion centered on the difference of the child in the
Rule 40A. In Rule 40, you have an allegation of
dependency and neglect, and in a lot of those instances you
do have a guardian appointed for that child. The difference
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between that and the divorce case is that you just don't have
that allegation of abuse and neglect in a divorce case.
LUCIE BRACKIN: Also, I'll give the non-politicallycorrect answer: the legislature was about to do something
and the court did not want the legislature coming up with
their own rule, because Lord knows what ruckus would
have resulted from that. Basically, it's because the court
wanted to preempt the legislature in doing anything.
ELIZABETH (LIBBY) SYKES: That's true. I think that
what the General Assembly was going to do might be a
couple lines prohibiting the appointment of the guardians in
cases where there are not the allegations of abuse and
neglect. The court wanted to be the one to go through that
rule-making process, because once you put something in
statute, you can only change it once a year. A Supreme
Court rule can be changed more often.
DANIELLE GREER: Hi. My name is Danielle Greer, and
I'm a 3L here at the University of Tennessee and a member
of the Journal. I'd like to know how deposing a GAL
would work, and in what situations that would occur? I
would think that would be very problematic.
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: I believe it would too,
but the current provisional rule allows for that. If you're
going to be called as a witness, you're going to be almost
treated like an expert by some judges, and they're going to
depose you like they're going to depose everyone else for
discovery. In some cases I've had some colleagues who
have been served interrogatories to answer. To protect the
confidentiality of my client but still comply with rules of
discovery and the court order creates a lot more problems. I
think the current provisional rule opens you up to discovery
requests such as that, and I think that's going to make it
more time-consuming and run up fees even more. Now, if
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the working group rule is passed, I don't think that it would
allow that. I think it will treat us much more like guardians
ad litem in juvenile cases, as we should be.
LUCIE BRACKIN: Have you been deposed, Jennifer?
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: No, not yet.
LUCIE BRACKIN: I haven't either.
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: I've been called as a
witness and I've had a colleague get served interrogatories,
but I haven't been deposed. They usually will call me and
depose me over the phone but not a formal deposition.
COLLEEN STEELE: Hello. Colleen Steele of the
Knoxville Bar and also a GAL, and I am in adversarial post
divorce, so I'm in both sets of courts. Has there been any
anecdotal evidence of how each individual court system is
responding to the provisional Rule 40A? I've not found any
consistency even from one judge to another. So invoking
the rule at this point is kind of like saying, "Well, hello,
come down my little rabbit hole," because they don't
believe in it.
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: Right. I've had some
judges tell me "I'm going to run the courtroom the way I
feel that it needs to be run, and I'm going to do what I feel
like I need to do until an appeals court tells me that I can't
do things this way." I think we know a lot of judges that
have handled it that way. The judges that I've practiced in
front of have tried to stick by the provisional rule in saying
that the parties can call me as a witness, but they've also
said they can leave me in the courtroom to act as a lawyer
for the client, leaving it to the litigants to agree as to what
the role of guardian ad litem is in some of those cases I've
done. Obviously, you should be following the provisional
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rule, because that's what the rule is, but until someone
appeals it, that decision is going to be final. But I've not
seen consistency. I don't know if you have, Lucie, as far as
how judges handle them.
LUCIE BRACKIN: I can think of only one case in Shelby
County where a guardian has been appointed since this
provisional rule went into effect, but I'm sure there are
more out there. I am the chair of the family law section, and
I like to know what's going on in the courtroom. Judge
Robert Childers, one of our circuit court judges,
commented that if the Supreme Court's intent in adopting
Rule 40A was to keep judges from appointing guardians ad
litem to assist courts in making the difficult decisions
involving the best interest of minor children, then the court
has succeeded. He's written a more detailed letter to the
chair of our committee and said that he stopped appointing
guardians ad litem. So in Shelby County, we're just not
appointing guardians ad litem.
ELIZABETH (LIBBY) SYKES: I'd like to add though that
after this hearing we did a search across the state, and what
we noticed is that you had pockets where guardians were
appointed regularly in divorce or post-divorce situations,
and then you had cases like Davidson County, where they
never appointed a guardian ad litem. So, even in Shelby
County where that it was a little bit more common, it was
really on a small percentage of the more high-conflict
cases. The practices across the state were very different. So,
Lucie, you say that guardians ad litem haven't been
appointed in Shelby County since then. What has been the
impact on the children?
LUCIE BRACKIN: From what I've seen, I think it's
leading to longer, more protracted trials. The guardians ad
litem in my experience were extremely helpful in letting
attorneys know the problems in the case on each side, and
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saying, "You guys need to knock heads together and make
these people settle this case, because this is going to come
out about your client and this is going to come out about
your client." So it was also an extremely effective
settlement tool. Guardians ad litem are being appointed in
Shelby County, but I just don't know of people that have
been used, other than my friend who is not going to be
called because neither side wants to call the guardian ad
litem. That's the only story really that I've heard in the last
year about that.
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: I have the same thing in
Montgomery County and in Robertson County, the district
that I'm mainly appointed in as a guardian ad litem. They're
continuing to appoint me even though I (inaudible) after
Rule 40, they're continuing to do that, because it is a very
effective settlement tool. They tell the litigants when they
appoint me as guardian ad litem, "You better listen to what
this guardian ad litem has to say because I know you got
one side but I know she's got the child's side and I'm going
to listen really strongly to what she has to say." Now, 50
percent of the time judges do what I recommend, and 50
percent of the time they don't, because sometimes I'm an
overprotective mother bear to the kids that I represent and
the judges want to be a little bit fairer to the parties. But the
parties take what guardians ad litem say seriously at the
appointment. So when I get through doing my
investigation, I usually do a letter and/or a phone call to the
lawyers and say, "This is what I think you need to do, this
is what I think is best for the children," and they usually
convince their clients to do that in a lot of cases and settle.
And that is the reason why the chancery and circuit court
judges there continue to appoint me, because it takes a lot
of trial time off their docket and reduces litigation because
I'm going to be influential to the judge at the time he makes
59 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40.
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a decision. Though, like I said, some of the time he does
what I ask, and some of the time he doesn't, depending on
what's needed to be done.
Another issue that I would file when I was
appointed guardian ad litem was a motion for random drug
screens. There are a lot of cases you get those allegations.
How are they going to get done? You file a motion. Well, a
provisional rule doesn't let me file motions. So I write a
letter saying, "Please do drug screens." How effective is
that? Well, someone is not going to say, "Oh, sure, I'll do
one. I smoked pot last week, but sure, guardian ad litem,
because you asked me to." So I can't file those kinds of
things under the provisional rule. Under the working group
rule, I'll be able to do that to protect children when I feel
like it's necessary.
AMY WILLIAMS: My name is Amy Williams. I'm a 1L
here, but I worked with the CASA program for several
years before I came to law school. And I was just
wondering, with the guardians at litem, GALs, in juvenile
court there's a fund for that and the families aren't paying
for it. Have you encountered cases where there are parties
who are going through a divorce where there needs to be a
GAL appointed to that child but the parties can't afford to
pay for it? Is there any kind of provision for that in the
works?
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: No. What the judges say
is, "If you can afford to hire a lawyer to fight this divorce,
you can afford to pay for the child's lawyer, and you're
going to do it," and that's what they do. And typically my
judges will make each party put $750 down, which is a
$1,500 retainer, and they ask when I get close to running
out of that if I would notify the court for additional funds.
But if you manage the case right and do what you're
supposed to do in a relatively quick time frame, you can
usually get it done close to that or slightly more. It depends
200
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on how litigious the parties are going to be and the extent
of the litigation, if it's going to continue to escalate some of
those fees. Sometimes I've had cases where there's a pro se
litigant and you've got one person that's filed for divorce
and the other side can't. The judge can make that pro se
litigant pay the entire guardian ad litem fee up front, and at
the end of trial the judge can possibly give a judgment
against the other pro se litigant for reimbursement, kind of
like a marital debt asset or something of that nature, and
they'll allocate that. Sometimes at the end of the divorce a
judge will split 50/50 on the GAL fee, sometimes a judge
will say 100 percent on one side, 75/25; whatever the judge
feels is appropriate.
One of the things I like that my judges are doing in
my county is giving a joint and several liability judgment
against both parties, so, that way, if I've got one party who's
got money and the other one does not, at least I can
hopefully get paid most, or a portion of, the fee that I've
expended and let them go after the other party later. Often I
incur more debt than I do collection on those fees, but like I
said at the beginning, it's not the money that you do this
work for; it just has to help supplement your income.
JACKIE KITTRELL: My name is Jackie Kittrell and I'm
wondering about the statement of the guardian ad litem as a
settlement tool. How do the guardians in 40A cases work
in mediation? Do they attend mediation? Is mediation even
in play at that time?
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: Mediation is required
before there can be a contested litigation. And I attend
mediation if the lawyers attend mediation. I take that rule.
Because everybody knows when lawyers are at mediation,
it kind of hypes everybody up and they're all bullied up,
and if we're not bullied up, then parties might be more open
60
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to resolve disputes. So I attend it if the lawyers attend it. If
the lawyers don't attend it, I don't. I demand that the
lawyers consult with my schedule so that I can be there if
they're going to be there, because often I'm going room to
room helping the mediator settle the case, and I've settled
some cases that way. Have either of you had experience
with that?
LUCIE BRACKIN: I've not actually attended a mediation.
I make sure to do a report before mediation so that the
lawyers can have it at mediation, and that's a very effective
way to do it. But in mediations, you're sitting there all day,
maybe a half a day, and there's a lot of down time. So, to
me, it doesn't make a lot of sense to be there at the
mediation. I've been on call when I've known that a case
was mediating, and I will inform the lawyers to call my cell
phone, and that I'll interrupt whatever I'm doing. I'll talk, or
I'll come down there if they want me to. But, I think just
sitting there with them is maybe not the best use of time.
But I do know GALs who have sat there through a
mediation, like in an extremely contested case where their
presence would be helpful. So it just depends.
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: I've done both.
Sometimes I've gone; sometimes I haven't, because I've
been on call. Sometimes I've sent a letter ahead of time
saying, "This is what I think is going on in this case." Like
Lucie said, it depends on the kind of case.
LINDA SHOWN: I'm Linda Shown. I practice in Blount
County in juvenile, chancery, and circuit court. I believe
that we really are on the right track here by revising this
rule because the other rule just gutted the effective
representation for the child. But I think we should also
consider a name change because we're really not guardians
ad litem, we're more to the effect of attorneys ad litem, and
I think that that would make it clearer and reduce the
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confusion of what our role is. How can it be possibly be
that we would be sent out into the other room or the witness
room when we're supposed to be there acting as an
attorney? So it seems to me that we should rename
ourselves.
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: I agree to a point. What I
have found goes to the part where the working group
actually has addressed what you've just said, where they
pretty much bifurcated the role of the guardian ad litem. It's
under Section 8(c). 61 Because the way I take those terms,
and this may be old school from what I learned, an attorney
ad litem can be appointed in juvenile court as well as in a
dependency and neglect proceeding strictly for the
preference of the child. It doesn't matter what you want, it's
strictly what the child wants that you've got to push for,
whereas a guardian ad litem in juvenile court uses best
interest strictly. And often as guardian ad litem you can do
both, unless it becomes so divergent that you can't do both
and you have to ask for an attorney ad litem under Rule
4062 to be appointed for that child in juvenile court. So the
only thing that concerns me about the term is that's what
we're doing, because we are attorneys for the children, but
we're called the guardian ad litem, although we should be
doing both. Under the provisional rule as under this
working group rule, we're going to be the guardian ad litem
and the attorney ad litem because we've got to put on two
hats. 63 We've got to make sure that the best interest of the
child is fully advocated for, but at the same time we've got
to make sure that that child's preferences are expressly
given to the court. I feel most of the time I can do that by
making sure the right witnesses are called and making sure
the court knows the child's preference when it's an age
61TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40A, §8(c).
62 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40.
63 TENN. SUP. CT.

R. 40A, §9, cmt. (2).

38

7.2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 204
appropriate circumstance. I also advocate for best interest
as well. This doesn't contemplate getting an attorney ad
litem to come in only for a child's preference, and I don't
know if other extreme situations will allow that or not. But
I can see your point.
DANIELLE GREER: As you can see, I'm very interested
in this topic. It's Danielle Greer once again. And I know
one of the main criticisms of the prior rule and using it in
divorce cases was that the GAL was a lot of times acting as
the judge and judges saw that as a problem. I don't
necessarily agree. I see the argument. I could make the
argument if I was on that side of the opinion. How do you
think the changes that your group has proposed alleviate
that concern? I'll ask the rest of you whether you think that
that is a real concern or not. Because my opinion is that it's
truth-seeking, and that may be the common thread, but it's
something that we need in these cases. It's the only reason
why GALs are necessary in these types of cases anyway,
and to eradicate that thread of it would be to render you
pointless.
LUCIE BRACKIN: Well, in the proposed rule we say
specifically that the guardian ad litem cannot have a
judicial or quasi-judicial role and cannot be a special
master, so that specifies that a guardian cannot make
decisions over the situation at hand. But, you know you are
being a truth seeker, because oftentimes you have a
guardian appointed because one party's saying this and
another party's saying that and the attorneys are saying,
"We don't know who's telling the truth so let's get a
guardian to investigate and tell us what is the truth here."
The next step is that if you have a truth-seeker, there's got
to be a fact-finder. So the guardian is sort of a fact-finder,
which is the judicial role, and that's a difficult problem to
64
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have. But you've got to have someone impartial to step in
and say, "I've talked to this neighbor, I've talked to this
teacher, I've talked to this doctor, and this is really what's
going on here." And usually it's sort of a blend of what both
parents are saying that I've seen and that I've found. So, I
hope that helps.
65
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: Did the original case
deal with the judge just rubber stamping some of the
guardian ad litem's recommendations?

LUCIE BRACKIN: That was a big complaint. The issue
was that the judge would say, "Oh, we have a guardian ad
litem report," and the parties perceived that they were just
rubber stamping it and saying, "We're going to go with
this."
ELIZABETH (LIBBY) SYKES: That was the perception.
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: Okay.
ELIZABETH (LIBBY) SYKES: I don't know that that was
reality.
LUCIE BRACKIN: It was the perception.
ELIZABETH
perception.

(LIBBY)

SYKES:

But that

was

the

LUCIE BRACKIN: The attorney still had the opportunity
to put on their case. They could still call their witnesses,
but we do have some judges in Shelby County who won't
let you put on your case, so there was a complaint made for
a reason.
65

Andrews, 2010 WL 3398826.
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JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: In my jurisdictions I've
heard that that's the perception, but actually, with my
judges, like I said earlier, fifty percent of the time they do
what I recommend, or a quasi-part of what I recommend,
and fifty percent of the time they don't, which really shows
the impartiality of the guardian ad litem. I'm not the
magistrate; I'm not the one making the decision. I'm just
there as an advocate for the child and my opinion of what's
best and the judge's opinion sometimes coincide and
sometimes they do not. I listen to the judges and think,
"Wow! That makes sense. Why didn't I think of that before
I told you what I was going to say?"
RENEE DELAPP: Thanks. My name is Renee DeLapp and
I work as a therapist here in town and I also have a law
degree, so I come at it from a couple of directions. And I
just want to comment that one of the things that I've really
appreciated about the guardians ad litem that have been
involved with children I've been involved with - I used to
work as a school-based therapist - has been the problemsolving that's possible before all the damage is done,
because these cases can go on for years, as we all know.
And what I've really noticed too is as we defund DCS and
some of the other social agencies that could have had a
role, the gap is getting huge. So the presence of somebody
who actually is the child's advocate, who can fill in for a
therapist like me, where my ability and my professional
role, my ethics, have to stop, there needs to be that next
step that can happen. So I really appreciate what you do.
ELIZABETH (LIBBY) SYKES: Our office administers the
indigent defense fund and the guardian ad litem fund. So if
you have attorneys here in the office who haven't been
paid, it's probably my fault.
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: You better exit fast right
now.
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ELIZABETH (LIBBY) SYKES: But, anyway, I would
encourage you by saying that in the next couple of months
we're introducing a system we're calling ICE, it's Indigent
Claims Entry, it's an electronic interface for the submission
of these claims. And so this is my plug for that. Guardians
ad litem are being paid within three to four days as opposed
to twelve weeks.
LUCIE BRACKIN: Yeah.
ELIZABETH (LIBBY) SYKES: So anybody who is still
continuing to send in paper, I've really decided they must
not want to be paid at this point.
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: We have the ICE system
in Robertson and Davidson counties now and it's
wonderful.
ELIZABETH (LIBBY) SYKES: It's wonderful.
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: It's computerized.
You've got to put it all in the system, but that payment
comes by automatic draft. It's working really well.
ELIZABETH (LIBBY) SYKES: It may be the greatest
thing we've ever done.
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: Really.
ELIZABETH (LIBBY) SYKES: But I would like to add
that when our office took over the guardian ad litem fund
for dependency and neglect, and we took it from the
Department of Children's Services in mid-2000 or so, we
were given $800,000. This year, we'll spend six million
dollars from that fund. Last year we spent a total of thirtysix million dollars statewide for our guardian ad litem and
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indigent defense funds. And almost ten million dollars of
that money is used for what I now call child welfare cases
as opposed to the attorney that is representing a person in a
criminal case. I think a lot of those things are more of a
social work-type role than the role of an attorney, but what
I'm often told is that because of the cuts in the staff at
Department of Children's Services, there's not people
actually there to do it, so that guardian ad litem in those
dependency and neglect cases actually does have to take on
that role that you would otherwise think the Department of
Children's Services would do. But that's not a criticism with
the Department, we've taken our own cuts, but it's a reality
that it's moved our fund from $800,000 to $6,000,000.
JACKIE KITTRELL: I had one more question for Lucie
Brackin that participated in the work group.
LUCIE BRACKIN: Yes.
JACKIE KITTRELL: Could you talk more about the
reasoning behind Section 12 that prohibits GALs from
initiating appeals?66
LUCIE BRACKIN: Yes.
JACKIE KITTRELL: I have a problem with that because I
figure if I'm going to be the child's attorney that means I
need to be able to access every legal avenue that's available
to me, and that might be filing an appeal if necessary. It
seems like that would unnecessarily handicap the child's
attorney, the GAL. I don't know if there's been a rash of
GAL-initiated appeals in the state.
LUCIE BRACKIN: Well, the reality of it is that of course
there's not, because who's going to pay for that? The
66
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rationale for that is that if either parent does not make the
choice to appeal the decision, then the working group didn't
want to give the authority to the guardian ad litem, because
the parents' rights are paramount in their divorce. We just
didn't want to give the guardian that power.
JACKIE KITTRELL: Isn't that a bit difficult to square with
advocating for the best interest of the child? I mean, you
can have cases where the parents are possibly colluding one
or more issues and the trial court goes along with it. I mean,
does it LUCIE BRACKIN: Well, in such a hotly-contested divorce
situation or post-decree modification, those parents really
aren't colluding about much of anything because they can't
say that the sun sets or the sun rises.
JACKIE KITTRELL: Right.
LUCIE BRACKIN: And so that's not a real possibility.
And we did have a lot of discussion at the end of our
committee meetings about this and just decided that if we
included the authority of a GAL to appeal we would
obligate the parents to pay for the guardian to appeal the
decision and we just couldn't put that burden on them.
ELIZABETH MCDONALD: Could I follow up on that?
LUCIE BRACKIN: Sure.
ELIZABETH MCDONALD: I don't know that I need that
but you know, if you're the guardian ad litem and you
would be interested in appealing, a lot of times that's
because the parent who may not have much money is the
one appealing, and the one who had the money and the
hotshot lawyer won - and from a guardian ad litem's
perspective that was not the right decision. The wealthier
209
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party was able to put more of their case on because they
had more money for the experts and the discovery and the
private investigators, but little mom or dad who didn't have
that much money was the best place for the child, although
they didn't have the money to really litigate with as much
intensity, as the other side. I mean, that's been my
experience. The one with the money is the one who's going
to win, unless the other one is just so grossly off the chart.
So it sort of seems to me that - I agree with what you're
saying - you give the guardian ad litem for the party with
less resources just enough to make a little sting but not
enough to do enough to help the child.
LUCIE BRACKIN: I think you have definitely hit on a
concern in this proposed rule.
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: I've run into that as
guardian ad litem on occasion. And to file an appeal is not
that expensive with a cost bond. Even the parent that
doesn't have that much, all they've got to do is file the
appeal and you, as guardian ad litem, are still appointed,
and so you then go in and advocate on that appeal for what
position you're going to advocate. Whether or not you're
going to get paid is a different matter, but you're obviously
going to do what you need to do for the child in doing that.
I've also had people say they wanted to call me when I
wasn't even on the case to be a guardian ad litem for a
child. Well, you can't hire a guardian ad litem, that's courtappointed. Now, you can go hire an attorney ad litem for
that child's preference if there are some issues that are
going on where that could be done.
ELIZABETH MCDONALD: In a divorce proceeding?
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: You can try to hire an
attorney for the child. Whether or not you're going to have
standing or not, I don't know.
210
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ELIZABETH MCDONALD: In a parentage action I was
involved in the other side didn't like my position as the
guardian ad litem, so they wanted to demand an attorney ad
litem. The judge said there was no provision for that.
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: There's not. All I know
is it would be a case of first impression, if someone were to
file it.
JAMES CARNEY: I'm James Carney. I'm a family
mediator. I'd like to follow up on the discussion around
Judy Kittrell's question. I do a lot of cases that involve high
conflict and about one-third of those have guardians
appointed, and I find often that the guardian serves a very
valid role in the mediation because they can offer resources
or help resolve some of the allegations that often fly about,
about a parent being terrible, and they can help work
through solutions to improve the trust, and resolve those
questions and get down to the needs of the child, and that
often is what is the key to getting the resolution.
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: Thank you. That helps.
And I think for everybody that does guardian ad litem
work, it helps to know from a mediator's standpoint that
we're not stepping on your toes. Because I'm a talker, as
you can tell, and sometimes when I go to mediation I really
get to talking and I'm thinking, "Well, maybe I'm stepping
on the mediator's toes," and I pull them aside and say, "Do
you need me to shut up?," and they say, "No, you're giving
me the information, it's being helpful."
ALAN BALLEW: I'm Alan Ballew. I've been a guardian
ad litem in the juvenile court here in Knoxville since 2000.
That's all I do. I believe that there is a fundamental right
that's being ignored. Someone just a minute ago said that
the parental rights are superior, or fundamental, or more
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important, as an underlying right in a case. When you have
parents that are fighting in litigation, one cannot assume
that the children involved are not being abused or
neglected. Anytime the parents are fighting like that, the
children know that they are in the middle. There is no
constitutional right for children. Everybody pays lip service
to protecting children, but they have no constitutional
rights, it's always parental rights. And until we address that,
we'll be doing this sort of thing forever.
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: Well spoken. I agree.
RACHEL KIRBY: I think it was Section 7, access to the
child and information relating to the child,67 and this may
already be decided, but if there is a tape at the CAC 6 8 of an
interview, does that fall under that and give me access to
that tape?
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: It should. And one of
you might want to answer this more than me. My
experience is what I usually do with DCS. A lot of times
DCS is involved in these cases, that's the reason there may
not be an action pending but there's been allegations and
DCS is investigating and that's the reason why I'm
appointed by the court, and I will do an agreed protective
order with DCS to get access to their records, which
includes the CAC records. Now, under the provisional rule,
I can't file pleadings, but under the working group rule I
can, 69 and that will give me access to that. But recently
there's - and I haven't had a chance to read all the way
70
through it on my e-mail - an Attorney General's opinion
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about access to CAC records that actually just came out in
the last month and I had that sent to my e-mail. So if you'll
see me after, I'll get you that. But do you all have any
comments about that? It seems like this should be allowed.
This should help you get that.
LUCIE BRACKIN: I think it would help you get that. You
know, the order that we put forth said that work product
would not be discoverable, 7 1 but an interview with the child
I don't think could ever be classified as work product. I
think you should be entitled to obtain that. You may have
to go to your judge if you have a problem getting it.
JOHN GROGAN: John Grogan, Washington County DCS.
If you're appointed GAL, there's a statutory provision that
allows you access to those records.72
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: Right. And that's what I
usually use. My local DCS attorneys prefer a protective
order in the file one that I'm going to use and keep for
myself for the purposes of litigation, so that it's not
disseminated, because they deal with all kinds of lawyers
and they want to make sure that some GAL is not just
going to get it and start streaming it to the parents and
relatives and all this kind of thing. So, to protect the child,
they ask me for a protective order, which I don't have a
problem doing because I'd rather be more protective than
not. But I agree with you, there's a statutory provision, but
not everybody recognizes that as they should.
JOHN GROGAN: Okay. The way I usually do that is with
that or a HIPAA 73 protective order perhaps.
2011), availableat http://www.tn.gov/attomeygenera~lop/2011/opi11 21 .pdf
71 40A Work Group, supra note 13, App. at 5.
72
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JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: Yeah. It kind of protects
everything. I think it's good practice.
COLLEEN STEELE: In my experience, I've had a lot of
GALs that were very helpful in getting medical records,
especially for the child or for the opposing party in an
adversarial role where I represent one or the other parent.
The GAL has been the one who has been able to get the
information and most of them have been very cooperative
in providing it because this is information that adversarial
counsel need to know.
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: That's the reason why
when I get my protective orders, most often what I'll do is
include that information in my protective orders, if it's
appropriate, and it's going to be for me and the opposing
counsel, because I don't want to be in violation of the order
and distribute it to opposing counsel if the person who
provided it to me expected it would only go to me. But a lot
of times I've been using that too.
JOHN EVANS: We've got about five more minutes, so a
couple more questions.
LORI SAYLOR: My name is Lori Saylor. I practice in
Cumberland County. I was just wondering if there was
going to be a discussion of guardian ad litem appointments
in child support cases where the district attorney said under
Witt v. Witt 74 that in a paternity issue you have to have a
guardian ad litem, but there's absolutely nobody that wants
to pay for you to go to court or do any work whatsoever on
that case.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42
U.S.C. § 201 etseq. (1996).
14 Witt V. Witt, 929 S.W.2d 360 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
73
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LUCIE BRACKIN: I don't know of any discussion on that
issue that I've ever heard.
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: I don't either, except that
under Section 175 it talks about post-divorce and paternity
actions. I'm wondering if this Rule 40A is going to apply to
paternity actions as well: if it's going to require the litigants
to be responsible for those fees, and if they can't pay those
fees, if it's going to be up to the judge to determine how
they're going to be appointed. In Davidson County, they've
appointed me under a 40A appointment in some paternity
actions in the child support court because it was a paternity
suit about the original parenting plan involving allegations
back and forth about what's best for that child, but the
judge has to assess the parties with that. Now, they assess
it, the parties never put down the original payment, I finish
the case and I'm still not paid, and I've got a debt out there
to collect. But when you're appointed by the judge, you're
going to do the job you're supposed to do. But I haven't
been appointed in some of those under this rule.
LUCIE BRACKIN: I don't think this proposed rule,
specifically the title "Appointment of Guardians ad Litem
in Custody Proceedings, 76 would apply to a child support
matter.
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: I don't think it applies to
child support only, but when it defines custody
proceedings, it says paternity, 77 and I kind of think it may
apply.

75TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40A, at
76

§ 1.

See generally TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40A.

77 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40A,

§ 1(a).
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LUCIE BRACKIN: Well, this custody can be an issue in a
paternity case.
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: Right.
ELIZABETH MCDONALD: I'd like to follow up with that.
I'm Elizabeth McDonald from White County. And when
you get in these cases where the real issue is DNA, there's
really nothing for an attorney - a guardian ad litem - to do.

You talk to this person, they're decent, you talk to that
person - what is it for us to do in those cases? Yet, when
you go and you look at what we're supposed to do, the
things that I do really are not going to impact the situation.
Both of them have got an attorney, both of them have a
child. I don't understand what we're supposed to be doing in
those cases.
JENNIFER EVANS WILLIAMS: Those that I've been
appointed to use the initial comparative fitness test. 7 When
paternity has been established and there's allegations back
and forth about how each parent is not fit, and there's
allegations similar to a DCS or a post-divorce type of
action -

ELIZABETH MCDONALD: But under the statute 79 you
have to appoint one and it's just DNA out there, that's all. I
don't see the point.
LUCIE BRACKIN: I don't see the point.
JENNIFER BJOUNSTAD: I was on a case like that with
Witt 8° and it says there ought to be a guardian ad litem and
See Parker v. Parker, 986 S.W.2d 557 (Tenn. 1999); Nelson v.
Nelson, 66 S.W.3d 896 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); Gaskill v. Gaskill, 936
S.W.2d 626 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
78

79 TENN. CODE ANN. §37-1-149 (2011).
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that was before DNA was as strong a proof as it is now, but
it said you had to have a guardian ad litem if there's ever an
issue, and so what you do is look at the DNA test and you
say, "Yeah, he's the dad."
LUCIE BRACKIN: That's it.
JENNIFER BJOUNSTAD: In that case I tell the attorneys
I'm going to meet the child, there's really not a lot for me to
do, if there's stuff you want me to do I'm not doing, I'll be
happy to do it, but this is what the case law says, this is
what the paternity test says.
ELIZABETH MCDONALD: I know.
JENNIFER BJOUNSTAD: But the case law requires that
there's a guardian ad litem.
ELIZABETH MCDONALD: Yeah.
LUCIE BRACKIN: Can I just say one last thing before we
close? The work group is very optimistic that the
Tennessee Supreme Court is going to adopt our rule. We
hope very much that the court will. We've actually drafted a
suggested order on how to appoint guardians ad litem that I
believe will be disseminated. One thing that we wanted to
say specifically in the order was to reference Rule 40A and
put the website address where anyone can go and find the
rule, 8 1 so that the parties can go and find it and read it. That
was one thing that we thought would be important for the
litigants to be able to see the rule and read the rule that
governs guardians ad litem.
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Witt, 929 S.W.2d at 360.
generally, 40A Work Group, supra note 13.

81 See
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JESSICA VAN DYKE: Thank you so much to this panel.
They were all excellent. I think they gave us a lot of great
information that we can all use in the future. We have a
small token of our appreciation for each of you that
Danielle has. At this point, we're going to take a quick
break.
DANIELLE GREER: Let's give the panelists a hand before
we go.
(A break was taken)
JOHN EVANS: Panel number two will discuss litigation
for change. The panelists will each discuss how various
jurisdictions have raised awareness about the shortcomings
in the child welfare system. We have several scholars that
are going to be speaking on this topic this morning. We
have Jacqueline Dixon, who is a local counsel, and she
served on Brian A. v. Bredesen, 82 and she's from Nashville.
We have Professor Dean Rivkin, he's a professor of law
here that works with the Education Law Practicum. And we
have Robert Schwartz, who is the executive director of the
Juvenile Law Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. And
also Professor Rivkin has several students who will be
speaking on this panel as well. I just want to remind the
panelists that I know that we've divided up the time so we
can hear from you equally and we'll have cards up there
demonstrating that. And we certainly look forward to your
remarks.

82

Brian A. v. Bredesen, 149 F. Supp. 2d 941 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).
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PANEL DISCUSSION 2:
LITIGATION FOR CHANGE

Jacqueline Dixon
Professor Dean Rivkin
Robert Schwartz
JACQUELINE (JACKIE) DIXON: Thank you. I'm Jackie
Dixon. It's really a privilege to be here. I graduated from
this school twenty-five years ago and it's really changed a
lot in terms of the facilities. It's wonderful. We did not have
a room like this. Our big room was over in the part of the
building that is no longer a part of the law school I believe.
So it's really nice to be here. I enjoyed the first panel. I'm
good friends with both Jennifer Evans and Libby Sykes and
just really got a lot out of what they had to say. I have a
case that's on appeal' that's going to address the issue of the
distinction between a Rule 40A and a Rule 40 guardian,
and so that will probably be out in a year or so. It really
gave me a new perspective on the rule to hear them talk.
I feel like I need to state a disclaimer. I am not an
expert on child welfare litigation, and I'm not a scholar
either. If you knew how I struggled to get through law
school, that's funny to hear me introduced as a scholar. But,
anyway, I am not an expert on child welfare litigation. I
had the good fortune to be in the right place at the right
time. My former firm in Nashville was approached by
lawyers from Children's Rights when they were
investigating prior to filing the Brian A. lawsuit, 2 and my
partner, my former partner now, David Raybin, and I were
asked to be local counsel. And that has been a tremendous
experience for me. It's been a privilege to work with those
lawyers from Children's Rights in New York City. Marcia
1In re Jonathan S C-B, M2010-02356-COA-R3-JV (Tenn. Ct. App.
June 28, 2011).
2id.
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Robinson Lowry and Ira Lustbader have been the two lead
attorneys on the case.
Children's Rights is a public interest law firm. They
started as part of the American Civil Liberties Union. They
became their own entity in 1995. They protect the lives and
legal rights of America's abused and neglected children by
advocating for the reform of failing child welfare systems
across the country. They have used legal action and policy
initiatives to drive lasting reform in child protection, foster
care and adoption. They have a website, and I realize you
all may have looked at this as just being curious about
Brian A., 3 or as part of class work. They have an excellent
website, childrensrights.org, and they have a complete
archive of all of the Brian A. filings 4 on that website.
The case of Brian A., as it was known at the time
Brian A. v. Sundquist, was filed in May of 2000 in the
Middle District of Tennessee in federal court. It was
assigned to Judge Todd Campbell. Brian A., the lead
plaintiff at the time, was a little nine-year-old boy who had
been in foster care for four years. At that time he lived in an
emergency shelter in Shelby County where he had lived for
seven months. He was waiting indefinitely for a home. He
didn't have any social work plan or goal to get him out of
foster care and into a permanent family. He was without
necessary treatment, caseworker services, or appropriate
schooling. He was in a grossly overcrowded and
inappropriate facility that was meant for extremely short
stays of under thirty days, and he had little or no contact
with his five siblings. The lawsuit was filed and generated a
lot of press. Prior to that there had been a big investigation
by the attorneys and other staff people from Children's
3 Id.
4 Children's Rights, Tennessee (Brian A. v. Bredesen), Legal

Documents, availableat http://www.childrensrights.org/reformcampaigns/legal-cases/tennessee-brian-a-v-bredesen/2/.
5 Brian A. v. Bredesen, 149 F. Supp. 2d 941 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).

55

7.2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 222
Rights involving a lot of local Tennesseans that worked in
the child welfare system, including local attorneys. The
investigation had actually started years before the case was
filed. Back in the early- to mid- 90s, close to ten years
before the suit was filed, people in Tennessee were voicing
concerns about the system, how the system was broken,
how it needed to be fixed. Nothing was done for a number
of years. At the time because all the State entities that
provided services to this population of children were going
to be consolidated into one department, the Department of
Children's Services, the thought was let's give that a chance
to work, let's see if that will make things better, and I
believe that consolidation happened in '95 or '96.
Unfortunately, reforms were never put in place, or
not put in place to really solve the problems. So in 1999,
after Children's Rights began to receive more and more
complaints from the advocates on the ground here in
Tennessee, they began investigating the concerns, and
developed a team of local counsel that was statewide. Wade
Davies from a law firm here in Knoxville was one of the
local counsel, and he did a lot of work up to the filing of
the suit in May of 2000. The main things that were
complained about in the lawsuit at that time were children
were placed in large orphanage-like settings and other
group settings at one of the highest rates in the nation.
Children were routinely placed in emergency shelters, like
Brian A., our lead plaintiff, and other temporary holding
facilities for more than six months at a time without any
services, without any appropriate treatment because the
State had no other foster care placements for these children.
Case workers were overworked and poorly trained with
caseloads that prevented them from adequately monitoring
and supervising the children in their care. This,
unfortunately, in some instances, led to additional abuse
and neglect while the children were in custody to remedy
home situations where that had happened. Children were
bounced around from one inappropriate foster placement to
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another, based not on their specific needs, but just because
there was a slot here, there was a slot over there at this
group home, so they stuck the child there. That attitude was
prevalent.
So the lawsuit was filed. For those of you who
enjoy civil procedure, there was a motion to dismiss filed,
and that opinion 6 is in the written materials that you were
provided today. We undertook voluminous discovery; that
was very interesting. There were lots of documents. The
State fought discovery. The case was assigned to a
magistrate judge, Judge Joe Brown, for discovery disputes.
Again, for a little civil procedure issue, most federal court
discovery disputes do go to the magistrate judge who's
assigned to the case. Magistrate Judge Joe Brown ruled that
we could take discovery. The case moved forward. The
discovery phase lasted about a year. Then in the summer of
2001 we reached a settlement with the State and a consent
decree 7 was entered that provided for a lot of work to be
done by the State. A lot of times when you settle a case, for
those of you who do litigation, that's the end of it, you're
done with the case, the file goes away. You expect that
there's going to be just compliance with the settlement,
that's it. But in this instance, there was a plan put in place
where the folks from Children's Rights would continue to
be involved and there would be technical assistance people,
experts in child welfare, involved in monitoring and
working on remedies to specific problems that existed at
that time. The settlement also required the State to commit
resources to care for and move children through the system

6 Order

and Memorandum, Feb. 24, 2010, availableat

http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/02/2010-02-

24 tn order and memorandum denyingdefs_motion to dismiss.pdf.
Consent Decree, July 27, 2001, availableat
http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/2001-07-

27_tn_brianasettlement.pdf.
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safely and appropriately, and as 8I mentioned, it provided
this independent group of experts.
The major terms of the settlement were very
detailed, spelled out very specific things that had to be
done. There were both quantitative results, such as the size
of the case loads and worker/child contact, and there were
qualitative outcomes for the children, such as moving
and staying for shorter periods
among fewer foster homes
9
care.
foster
in
of time
Unfortunately, after that settlement agreement in the
form of a consent decree was approved by the judge in the
summer of 2001, after a public fairness hearing was held in
federal court, not a whole lot happened. And in 2003, the
attorneys from Children's Rights with local counsel filed a
contempt petition against the State' 0 for failure to comply
with the consent decree. At that time there had been a
report" by this technical assistance committee that stated a
lot of deficiencies in the system that just had continued.
Things just hadn't progressed the way we had hoped. The
contempt action was actually resolved with a new
agreement. There was some discovery taken on the
contempt action. We mediated to reach a resolution on that.
The contempt action was actually set for trial between
Christmas and New Year's in 2003, and for those of you
who are still in law school, and I think the practicing
lawyers will appreciate this, you try not to have a whole lot
of calendar during the holidays. When you see like some
8 See id.
9

Id.
10 Contempt Petition, Nov. 20, 2003, availableat

http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/2003-1120 tn brianacontemptmotion.pdf.
STATUS REPORT BY THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE IN THE
CASE OF BRIAN A. V. SUNDQUIST TO THE PARTIES AND THE MONITOR
(TAC MONITORING REPORT), Dec. 10, 2003, availableat

http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads//2008/12/2003-1210 tn status-report.pdf.
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big lawsuit is just hanging at that time of the year, I now
think, "Oh, those people have been working way too hard;
they've messed up their holidays." But we went to
Baltimore for mediation on December 23rd to try to get this
resolved so we wouldn't be having this hearing right there
between Christmas and New Year's, and mediation
worked, and we got it resolved, and we entered a new
agreement with some new goals to try to remedy these2
deficiencies that were ongoing. For example, the report'
that prompted the filing of the contempt action showed that
the State had only complied with twenty-four out of 136
stipulations in the original consent decree. At that time, the
Department of Children's Services got a new
commissioner, Viola Miller, who had similar experience in
Kentucky and was a real asset. She was a joy to work with,
and she worked very hard, and, in my personal opinion, did
a lot to turn things around.
From that beginning, early in 2004 up to now, we've
had a lot of reports filed by this new technical assistance
committee. The DCS implemented their Path to Excellence
Implementation plan to work on the deficiencies. This
technical assistance committee has issued a report pretty
much every year. For example, in January of 2006, the
report 13 noted that although there had been a lot of progress
made in some areas, such as addressing staffing issues,
which were initially a big issue, there still hadn't been
progress made in improving placement stability, reducing
reliance on shelter and emergency placements, obtaining
timely permanency, and putting the child in a home that's a
forever home, not a temporary fix to a problem. The
settlement agreement has been modified several times
based on these reports that have been filed by the technical
12

id.

13TAC MONITORING REPORT, Jan. 19, 2006, availableat

http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/2007-0 119 tn briana tac report.pdf.
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assistance committee. Almost every year there's been some
modification based on the report. But, all in all, things
moved along pretty well and progress has been made.
In late 2009, we were in the news again with this
case when our legislature had passed a law 14 that looked
like it was trying to tie the hands of juvenile court judges
on how many children they could actually place into State
custody, and it appeared that the problem was more acute
in counties where there is a big meth problem, where kids
are coming into custody after a meth lab is busted. And I
think we all know meth is a huge problem, and especially
here in East Tennessee. I understand that it's maybe not
quite the problem in more urban areas. It's more of a rural5
problem. But this law that was passed by the legislature'
attempted to put some financial responsibility on the
counties and really attempted to limit how many children a
juvenile court judge could take into State custody. We felt
like that was a big no-no under Brian A., 16 so we filed a
supplemental complaint. 17 We call this an "Over-8
Commitment" law, because it violated the consent decree.'
That issue was ultimately resolved when the legislature
repealed that law, or changed it. 19 I can't remember if they
changed it or repealed it. But there was a big change made,
so that became a moot issue. That happened last spring in
the legislature.
So that kind of brings us up to where we are now. In
your materials, there is a monitoring report. This is the
most recent monitoring report that's filed by the technical
14 TENN.

CODE ANN. §37-2-205(f) (2011).

15 TENN. CODE ANN. §37-2-205(f).
16 Brian A.,149

F. Supp. 2d 941.
Supplemental Complaint, Nov. 9, 2009, availableat
http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads//2009/11/2009-11 09 tn overcommitmentlaw supplemental complaint final.pdf.
17

18

Id"

19 TENN. CODE ANN. §37-2-205(f) was deleted in its entirety and

amended on Mar. 30, 2010 by 2010 Tenn. Pub. Acts 662.
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assistance committee. As you can see, it's quite lengthy,
but it has a lot of very detailed information in it. I had sent
Jessica the executive summary and introduction. It's kind of
interesting and it shows the detail and thought that have
gone into this settlement. I also have the 2009 modified
settlement agreement and exit plan, 2 1 which is also a fairly
lengthy document and very detailed. If anybody is
interested in that, I can e-mail any of this stuff to you
electronically if you'd like to see that.
Where we are now, there is still some room for
improvement. DCS has made great strides in fixing
problems, but there is still some room for improvement.
And the specific things that - and this was all in the
monitoring report 22 - need to be worked on are improved
services for youth transitioning out of foster care. This has
been a big issue. Most of us, like Jessica stated when she
introduced the program, had parents or at least an adult in
our lives that cared about us, that took care of us, read to
us, and they didn't just send us out the door when we turned
eighteen and say, "Okay, done, you're on your own." No,
they continued to monitor us and help us, get through our
college years. But there still needs to be work done in
Tennessee on improving services for youth transitioning
out of foster care. DCS is certainly doing a better job in
finding permanent homes for older youth in foster care. The
Department must work harder to support teens leaving
foster care without an adopted family or ties to family
members. These youth especially need help in developing
plans for life after foster care and need connections to
stable housing, educational opportunities, and other vital
20

TAC MONITORING REPORT, April 6, 2011, availableat

http://www.childrensrights.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/04/20110412 tn monitoring rpt_8_as filed.pdf.
21 Modified Settlement Agreement and Exit Plan, Nov. 10, 2010,
availableat http://www.childrensrights.org/wpcontent/uploads//2010/11/2010-11-10_tnjointexitplan.pdf.
22 TAC MONITORING REPORT, April 6, 2011, supra note 20.
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services aimed at strengthening their independent living
skills.
Another issue or area for improvement is to
improve the quality of work on each individual case and the
quality of case worker supervision. DCS has implemented a
number of strong initiatives to enhance case practice such
as holding regular team meetings with youth and their
families to develop short- and long-term plans to strengthen
the family and keep kids safe. However, its new policies
and practices have not yet been fully implemented. For
example, this report that came out late last fall 23 shows
meetings aren't happening on a regular basis, foster parents
are being left out, and many meetings aren't being tracked
by the State's data system.
Another issue is improved recruitment and retention
of foster parents, especially with respect to relatives of
older kids in care. The State has done a commendable job
of placing more children with families rather than in
institutions. DCS must better engage relatives and recruit
kinship homes for children in foster care. Additionally,
DCS needs to improve its overall ability to recruit and
retain new homes as the steady loss of available foster
families is currently outpacing the overall decline in the
number of children in foster care.
And finally, there needs to be a focus on finding
permanent homes for children who have been in foster care
for more than two years. The State must continue its
diligent efforts to find adoptive families or legal guardians
for children who have been stranded in the foster care
system for more than two years. This includes a current
initiative to seek outside funding, to expand programs that
dig back into a child's history, back into a child's files, to
find family members, coaches, teachers, and former foster
23

TAC MONITORING REPORT, November 6, 2010, availableat

http://www.tn.gov/youth/dcsguide/fedinitiatives/TACMonitoringReport
11.10. 1O.pdf.
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parents who might become a positive connection or even a
permanent family for that youth. So while there's still some
work to be done, we feel like a lot of progress has been
made and the end is in sight for the Brian A. litigation. I
asked Ira Lustbader, who has worked really, really hard on
this case, much harder than I have, just for some thoughts
on how this litigation worked, and the importance of it, and
he said, "what is so powerful about the Brian A. case, 24 as
an illustration of effective reform through litigation, is how
it has raised the profile of these vulnerable kids and the
agency-wide problems to a level where this population can
be protected." Mr. Lustbader reminded me of why I went to
law school when he said, "to protect a population like
abused and neglected kids - who do not vote, don't have a
lobby, who can be re-victimized while in state custody
mostly without anyone even knowing, who are subject to
the intractably sad part of society - this elevation of the
issues and heightened accountability of an otherwise closed
system (due to confidentiality laws) - is why civil rights
statutes like section 198325 were enacted in the first place."
I mentioned at the beginning of my comments what
a privilege and inspiration it has been to work with the
team of lawyers from Children's Rights especially Ira
Lustbader and Marcia Robinson Lowry. There has been a
book written about the efforts to reform the New York City
child welfare which was a decades-long case for Marcia
Robinson Lowry. The Lost Children of Wilder 26 by Nina
Bernstein is an excellent book on child welfare reform.
Thank you.
DEAN RIVKIN: Hi, everybody. It's great to see so many
long-time colleagues and former students. Our part of the
24

Brian A., 149 F. Supp. 2d at 941.

2542 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871).
26

NINA BERNSTEIN, THE LOST CHILDREN OF WILDER: THE EPIC

STRUGGLE TO CHANGE FOSTER CARE

(2001).
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program on litigation for change is going to be a snapshot
of a project that we have been involved in for the last
couple of years through a course called Public Interest
Lawyering, Education Law Practicum. It's a clinical course.
This is going to be a choreographed presentation. I'm going
to set the framework and five of our students are going to
tell you different aspects of our work. This part of this
panel is different from the major class action that you just
talked about. It's more in the public interest realm of a case
aggregation strategy, using individual cases, representing
clients in individual cases to solve a major problem that I'll
tell you about.
We started from a premise that there is a school-toprison pipeline, it's well documented and we're quite
concerned about it in a number of former cases. What we
focused on was truancy prosecutions. You see this student
behind bars? (Pointing to illustration). The abuses of
truancy prosecutions nationwide have surfaced recently. I
have an article 27 in your materials that's the final draft of an
article that's going to be published in the Duke Forum for
Law and Social Change that sets out exhaustively the
collateral consequences flowing from truancy prosecutions
nationwide, and I'm not going to go into it. In Tennessee,
absences - and I'll get to the definition of truancy - are

quite substantial, as you can see. These are the Tennessee
Department of Education figures 28 on what their definition
of truancy or excessive absences are. Nationwide, there are

27

Dean Hill Rivkin, Truancy Prosecutionsof Students and the Right

[To] Education, 3 DUKE F. FOR L. & Soc. CHANGE _ (Fall 2011) (at

the time of publication, the page number for Dean Rivkin's article was
unknown as the article had not yet been published).
28 TENN. DEPT. OF EDUC. FIGURES, Apr. 12, 2010 (figures faxed to
speaker by the Tennessee Department of Education independent of any
publication).
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57,000 or more truancy prosecutions of students. 29 In
Tennessee, we know that there are thousands of those
cases, and yet, when we started looking into this, there's
absolutely no case law at all. In discussing this with
lawyers around the state, we don't think there has ever been
an appeal of a truancy case, and we know that there have
only been the rarest number of cases ever tried. The large
bulk of these cases are pleas that are taken.
Now, the definition of an unruly child in Tennessee
is pretty simple: Habitually and without justification is
truant from school. 30 What we, in our investigation and
doing our cases on this, found is that the "without
justification" part of this statute has not been used very
frequently and there has been a conflation of the education
statutes that deal with attendance and excessive absences
with the juvenile statutes that have a standard that is
interpretable, is litigable, involves defenses, as you'll see,
without justification.
What we've been doing in this course in a real
nutshell - and we've had really intrepid students last year
and this year - is ranging through a wide variety of
substantive legal issues. A lot of them involve special
education, some involve more regular education, issues
around alternative education, school discipline, the
FERPA, 3 1 and a whole range of school attendance policies
both on the state level and on the local level where there are
procedures, and juvenile rules as well, that talk about when
cases should be prosecuted. There are a range of mental
health issues that we've run into. We have run into a
number of TennCare issues, because the only kids who are
prosecuted are kids from low-income families; families
29 BENJAMIN ADAMS, ET AL, JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS

REPORT, NAT'L CTR. FOR JUV. JUSTICE,

2006-2007:

March 2010, availableat

http://www.ncjjservehttp.org/ncjjwebsite/pdf/csreports/jcs2007.pdf.
30 TENN. CODE ANN. §37-1-102(25)(A)(i) (2011).
31 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C.
§1232g (2011); 34 C.F.R. § 99.1 (2011).
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without resources. That's just an indisputable fact. People
with resources can provide alternatives for their children
before the case ever gets to court. TennCare issues galore:
for example, transportation. When a kid gets sick in a lowincome family and the parents don't have transportation, it's
very difficult for them to get to the doctor to get the quote
or notes that the school requires. We mined the TennCare
laws with help from some great legal services lawyers and
found that there is an urgent care transportation
entitlement.32 You don't have to make an appointment three
days ahead, you don't have to take your kid to the
emergency room, because the kid is not that sick, but there
is a three-hour window, if you need to take your kid to the
doctor, and we've instituted that in several cases.
Residential placement is a matter of really last resort.
We've also worked on those legal issues.
There are a number of child welfare issues you'll
hear about. Juvenile defense, of course, is part of all this.
Bullying, part of education I guess, but there is a body of
emerging statutory law and case law around bullying.33
Interesting constitutional law issues. You'll hear in a minute
about the right to counsel. A lot of interesting
administrative law issues too with respect to State rulemaking by the Department of Education in terms of local
school system policies and procedures. I mean, these are a
range of legal issues that are embedded in the kind of legal
work that we've been doing.
We've also been doing a lot of lawyering skills in
this course. Our students have been interviewing,
counseling, and investigating. They have been doing
motion practice, arguing motions. I mean, there is a range
of interesting legal skills that are unique to this kind of
child advocacy effort. I am then going to turn this over to
32 TennCare Urgent Care Transportation Amendment, Sept. 2008 (on
file with author).
33 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. 49-6-1014 etseq. (2011).
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Amanda Jay who is going to give you a very brief case
study. We've asked our students to do five minutes max
about some of their work.
AMANDA JAY: Thank you. Good morning. I'm going to
talk to you today about one of our clients, Anita. Anita is a
fifteen-year-old girl. During the 2009-10 school year, she
missed over one-third of the school year. When I first sat
down and interviewed her, the first thing she said to me is,
"Look, I'm not laying out of school." And any kid who is
that up front and straightforward with you usually has a
story, and Anita has a pretty good one.
Just to set up some background about how these
petitions are filed, at that point in time the school system
was filing these petitions usually without any prior contact
with the student or parent regarding the absences. In fact,
when Anita's petition was filed, the petition was the first
notice that the family received that her absences were a
problem.
I'd like to talk to you guys a little bit about
justification, because, as Dean said, in many of these cases,
the justification prong 34 isn't even discussed at the time. In
fact, when Anita appeared in court, she was asked, "Are
you absent?" and being generally a truthful child, she said
"Yes," and ended up pleading guilty to this charge. She was
sentenced to complete a social services program, which is a
character education program that really didn't address any
of the underlying causes of her truancy or serve any
purpose in eliminating her absences. And I'm going to go
back to that definition of what an unruly child is. An unruly
child is one who is habitually and without justification
absent from school.35 Let's talk a little bit about
justification. This particular student suffered from multiple
chronic medical conditions and the school was aware of
34 TENN.
35

CODE ANN. §37-1-102(25)(A)(i).
TENN. CODE ANN. §37-1-102(25)(A)(i).
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this. Part of her medical condition required her to take pain
medication, so, oftentimes, even when she wasn't in need of
seeing a medical professional, she was unable to attend
school because the pain medication made her sleepy or
unable to concentrate, that sort of thing. Anita also comes
from a family who is very poor; therefore, they sometimes
had trouble getting her to a doctor. And one of the things
we've seen is that the school system wants a note for each
and every absence. So even if she's absent for one day and
has a note, the next two days will not necessarily be
excused unless that note explicitly states this is for this time
period. A lot of times these families who are involved in
truancy prosecutions aren't very sophisticated in dealing
with systems, whether it is a medical office, the emergency
room, or the social services office at the school. They really
don't know what resources are available to help them get
through the process. And we came to find out that Anita
was also dealing with some pretty complicated mental
health issues that no one was really aware of and that
weren't really being addressed.
One of the major problems with this case is at the
very beginning the school and the court didn't really make
any inquiry into why she was absent. When she appeared in
court, the question was, "Are you absent?" she responded
"Yes." Usually the proof or evidence that's brought against
these students is a STAR 36 report. It's generated by the
school, and it just lists their absences and whether there
was a medical excuse. In this case, with the help ofjuvenile
court workers and the attorney general's office, we were
eventually able to get some supports in place for this child.
She is now in therapy, the school is more aware and willing
to work with her with her medical conditions, and we're
also trying to help her catch up in school to address some of
her educational needs. This is a great child. She has lots of
goals. She hopes to be a nurse. And this is just one
36

Student Teacher Achievement Ratio.
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illustration of some of the issues we're dealing with as we
do these truancy cases. Thank you.
DEAN RIVKIN: Kate Holtkamp is going to talk about an
adult who we were appointed to represent in a truancy case,
which is not the gist of our work, but you'll see some of the
issues here.
KATE HOLTKAMP: As Dean said, this is the only adult
that we represented this year. Jane Doe was a single mom.
She's about twenty-five with two kids: a five-year-old,
John, and a one-year-old. She was charged with
contributing to the unruly behavior of a minor, and this
charge was based only on John's thirty-four documented
absences during his kindergarten year. When we
investigated the reasons behind the absences, it became
pretty clear there was some substantial justification for why
this kid was missing. In the spring of 2009, Jane was
estranged from her abusive husband and had begun her
divorce. Around September, she was assaulted by her
husband and her five-year-old son was kidnapped, and this
went on for about two weeks. John, after being returned to
his mom, developed some serious anxiety issues resulting
from the kidnapping. On some school days he refused to
part with his mom to go to school. Jane attempted to work
with him and to get counseling services both through DCS
and through the school's guidance department, but wasn't
able to get any sort of regular service in place. And getting
John to school was particularly challenging for Jane
because they lived too close to the elementary school to
allow him to ride the bus but too far away for her to walk
with two little kids. Further complicating this issue is the
fact that she simply could not afford to buy a car and her
husband had taken the only family vehicle. She was totally
reliant on her friend, who lives about twenty minutes away,
to take her son to school, and obviously this was not a
reliable way to get him to school.
235
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In the spring of 2010, John became seriously ill. He
was originally diagnosed with seasonal allergies but there
was really no serious attempt to get him strong treatments.
Two or three weeks later he developed a golf-ball-sized
abscess in his throat and required immediate surgery and
subsequent hospitalization. Throughout the school year,
Jane had been in constant communication with the school,
she had spoken with the vice-principal, the school social
worker, the school nurse, and her son's classroom teacher
about her situation and particularly the custody dispute.
The school was aware of her ongoing struggles with her
husband and she felt that the school understood why she
was having trouble getting her son to school, so she didn't
worry a lot about getting precise documentation and
medical notes.
At the end of the school year, John's teacher
expressed concern to Jane that he had missed so many days
and she was a little worried that he might not be ready for
the first grade. So, in May, well before she was aware of
any prosecution efforts against her, Jane voluntarily
enrolled John in summer school. This is not a mom who
was neglectful. This was not a mom who was not
concerned about her child's education. She was dealing
with incredibly difficult circumstances and she just had
incredibly limited means.
In July, Jane was arrested by police officers, and as
they forced their way into her home, they broke down her
door and removed her from bed, handcuffed her, and took
her to the penal farm. After being released, Jane was never
notified of a court date. She had to call the court herself to
make sure she knew when to come, and she was never
offered a public defender before her first appearance in
court.
We were appointed to represent her in September.
In November, we filed a motion to dismiss. We
successfully argued that under Tennessee compulsory
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education laws 37 only children age six through seventeen
are required to attend school. When we researched it, it
became clear that the mom of a five-year-old was under no
legal obligation to send her child to school and could not be
prosecuted for his unexcused absences.
DEAN RIVKIN: Ebony Connor is going to give you one
more snapshot of a case in which we're representing kids.
EBONY CONNOR: Hi. Good morning. I've walked into a
lot of classrooms, and I don't think I've ever had all eyes on
me. I feel like I need intro music for this. I'm going to talk
about two of the students that we've been representing and
the economic barriers that have affected them, both in their
entrance into the juvenile justice system and their ability to
communicate with us and for us to effectively represent
them. One of our students is a fourteen-year-old boy, he is
an eighth-grader at a local Knoxville area school, and the
other is a sixteen-year-old boy also at a local school. They
are both adamantly into sports. One is really into
basketball. The other is really into boxing. But they have
horrible circumstances behind them. They are both
intelligent boys who have interests, but don't necessarily
have the economic means to do the things that interest them
and so it's affected them in a multitude of ways. And that
has affected their entrance into the juvenile justice system.
They've had a family member who lost a job and
there were some traumatic things that resulted from that,
including homelessness. As homeless students in the area,
they were staying at one point in a homeless shelter, at
another point they were staying with friends, and at a third
point they were staying with friends that were an hour-anda-half outside of Knoxville and were being transported in.
All of these things resulted in their irregular school
attendance, but not necessarily without justification for not
37 TENN. CODE ANN. §49-6-3001

et seq. (2011).
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being in school. They also don't always have adequate
access to health care, as Dean mentioned very early on.
They have TennCare, but there are programs that are
available through TennCare that most aren't aware of,
including transportation located within three hours
distance. They do not always have access to a car, so if they
weren't aware of TennCare-provided transportation and
they needed a doctor, they weren't aware that they could
call this service, so they weren't getting to school and
weren't coming with doctor's notes when they were able to
get back. As I said, they also don't have adequate personal
transportation. They have a vehicle but it hasn't always
been in good shape and there have been some instances
where they just haven't had anything. That has affected the
parent's ability to get them to school when they weren't
living within an area where the bus picked them up and
dropped them off. This has also affected their ability to get
to court and to status hearings when required to do so.
Again, as people with very little economic means, they
haven't always had adequate communication devices. So it
has been difficult for them to contact the school, doctors,
and us. These are issues that have to some extent led them
into the juvenile justice system. But in terms of my
representation of them and our working with them, we
found that it's very difficult to have them understand the
importance of what is going on if we're not able to actually
get in touch with them, and that's all based on their
economic status. And because they are fourteen- and
sixteen-year-old boys who have interests, they've
developed some anger management issues that are a result
of a lack of opportunities that they do or don't have because
of their family's economic status.
After we were appointed to represent them, there
has been some dramatic and some amazing changes. We
have absolutely been advocating very heavily for a change
in the truancy system, but a good portion of what we've
been doing with regards to these students is advocating for
238
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some of the social programs, that had the school system or
community workers been involved in, may not have
prevented these students from entering the juvenile justice
system. They are now aware of programs and organizations
that are designed to better serve them and their family,
which actually helps them deal with some of the underlying
issues that resulted in their not attending school regularly.
They're aware of health programs that are available to
them, including the transportation that I've mentioned and
that Dean mentioned. They're aware of extracurricular
activities. Because the absences from school affect their
grades, they're not always eligible for school programs, but
there are outside programs that are available to them that
they are now aware of them. There have also been some
educational changes with them as a result of our
representation. They are now aware of the services that
have always been available that the school did not make
known to them or most others that we've worked with. And
so I can say that while we are strongly advocating for a
change in the truancy process, a lot of what we've done is
to advocate for social change, and these are all things that
would have been available to them had an interested party
taken interest prior to them entering the juvenile justice
system. Thank you.
DEAN RIVKIN: Our final two presentations are going to
be nutshells of a couple of legal issues that we have
encountered in our practice. And Brennan Wingerter is
going to present the first one on guardians ad litem.
BRENNAN WINGERTER: Good morning. I'm going to
talk to you all about the role of Rule 4038 GALs in truancy
cases. So starting with Tennessee Rule of Juvenile
Procedure 37,39 as you can see under Rule 37(a), which
38 TENN. SUP. CT. R.
40.
39 TENN. R. Juv. P. 37.
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governs the appointment of GALs in delinquent and unruly
proceedings, truancy, by definition, is an unruly offense.4 °
Then we also have Rule 37(c), 4 1 which governs the
appointment of GALs when there has been a report of
harm. Now, under T.C.A. Section 37-1-403, this report of
harm contemplates that there is a child who is suffering
from or has sustained any wound, injury, disability, or
physical or mental condition that has been caused by
brutality, abuse or neglect. 4 2 So under this statutory
scheme, with truancy being an unruly defense, if the court
decides to appoint a GAL in a truancy case, Tennessee
Rule of Juvenile Procedure 37(a) 43 would apply. However,
sometimes GALs are appointed in truancy cases under Rule
37(c). 44

So let's take a look at what that does. When a GAL
is appointed under Rule 37(c), 45 you can see that Tennessee
Supreme Court Rule 4046 comes into play, and DCS
becomes involved, so a guardian should be appointed for
the child and the indigent parent should receive an attorney.
But, in a truancy case, those next steps don't come into
play. DCS doesn't become involved and the parent usually
doesn't get an attorney. So if I'm a GAL and I've been
appointed to a truancy case under Rule 37(c), 47 I'm kind of
in an awkward position and I'm probably thinking, "What
is my role? What should I do?" So, taking a look at how the
statute 4 8 works, when there is an appointment under

40

TENN. R. JUV. P. 37(a).

4 TENN. R. Juv. P. 37(c).
42 TENN. CODE ANN. §37-1-403

43

TENN. R. JUv. P. 37(a).
44 TENN. R. Juv. P. 37(c).

(2011).

45 TENN. R. Juv. P. 37(c).

46 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40.
47 TENN. R. JUV. P. 37(c).
48

TENN. CODE ANN. §37-1-403.
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37(c), 49 it's clear that Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 4050
does apply.
So let's take a look at Rule 40. 5 1 As you can see, it's
basic. It starts off the application, and it does apply under
Rule 37 of the Tennessee Rules of Juvenile Procedure. And
Rule 40 goes on to set forth some of the basics of a GAL
who has responsibilities under that rule. For example, it
defines a guardian ad litem as a lawyer appointed by the
court to advocate for the best interest of a child and to
ensure that the child's concerns and preferences are
effectively advocated. 52 A key to Rule 40 GAL lawyers is
that the child is the client of the GAL, not the court. And,
with that in mind, Rule 40 goes on to lay out some of the
specific responsibilities of Rule 40 GALs. For example,
conducting an independent investigation of the facts. 5' This
can include reviewing court files, medical and school
records, and interviewing parents, mental health
professionals and caseworkers. 54 It also goes on to state
that GALs' responsibilities include explaining the litigation
process, which means consulting with the child.55 Constant
communication with the child client is essential to the
GAL's responsibilities. Further, Rule 40 has a provision
where responsibility for the GAL is to consider resources
that are available through programs and processes. And I
specifically want to point out, because Dean mentioned it
earlier, when there's a special education issue involved,
GALs can and should remember that there are also federal

49 TENN. R. Juv. P. 37(c).
50
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40.
51 TENN.

SuP. CT. R. 40.
TENN. SuP. CT. R. 40(c)(1).
53 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40(d)(1).
54 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40(d)(iv).
52

55 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40(d)(2)-(3).
56
TENN. SuP. CT. R.

40(d)(5).
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law processes available, such as IDEA 57 and a disability
statute 58 that are there.
Some other responsibilities include ensuring that the
child is prepared to testify and making the child feel
comfortable. 59 And another big one is the responsibility to
advocate the position that serves the best interest of the
child. 60 And the bottom line with that responsibility is that
the GALs should act as lawyers. That includes everything
from the ethics requirements of competent representation,
such as filing pleadings, attending all meetings and
hearings, calling witnesses, and even making opening
statements and closing arguments. And, to sum up, these
excerpts are from a booklet 6 1 that was put out by the
Tennessee Youth Advisory Council, actually for children
who have GALs appointed to them, and I think it's a very
good summary of Rule 40 in layman's terms that the
bottom line is that GALs in truancy cases, are not cops, or
social workers. They do not work for the judge, they don't
work for DCS, and they don't work for the school system.
GALs at the end of the day are lawyers, and they are
lawyers who, as these brochures really break down for the
child clients, represent their clients, and those clients are
the children to whom they are appointed in court. Thank
you.
DEAN RIVKIN: Erin Raines is going to talk about a
complicated issue that Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
1990).
8 Rehabilitation Act of 1973,29 U.S.C. §701 etseq. (1973), §504,

57

effectuated by 34 C.F.R. Part 104.
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40(d)(6).
60
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40(c)(1).
59

61 TENNESSEE

YOUTH ADVISORY COUNCIL, ARE YOU A YOUNG PERSON

IN A CHILD ABUSE OR NEGLECT CASE IN JUVENILE COURT? YOU
SHOULD HAVE A G-A-L LAWYER (Dec. 2004), availableat

http://www.tba.org/sections/JuvenileLaw/gal.pdf.
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ERIN RAINES: In a short amount of time.
DEAN RIVKIN: - in a very short period of time - and that

is the right to counsel or the potential right to counsel in
truancy prosecutions.
ERIN RAINES: Through the research with Dean and some
of our case exposure this semester, we've seen various
issues with our clients where now more than ever we have
realized that not having a right to counsel or counsel
representation in a truancy proceeding presents a
significant risk to the child and the parent. In the United
States, there are forty-five states that address truancy
issues, and in thirty states there is a statute that
automatically provides the child with the right to counsel.62
Tennessee is, unfortunately, not one of those thirty
63
states. The right to counsel for children in initial truancy
hearings is consistent with the prevailing trend of states
nationwide and continues to guard the rights of children by
ensuring them adequate legal representation in juvenile
court proceedings.
So why is the right to counsel important? Denying
children the assistance of counsel at their initial truancy
hearing creates a substantial risk for the erroneous
deprivation of a meaningful education for that child. And
by giving a right to counsel to a child, the attorney can help
by discovering various reasons for the child's truancy,
explaining the truancy proceedings to the child and the
parent, ensuring adequate procedural protections leading up
to any truancy proceeding. After the fact, counsel may
62

Juvenile Law Center as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent,

Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.S., 199 P.3d 1010 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009),
available at
http://www.jlc.org/litigation/BellevueSchoolDistrict v. E.S._I.
63 id.
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present evidence on behalf of the child, and build a record,
and have the opportunity to bring an appeal should there be
one or should there be an erroneous decision on behalf of
the child. Also, initial truancy proceedings and not having a
right to counsel jeopardizes the children's fundamental
interests in physical liberty, education and privacy. The
educational interests are laid out in Goss v. Lopez, 64 which
states that any State action that potentially interferes with a
child's education, such as suspension from school, requires
due process protections.
The most important case, which is in the State
Supreme Court of Washington, is Bellevue School District
v. E.S.6 5 This is a case where a child had a truancy petition
initiated against him by the school system. He was not
afforded a right to counsel at the initial truancy hearing, but
he was later given a right to counsel at the contempt part of
the hearing, and the trial court held that this was okay
because that counsel is only appointed when a child is
facing possibility of losing her liberty and the school board
felt at the initial hearing phase that E.S.'s liberty was not at
stake. On appeal, the issue being looked at is that the trial
court entered that there was no due process right to counsel
at an initial truancy hearing when the hearing engaged the
fundamental right to education, and the truancy finding
66
could possibly lead to incarceration in a later proceeding.
Basically what this case will hopefully demonstrate,
and what Dean is using this case to argue hopefully once it
is decided by the Washington Supreme Court, 67 is that
64 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
65

Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.S., 199 P.3d 1010 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).

The Supreme Court of Washington ruled on Bellevue in June 2011,
holding that students do not have a right to counsel at truancy hearings.
Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.S., No. 83024-0, 2011 Wash. LEXIS 392
(Wash. June 9, 2011).
6 Bellevue Sch. Dist., 199 P.3d at 1013.
67 Contra Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.S., No. 83024-0, 2011 Wash. LEXIS
392 (Wash. June 9, 2011).
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failure to provide counsel and to require proper notice or a
sufficient petition resulted in the denial of due process and
the order should be set aside, therefore providing a
potential change in the law in other states that do not have a
right to counsel, Tennessee included, for the ultimate goal
of protecting the fundamental interests of the child during
any truancy proceeding.
DEAN RIVKIN: Great. Thank you. Has there been
change? There has been change. And it's not only because
of our work. The school system has become much more
aware, maybe because of our work, that there is a need to
prescreen before petitions are filed. Change also may be
coming because we filed several petitions to vacate clients'
convictions or adjudications from juvenile court. There's a
very generous post-adjudication statute for juveniles in
Tennessee that is elaborated on in the Rules of Juvenile
Procedure, 68 and we're raising issues that we hope will help
improve the system even further for the court-involved
children and youth who are there. So thanks, everybody.
ROBERT SCHWARTZ: Thank you, Dean, and Jackie, and
all the students. I'd like to spend a few minutes talking
about our experience in litigation around children's issues
at Juvenile Law Center where I've been since 1975. And I'll
discuss a little more of our history and some recent work
during the lunch talk that I'm scheduled to give about the
Kids-for-Cash Scandal, which also implicates some of the
right to counsel issues clearly that you heard about this
morning.
I think that we, over the years, have struggled to
find the appropriate place for the affirmative class action
litigation, the damages litigation, the appellate practice, and
law reform vehicle, because litigation in the wrong hands
can be a pretty powerful and destructive tool. In the right
68

TENN. R. Juv. P. 36; see also TENN. CODE ANN. §37-1-139 (2011).
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hands, with the right defendants, it can be quite effective,
but the fact is that lawyers for kids don't run anything, so
we're only as good at the end of the day as the people who
run the systems for children. In a way, the strategy of
litigation from beginning to end, including the discovery,
the demand letters, the follow-up, and implementation is
about figuring out a way to use this vehicle to help people
who run the system for a living succeed, and then trying to
figure out what success means in the child welfare system.
I think it's the difficulty of figuring out what that means
that has plagued child welfare litigators as well as child
welfare administrators probably for the last thirty or forty
years since litigation has taken hold.69
I thought it would be useful to get some examples
of some juvenile justice litigation that we've been involved
in to show the contrast between litigating in juvenile justice
and litigating in child welfare. One I think is relatively
straightforward and easy; the other is an example of
litigation, as Jackie described, that begins with
investigations twenty years ago, continued with the filing
of a lawsuit in 2000, and ends up with a Pentagon-papersized document of the technical assistance team in 2011
and how you find the right balance in the course of
litigation.
One of the major differences between litigating
juvenile justice versus child welfare is that juvenile justice
litigation is often about discrete actions to prevent harm,
like the use of isolation, physical abuse of kids in facilities,
or overcrowding of State training schools or juvenile
detention centers. So, we have brought and we continue to
bring at Juvenile Law Center those kinds of lawsuits that
are targeted to a particular problem. While we often have
hurdles in making sure that we've identified the rights that
are at stake to overcome the motions to dismiss as well as
69

See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States,

383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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motions for summary judgment, if we get relief, the remedy
is pretty easy and straightforward. You have isolation, you
end isolation, or you provide that it's of very limited use
with people coming by the door looking in every ten or
fifteen minutes, and you define the purposes and you solve
the problem. If you have overcrowding, it's fairly
straightforward to get a cap on an institutional size so the
children are safe inside a building. The issue of kids being
hurt by staff is a thing that can be dealt with in numerous
ways that are fairly straightforward.
We have done work on slightly more complicated
issues, for example, around school re-entry, which is I think
a corollary to the truancy issue since many kids are truant
after returning from delinquency placements and much of
the truancy is related to school policies. An example is in
70
2002, the Pennsylvania General Assembly passed a law
saying that students in the school districts of the first class
in Pennsylvania were not allowed to be in Philadelphia
public schools if they were adjudicated delinquent. They
weren't allowed to be in school if they were adjudicated
delinquent. It was a generalized law that applied only to
one county and one school district in Philadelphia. We at
Juvenile Law Center share space with Education Law
Center, which is a happy collaboration, and together we
filed a lawsuit 7 1 and the legislature changed the law to say,
"Okay, you can stay in school if you're in school, but you're
not allowed to return to school if you've been in a
delinquency placement." That, again, was a fairly narrow
targeted issue that we could take on that turned out to be
more complicated than we thought it should have been in
70

Act 187 of December 9, 2002, No. 187, § 12, 2002 Pa. Laws 1472

(amending the Pennsylvania School Code, 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 212134 (West 2011)); H.B. 2644, 186th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa.
2002); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. §21-2134 (West 2011).
71 See generallyJLC Working in Partnershipsto Ensure Quality
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terms of the right to relief. We managed to get an appellate
court,72 but not a trial court, to agree that by having a
complete ban for all kids on return to school, that there was
a violation of due process. There was no hearing or
judgment. As you mentioned about Goss v. Lopez 73 earlier,
this was related not to the suspension or expulsion way, but
in a return to school way, and we were able to at least get
kids back into a transitional school that would evaluate
where they should be, because we didn't want kids going
back to a school in which they were involved with gangs or
likely to be victims of crime and where they might not
succeed academically. But that was an example of a
discrete piece of litigation that had an impact and where we
could pull something off. It was also pretty clear to the
public what was at stake; we could tell the story pretty
clearly.
Major class action child welfare litigation has had
mixed results in the country. I think you've had movement
here in Tennessee. I think there's been some good
movement in New Jersey. New York City, a state unto
itself, had its own child welfare litigation that has changed
things quite considerably, particularly after the recent
commissioner came in several years ago, including a
reduction of the foster care population from about 50,000 to
74
about 15,000 in New York City alone. It was done in a
way that made the system more manageable through
placement prevention as well as permanence and it gave the
caseworkers a fighting chance to success.
But it hasn't succeeded everywhere. In Philadelphia,
in 1990, Children's Rights came in and we had lots of
D.C. v. SDP, 879 A.2d 408 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005).
Goss, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
74 Press Release, New York City Administration for Children's
Services, Administration for Children's Services Unveils Major
Initiative to Strengthen New York City's Child Welfare System (Feb.
3, 2005), availableat
http://www.nyc.gov/html/acs/html/pr/pr05_02_03.shtml.
72
7'
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debates about class action, but we declined to participate in
the litigation that Children's Rights brought 75 that lasted I
think for the next nine years in the state because we felt that
targeted litigation would be more effective, and Children's
Rights has a history of comprehensive litigation. The
debate basically is whether or not targeted litigation is the
leverage point that many of us think it is, or merely a way
to displace the problem. You get targeted solutions in your
narrow litigation, but the argument is that every other part
of the system suffers. Children's Rights, supported by
many others in the field, believes that you really need a
comprehensive approach; otherwise, you end up with a
shifting of resources and you always have a part of the
system that ends up doing a disservice to children and
families.
There are others of us who think that
comprehensive litigation is too big to manage in the child
welfare system and ends up having the lawyers as well as
the judges try to balance competing values. Because kids'
rights change overtime, the issue of permanency is
complex. When does it really kick in? The Adoption and
Safe Families Act of 199776 added requirements for states
to do permanency reviews after kids are in placement for
fifteen months out of a twenty-two-month period. Courts
are still reluctant to do that when siblings are involved and
it turns out that it's been much more complicated in
implementation. When does a kid's right change from
reunification to placement? How does that get enforced?
How does it get implemented? All of these things are part
of the overall massive comprehensive litigation equation,
and I would say that there have been some unresolved
philosophical debates about the merits of this kind of
litigation.
75 Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48 (3rd Cir. 1994).
76
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The other problem is that it's hard for litigators to
create good systems. I think we are much better as lawyers
at preventing harm to kids by stopping things like
overcrowding than at creating good social work practice.
An example I think that Jackie used so well was the
difficulty we have now in Tennessee of improving the
individual caseworker's work on individual cases. That's a
chronic problem everywhere in the country, in part because
turnover is high, supervision is lousy, pay is low, and the
mission is impossible. The individual case work figuring
out whether decisions are good or bad ends up being quite
difficult unless you have something tragic happen. When
something tragic happens, that elevates these systems back
into the limelight and you have yet another either bit of
litigation, another blue ribbon commission, or another set
of newspaper exposes to deal with as litigators.
We've had some mixed success; I think we've had
some targeted success as well with the right administrators
at the right place at the right time. You described that in
correcting the change in administration here in Tennessee it
really did help and it mattered; having somebody who's
welcomed the technical assistance matters. I always
thought that as a litigator and somebody who uses a whole
range of strategies for social change, I always needed to
have really good defendants in place in order to succeed, so
that executive search became part of our change strategy so
that we could help states find people we could sue who
could succeed in the job. You need people who can actually
deliver and make the changes in their systems. I mentioned
that we've brought litigation around kinship care to
improve certification and payments of kinship care. Many
relatives take on a role of foster parents, agree to be
supervised, participate in case planning and court reviews,
but have not been compensated for their per diems for food
and clothing. We've litigated, and others have, over sibling
visits where siblings have been kept apart, and I think some
targeted litigation has some merit as well. I think it depends
250
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on context; it depends on resources. Comprehensive is
inevitably a decade's worth of litigation. If you're going
into it, you should be ready for it, whereas the other stuff
can be a little more targeted.
There are I think opportunities for appellate practice
to be a social change vehicle, an assist-in-improvement
vehicle, if you have lawyers in these cases that build a body
of law that regulates systems and can be quite effective as
well. Of course, for that to work, you need a couple of
things in place to happen. One, you actually need lawyers
representing clients in the case. What we heard from the
students and from Dean about truancy is an example of the
perils of not having attorneys in place at the beginning of a
case because - and we see this, I'll talk about this in my
discussion of the Kids-for-Cash Scandal - the idea that a
kid is not being placed at the beginning but agrees to
conditions that lead to placement later based on facts that
are wrong to begin with are reasons pretty clearly that
lawyers are necessary at the outset of these cases.
Even with lawyers, however, we in our field have
done a terrible job of building a body of appellate case law
in the child welfare system or the juvenile justice system,
for example. You take a look at most case law in the large
umbrella of family law and, for the most part, it's in
domestic relations: termination of parental rights cases are
the kinds of cases in which parents are actively involved.
There is not a culture of appeal in our practice, and I think
that our failure to build that culture has hurt kids and
families across the country. There are a lot of reasons for
that. One, the time-line for appeals doesn't really match
kids' life cycles and the case cycles, so at least - and I
don't know how it is here in Tennessee - but in
Pennsylvania you're not going to have an appeal decided
before the next six-month case review, or in Allegheny
County, the western part of Pennsylvania. They review
cases in foster care every three months. There's no
appellate process that can work in that field.
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There's a culture. You have a lot of very good
judges who care about kids deeply and who are really
insulted when their views about best interest are challenged
on appeal. I find the most difficult judges I've ever had to
deal with are judges who cared the most because they often
took the most liberties with the law, though not always as
you'll hear. The appeal process changes the relationship
and judges often did not like those of us in their courtrooms
when we challenged their efforts. But we need an appellate
body of law because, for example, "without justification"
needs a definition. In every other area of the law, appellate
courts help define what those words mean and give
guidance to trial courts so that we don't have to make this
up every case. Our law is particularly bereft of that.
There's also the issue of what our role is as lawyers
that also prevents us from often taking appeals. I have been
an opponent of the best interest lawyering for kids since the
first time I screwed up a kid's life by arguing for her best
interest rather than what she wanted me to do and
discovered that she had no reason to talk to me a second
time: when she got in trouble on the delinquency side and I
was her best interest lawyer on the dependency side, why
she would trust me not to sell her down the river on the
delinquency side as well? But one of the other things is that
when we're arguing for best interest, we're putting
ourselves in a position of offering evidence usually not
subject to cross-examination. We pretend to be experts that
were not. I've been around for thirty-six years doing this,
and I would find it very dangerous to consider me as an
expert on a child's life not subject to cross-examination, but
many judges want me to be exactly that: "What do you
think should be done in this case?" and have that
unchallenged. Then when I say it and it's paid attention to
and my client doesn't like it, I'm supposed to appeal my
own judgment. We're put in a position that is bizarre and
untenable. We are trained as lawyers and I think it's
important that we listen to our clients and put on the best
252
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case we can and, where appropriate, appeal errors of law or
abuses of discretion, but not pretend to be something that
we're not.
I would say that in Pennsylvania, where we have ten
definitions of dependent child, we have actually the worst
of all worlds. In some cases of a dependent child the
lawyers are expected to be best interest attorneys, and in
some instances, which are the old status offender cases of
truancy and ungovernability that were once in the
delinquency side but are now, since the mid '70s, in the
dependency side, we're supposed to be client-directed
lawyers. 77 So we would solve your problem in a pure
truancy case by being client-directed, but if the truant was
also abused, we would have a really hard time of figuring
out what exactly we are. In terms of law reform in the
individual case level, the role matters as well as being
around; ninety percent of this is showing up, and figuring
out the right litigation vehicle at the appropriate time is
important on the broader system reform litigation side. I'll
leave it there because I know you probably have questions
for the students, for Jackie, Dean, and me.
SALLY GOADE: I'm Sally Goade, and I'm the clerk for
the Court of Criminal Appeals but I'm interested in
practicing in this area of law. In an earlier life I was a
middle school English teacher in Nevada and Idaho and I
raised a child in those states, and I supervised student
teachers in upstate New York. I don't know quite what the
policy was there, but I was flabbergasted to learn that they
have to have a doctor's note for every absence. I know it
sounds like a little thing, but I'm thinking this has got to be
a nightmare for the schools to enforce that. As a parent, it
77 SUSAN SNYDER, PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN: AN ANALYSIS

OF CHILDREN'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN DEPENDENCY HEARINGS IN
PENNSYLVANIA n. 18 (2001), availableat

http://www.jlc.org/publications/promises-keptpromises broken/.
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would have driven me crazy. I realize that there are
probably a lot of Knox County parents here and I'm just
out of the loop, but to have to have a doctor's note for
every day that my son was sick, and he wasn't sick a lot,
but I always thought that was my judgment, whether to
keep him home. And for the students I had, that they would
have had to have that, if they were sick three days, a note
every day. I just wondered is this something that's common
throughout Tennessee, how long has it been in place, and
am I overreacting or is it a real problem with the truancy
laws that people just can't get the doctor's notes? It seems
like a huge tax on the health care system.
DEAN RIVKIN: My colleague, Barbara Dyer, who is an
adjunct member of the faculty who helps supervise our
students, she can answer that question for us.
BARBARA DYER: They do have to have a medical
excuse once they have exhausted their ten parent notes.78
SALLY GOADE: Okay. Thank you.
BARBARA DYER: The parent can make that judgment ten
times during a school year. But after those ten times, then
any absence should be a medical note from a doctor.
SALLY GOADE: Thank you for that clarification. Now
I'm not as flabbergasted.
COLLEEN STEELE: But in following up on that, I had a
client seventeen years old, just at the age where she was
still compelled to be in school, and she was undiagnosed.
She had had several absences where Mother took the option
and said, "No, I'm not sending her to school today, she just
78 KNOX COUNTY SCHOOLS PROCEDURES HANDBOOK: ATTENDANCE

(May 2003).
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can't function in school." And then they started getting her
to the doctor; they did all the diagnostics. Doctors would
write an excuse for one day, even though some of the
treatment and diagnostic tools that the doctors were
actually using kept the child out of school for two days. So
we have one day of unexcused absence even though on one
of those two days she was actually at Children's Hospital of
East Tennessee taking follow-up tests that had been ordered
by her doctor. Do we not have a uniform policy for excused
versus unexcused medical absences so that the parents
know to ask for a two-day absence slip? Because,
otherwise, it gets to the point where we're litigating it and
the parents don't know. We could actually prevent a lot of
this if they knew what the policy was. I don't think we even
have a uniform policy throughout Tennessee that go from
one county to the next, do we?
DEAN RIVKIN: No. The Tennessee Department of
Education has a very, very skimpy sort of discussion of
what are excused absences, and it comes from the
attendance statutes. 79 But what we've heard articulated
about this day-for-day need for notes is that it's not
administrable. It's so difficult to administer by school
people and to determine, they say, whether the note is for
one day and the child is absent for three or four after that.
Are those three days excusable or justified? This is an area,
one of many in attendance and truancy, which is of course a
key issue these days under No Child Left Behind 80 and
with the whole drop-out phenomenon and push-out
phenomenon. This is just one of many areas that we've
identified that really need statewide consistency; the
education statutes say these policies should be consistent,
and they're not, and there are all these conundrums in there
that make this system, frankly one of the least transparent
79 See TENN. CODE ANN. §37-1-102(b)(25)(A)(i).
80

No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. §6301 et seq. (2001).

89

7.2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 256
and accountable systems that I've ever encountered in four
decades of a legal career. I've said to a number of people,
after forty years of being a lawyer I'm in truancy court and
yet the issues are as complicated any I've encountered in
any other court.
JAMES CARNEY: I had the privilege of sitting on a
campus court in Anderson County and we see these cases
in detail with a panel with school and DCS present and I
can tell you that every one of these is different, and a lot of
this problem would be resolved if the school administration
had a counselor with the authority to review these things.
You get a parent who takes over custody halfway through
the year, doesn't know what the rules are, doesn't know
what the kid has done before, and doesn't realize that in
some jurisdictions if you bring the note in three days late
and has got a kid who doesn't know to drop it off, it's an
unexcused absence. Five times, automatically prepare a
citation. We don't do this with traffic citations. If you're
driving down the road, you've got your pregnant wife in
the right seat, and you're going to the hospital, the officer
has the ability to say, "Well, maybe I'll give you an escort."
Here, you have a kid dragged through this process, the
parents dragged through the process, because of a rule. So
we maybe need to look at it systemically and say, "Maybe
as a last resort, yes, you may need access to an attorney to
represent you, but you shouldn't have got there, your door
shouldn't have been knocked down."
DEAN RIVKIN: You're raising a really important aspect
of this system. There are screens built in, there are
procedures that school systems are obligated to have and go
through; fairly substantial obligations for interventions.
That is one of the issues that we're raising on appeal,
failure to follow those. And then of course there is Rule 8
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and 12 of the Juvenile Rules 8 1 that are screens basically,
where court officials are obligated to look at cases to
determine whether they should go forward and where there
is an opportunity there to say, "Wait, there is justification
outside of the sort of number of absences that might exist."
But, you're right, at the front end of the process is where a
lot can and should happen. Because at the back end of the
process, as we all know, the juvenile court, as much good
intention as exists, doesn't have the resources to make
things happen for a child.
JAMES CARNEY: Just to follow up, the idea of
gatekeepers at each point - so a school counselor or a
teacher could investigate this first and possibly write an
exception that could be reviewed before it goes to the
judge, the YSO, the youth services officer, to have the
ability to review this and decide if we need - should be
statutory. There should be some way to prevent in effect
what is abuse of privilege when you have these things
running forward.
DEAN RIVKIN: There are in our practice a lot of cases
that we know are ultimately screened out. We may be the
victim of seeing the really hard cases. But in most of the
cases that we've seen, these cases could and should have
been screened out also earlier. And, as I said before, there
has been change. Bob's point is right, in the administration,
for example, of the special education program here in this
county, which is a bellwether for a lot of East Tennessee,
there has been a promising change to live up to, for
example, what's called the Child Find obligation under
IDEA,82 which obligates school systems to identify
students who potentially have educational disabilities. All
the figures show that kids with educational disabilities
81 TENN. R. Juv. P. 8; TENN. R. Juv. P. 12.
12

20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3) (2010).

91

7.2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 258
represent forty to seventy percent of the number of courtinvolved children and youth. That's critical.
JAMES CARNEY: And this is great in Knox or in
Anderson where you have resources and a well-funded
school system. You get into Scott and Campbell and some
of the counties where they have very little resources, I sit in
court on those days and watch these poor juvenile judges
deal with these and they're getting them cold.
DEAN RIVKIN: Yeah.
ADRIAN BOHNENBERGER: Adrian Bohnenberger from
the Montgomery County Bar. What I'm running into and
what baffles me beyond all belief is the situation I had with
a child with a chronic illness that caused nausea every so
often. If the child got sick at school, the school system,
because of the lack of school nurses, called the parents to
take her home, and she had to be taken home even though
the nausea was something that passed relatively quickly. If
the child had nausea, she had to go home. But if they didn't
take the child immediately to the doctor and get a doctor's
note, it was an unexcused absence even though the school
was the one who sent her home. They know what caused
the problem, it's been well-documented, well-treated, it's
not something that is going to go away, and she's on
whatever medication she can be on, it was still an
unexcused absence. And it took a substantial threat of
litigation to get the school to back off. It just baffled me.
GARY FOX: Gary Fox from Loudon County Bar. Are
there any requirements for providing transportation for kids
that are placed in the alternative schools if it's located a
distance away from their home? I've got a case right now
where I'm a guardian ad litem for a young man who's been
doing very poorly in school, not doing homework, and is in
alternative setting - he can either receive three hours of
258
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homebound instruction a week with an assignment or go to
the alternative school, and is really doing a very good job
with that. He's about fifteen minutes away, eight miles
from his home to this, and they don't provide transportation
for that.
DEAN RIVKIN: We litigated a case from 2004 to 2008
called C.S.C. v. Knox County Board of Education.83 There
are a couple of appellate court decisions. One of the issues
we raised after we established the entitlement to alternative
education, and the school system set up a night program for
all students who were suspended or expelled for over ten
days was transportation. We felt there needed to be an
entitlement to transportation that went along with the
entitlement to some type of alternative education. We lost
that issue in the court of appeals, but we think it could be
maybe revisited in the right kind of case. But I'm afraid the
same is true here in Knox County; a night program that
goes from 4:30pm to 7:30pm really does exclude a number
of students who are not on transportation lines, and even if
they are, in the wintertime, going home at night. It's part of
this reform that needs to take place in terms of looking at
issues of attendance and continuing education. There's
been a heightened awareness of the need to keep kids in
school because of No Child Left Behind. 84 Whatever one
may think of that statute overall, there certainly has been a
much more focused attention on every kid. These are
systemic problems.
ROBERT SCHWARTZ: It's also an example of where
lawyers for kids working with others ought to be working
to get the legislation changed. I mean, there is one area in
federal law where kids do have a right to transportation is
83

C.S.C. v. Knox County Bd. of Educ. et al., No. E2006-00087-COA-

R3CV,
2006 WL 3731304 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
84
20 U.S.C. §6301.
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when they're homeless, and the McKinney-Vento Act
gives kids a right to go to their home school and have
transportation provided. There have been a number of
states that have been giving similar rights to foster youth:
when they change foster homes they leave different
boundaries to be able to stay in their home school. States
are divided on whether they provide transportation so kids
can get back to their own school. If you have a multi-tier
strategy as an advocate to change the legislation and then
litigate over the legislation that you've helped enact it's
easier than trying to create a right through litigation in the
first place.

DEAN RIVKIN: One of the reasons we advocate so
strongly for evaluations for students for potential special
education services is that if a student comes under that
umbrella, there's no cessation of education allowed, and, as
a related service, there is transportation. Obviously not
every student is going to be eligible, but that's another
aspect of this issue. I'd be glad to revisit this with you at
some time.
RENEE DELAVE: My name is Renee DeLave and I
worked in a rural school county for a number of years, and
if I may offer an observation and then a question connected
it. It really seems to me that the schools are very, very
ambivalent about whether they want to create an
educational environment, a beloved community type of
environment, or create really a kind of school-to-prison
pipeline. The type of power models that I certainly saw in
our schools resulted in a lack of evenhandedness in terms
of who actually got sent to the juvenile justice system. To
have a truancy charge against a child who already was in
alternative school is a very serious and compounding factor
in whether or not that child would get sent off or given
85

McKinney-Vento Act of 1987, 42 U.S.C. §11301 (1987).
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other pretty serious impairment to their freedom. That
would be the observation. My deepest concern though was
the bullying that I observed and the lack of a coherent
policy or an enforced policy, if there even was one, inside
of schools and the known correlation between that and
truancy. There's limitless documentation. I wondered if
you might talk a little bit about that issue.
ROBERT SCHWARTZ: You're raising the issue that is
now the hot issue in the United States, as states have seen
students commit suicide. You know, the Massachusetts
case 86 was a catalyst for that. In every school district in the
country right now they are trying to address bullying
curriculum. But it's going to be a transformation. I think
people are seeing the connection but that hasn't yet affected
the way schools are responding to the truant part of it. What
we are seeing is the introduction of bullying prevention
curricula at elementary school levels. The Olweus Bullying
Prevention curriculum 87 is in the blueprint for violence
prevention models out of the University of Colorado Center
on Violence Prevention. 88 So there are some examples that
have risen to the top but they're pretty slow to put in. But
it's the hot issue in the country now.
DEAN RIVKIN: And as lawyers in this field there is a
good anti-bullying statute in Tennessee that imposes certain

86 See Rick Hampson, A "Watershed" Case in School Bullying?, Apr.

5, 2010, availableat http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-0404-bullyingN.htm?csp+obnetwork.
87 See Olweus Bullying Prevention Program: Safer, More Positive
Schools, availableat

http://www.olweus.org/public/bullyingprevention_program.page.
88 See Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence: Blueprints for
Violence Prevention, availableat
http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/.
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requirements on school systems 89 and it's up to us to
enforce them in the right cases or to raise those issues.
JESSICA VAN DYKE: I'm Jessica Van Dyke, and I had a
question actually for Ms. Dixon, and that is there are a lot
of students in here today, young attorneys; can you relate
any of your experiences serving as local counsel for a
major class action lawsuit? There's a lot of people here that
want to get involved, especially in the upcoming years. Do
you have any suggestions or lessons learned from that
experience?
JACQUELINE DIXON: Wow. Like I said, I really feel like
I was just fortunate. I was in the right place at the right
time. My former partner, David Raybin, is really wellknown as a legal scholar and well-known in the criminal
law area. I'm not sure how they got his name, but they
contacted him and then he pulled me into it I think because
he knew I did a lot of domestic relations and some juvenile
court custody kinds of stuff. You know, I wish I knew. I
think if you just are aware of what's going on. I think
people that do this kind of work are very approachable.
Once they got us involved, we sort of sat and brainstormed
about other people to be involved. I think if you do a good
job in court, you get to know the judges, you maybe
become active in a Bar association where you make a lot of
contacts with people in different areas of the law, then your
name is out there. And don't hesitate to raise your hand or
speak up and say, "Hey, I want to be a part of that."
DANIEL ELLIS: Hi. I'm Daniel Ellis from the Anderson
County Bar. My question is about business records and the
three-day rule. Couldn't the three-day rule for doctor's
notes be used to invalidate just a STAR report or something
where you've got truancy, they're absent, but you don't
89 TENN. CODE ANN.

§49-6-1016 (2011).
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have anyone there to testify? Because if the three-day rule
says if you don't turn in that doctor's note within three
days, you can't turn it in, and if the business records
exception to hearsay says that it isn't trustworthy, or if
there are circumstances to indicate that it's not trustworthy,
then you shouldn't be able to rely on it. So if I have a note,
it's four days later, I'm not allowed to turn it in, well, then
your business records shouldn't be admissible because your
policy makes it not trustworthy.
DEAN RIVKIN: You see what happens when you have the
fertile minds of lawyers take on these issues? Terrific.
JESSICA VAN DYKE: At this point we're going to wrap
up this panel. They've all been fantastic. Thank you so
much for being here today. We have small tokens of our
appreciation for each panelist for being here. And I'll just
say it's so exciting, every person that's commented has
been from a different county in East Tennessee and Middle
Tennessee, and it's so fantastic to hear that we have so
many different represented counties here today.
(A break was taken)
DEAN RIVKIN: Welcome back, everybody. Austin
Kupke, who is a second-year student at the College of Law
and a student in our education law practice, got a very
coveted internship this summer with the Juvenile Law
Center in Philadelphia. I'm going to let Austin introduce
Bob for his keynote talk.
AUSTIN KUPKE: Robert Schwartz co-founded Juvenile
Law Center in 1975 and has been its executive director
since 1982. With over thirty years at Juvenile Law Center,
Mr. Schwartz is a national leader in advocating for
children's rights and has extensive experience in all areas
of juvenile law. In his career at Juvenile Law Center, Mr.
263
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Schwartz has represented dependent and delinquent
children in Pennsylvania's juvenile and appellate courts,
brought class action litigation over institutional conditions
and probation functions, testified in congress before House
and Senate committees, and has spoken in over twenty-five
states on matters relating to children and the law. Mr.
Schwartz's career has not been limited to Pennsylvania but
has included fighting nationally and internationally for
juvenile rights. From 1992 to 1998 he was chair of the
juvenile justice committee of the American Bar
Association's criminal justice section.
ROBERT SCHWARTZ: Why don't you skip some of that.
AUSTIN KUPKE: All right. I'm going to skip to the end.
He's very modest also. On behalf Tennessee Journal Law
and Policy, we're honored to have him here today. Please
join me in welcoming Mr. Schwartz and thanking him for
being here.
KEYNOTE ADDRESS
REVISITING LUZERNE COUNTY: PROMOTING

FAIRNESS, TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN JUVENILE COURT

Robert Schwartz
ROBERT SCHWARTZ: Thank you, Austin. Can you hear
me back there? Is this on enough? You're okay? Okay.
Thank you. If you can't, let me know. Thanks again for
sticking around. This is a terrific program. This lunch hour
I thought you would be interested in hearing about the
judicial corruption scandal that has had the greatest impact
in the history of the country that came out of Pennsylvania
and in which Juvenile Law Center has been intimately
involved. It's certainly affected our lives and changed our
perspective on the world in many ways and I think that
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there are aspects of it that have implications for every State
system everywhere in the country as folks look to see the
fallout of Luzerne County.
Let me just mention just for the students in the room
that in 1975 when I helped set up Juvenile Law Center it
was with three classmates from law school, we were just
out of law school at the time, and had really no clue what
we were doing. In talking with a gentleman in the back who
mentioned Mark Twain earlier, he also I think said there's
no amount you can't accomplish without the right
combination of confidence and ignorance. We were both
quite confident and quite ignorant when we opened up our
practice. We wanted to be public interest lawyers, and one
of the reasons was because the Supreme Court in 1967 had
decided In re Gault, I which gave kids for the first time a
constitutional status that enabled them to have a right to a
lawyer under the Fourteenth Amendment in delinquency
proceedings.
At the time there were new rights coming into play
in many other areas, the Education For All Handicapped
Children Act had just been passed in 1975, 2 the Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act in 1974, 3 the Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act in 1974, 4 all of these
things were just coming in and nobody had worked to
implement those laws or to give them content. So we were
very, very lucky that, as stupid as we were, we didn't know
less than other people and that helped in our ability to set
up our practice and become experts ahead of everybody
else as this edifice of children's rights was being built over
the next few decades.
1In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
for all Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. §

2 Education

1411 (1975).

3 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §

5602 (1974).
4 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5101
(1974).
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Our first office actually was a doctor's office in
Philadelphia, because we had no money, and a business
plan that really wasn't all that effective: that we could
change the world one case at a time without paying clients.
This was something that we learned pretty quickly wasn't
going to last in the long haul. But one of the women in our
group was married to a cardiologist who only used his
Center City Philadelphia office two mornings a week, so
we had it the rest of the time and shared the office with his
patients, shared the waiting room actually on Tuesday and
Thursday mornings, and made do the rest of the time using
the X-Ray machine as a desk and having the only law
office in the city with our own EKG and blood pressure
equipment. The EKG we could actually pretend with the
clients was a lie detector, because when we pulled out the
old strips, they really had no idea what we were doing, and
neither did we.
But let's take that story over again. We were a retail
shop. We represented any client who had any legal interest
as long as they were under eighteen, so name changes,
child custody. You heard about child custody earlier this
morning; we did some of that work early on. I didn't like it
very much and we eventually got out of it. Special Ed.,
school discipline, adoption, delinquency, kids transferred to
the adult system in criminal court. There was all the child
abuse-related work that was developing at the time. Mental
health commitments of kids. It turned out to be too big a
field for us, we thought it was going to be too small. And
over time we shifted from a Philadelphia-based walk-in
center to a national policy shop trying to change the world
wholesale rather than retail, and depending primarily on
national foundations for our support because we don't have
a fee-paying base. We now work and have worked for
probably the last decade on working for teenagers.
Originally, we were zero to twenty-one. But, again, if
you're doing that, early childhood education is a very
different world than keeping kids in school at the age of
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fifteen; the legal issues and the rights are different, so we
had to keep modifying and changing our identity,
geographic focus, and work plan. We worked for teenagers
in the justice system and the child welfare system, seeing
that they get what they're entitled to in education, health
care, mental health services, housing, employment, and
education. We try to ensure that kids have opportunities to
succeed when they're emerging from those systems, that
they're treated fairly by those systems, and that they aren't
hurt by those systems which are supposed to be helpful to
them.
The Luzeme County story is sort of a trifecta in that
regard because it was a story that involved depriving kids
of opportunity, inflicting harm, and treating kids unfairly.
And it began for us in a serious way four years ago. It was
April of 2007, in which a woman named Lorene Transue
called about her daughter Hillary who was fifteen years old
and was incarcerated in Pennsylvania. Lorene and Hillary
Transue lived in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, a county of
about 300,000 - old coal country in Pennsylvania, a
Democratic party machine that still was pretty much in
power, lots of poverty, lots of loss of jobs when the coal
mining industry went away. What we learned I guess was
that the major economic driver seemed to be bribes, and
that kept the community solvent. But we didn't know that at
the time.
What we knew was that Hillary had some months
earlier done a MySpace parody of her assistant principal
and said at the bottom, "I hope the assistant principal has a
sense of humor." I think one of the things Hillary learned is
that people don't get to be assistant principals of schools, at
least in my experience, because of their sense of humor. So
the assistant principal complained, the police filed a
petition charging Hillary with harassment based on the
parody, and she was called to come to the Luzerne County
Juvenile Court for the hearing. She came without a lawyer.
And this is a complicated situation that happens often to
267
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kids: a) she thought it was too trivial to warrant a lawyer; b)
that a lawyer might only make the judge mad, and why do
you really want a lawyer in that situation; c) lawyers would
be expensive to a middle class family. We'll just go down,
she'll apologize, get it over with. She arrived at the
courthouse building. Outside the courtroom was a
probation officer who sat at one of those little desks with
the artist pallet kind of desktop that we used to have in
elementary school and asked whether she had a lawyer. She
said, "No." The probation officer said, "Sign here." And
they signed a piece of paper, she and her mother, that
turned out to be her agreeing to waive her right to counsel.
She then came into the courthouse which was run
by the juvenile court judge who was also the president
judge in Luzeme County, a judge named Mark Ciavarella,
and she came in front of him and this relates to some of the
questions we heard earlier that Dean described - he asked
her, "Did you do this?" Now, it was asking a kid to
essentially say, "yes" or "no" to a question that
encompassed a lot more than yes or no related to guilt or
innocence. He didn't ask whether her conduct met the
elements of the crime of harassment, it was did you do the
MySpace parody. And she said, "Yes." "Do you
remember," the judge said, "when I came to your school
last year and spoke at an assembly and said that any kid
who came in front of me I was going to send away?" And
she said, "No." "Well, I didn't go to your school just to hear
myself talk." "Shackle her and get her out of here." That
was her hearing. It took about ninety seconds. The
transcript, such as it is, with really large font is about twoand-a-half, three pages, and that was it.
Lorene, Hillary's mother, collapsed. She didn't get a
chance to talk to her daughter, who was indeed shackled
and dragged from the courtroom and ended up going to a
detention center and then to a placement facility.
Lorene called around and finally reached us.
Different people in the State referred her to our office and
268
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we were attentive for a variety of reasons. Because of the
change of our business plan, as I mentioned, we don't take
every case that comes our way. We can't do it that way. We
generally work within our foundation-funded boundaries.
But this case was important for a variety of reasons. One,
we were just starting our fortieth anniversary celebration of
In re Gault, 5 it was 2007, and Gault's case and Hillary's
case, for those of you who have read In re Gault were
identical essentially except for the technology. Gault was a
fifteen-year-old who used a land line to call his next-door
neighbor to make what the Supreme Court called a joke or
a statement of the lewd and irritatingly offensive adolescent
variety. 6 He had been sent away for up to six years to an
Arizona training center without a lawyer, and had been
given no notice of the charges against him, and didn't have
a lawyer, and was also asked did you do it, implicating
Fifth Amendment issues, under the Fourteenth Amendment
at the time. 7 The Supreme Court in '67 said kids are persons
within the meaning of the Constitution, the Fourteenth
Amendment of which says no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law. 8 So this
Court in Gault had established constitutional personhood
and given procedural protections for what was essentially
the same offense that Hillary was adjudicated delinquent on
and incarcerated for except she used MySpace for her little
and irritatingly stupid adolescent humor. You can see why
the assistant principal would have been really irritated and
ticked off.
We also were intrigued because we had had a run-in
with this judge before. In 1999, we had received a similar
call out of Luzerne County for a twelve-year-old boy who
had been in and out of psychiatric hospitals most of his life.
5 In

re Gault, 387 U.S. 1.

6 Id. at4.
7 Id. at 5-7.

8 See generally In re Gault,

387 U.S. 1.

269

103

7.2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 270
His mother thought that he may have abused a sibling and
she had gone to Child Protective Services just to see what
should she do and they sprang into action and had him
immediately arrested and brought to court the same day,
where an adult came over and said, "This is what we're
going to do: you'll plead guilty and the judge will get you
help." So it turned out that adult was the prosecutor and the
judge found him, this boy, guilty, adjudged delinquent, sent
him to the detention center for assessment where over a
five-week period he was beaten up and stabbed by other
kids, taken off his medications and where they didn't listen
to his mother about the psychotropic medication that he
should have been receiving. By the time he got to a
placement facility, he was so badly bruised that the
placement facility filed a child abuse report against the
detention center. We did a number of things; one was to
bring an appeal around the adjudication, and the other was
a lawsuit of the sort that I was mentioning earlier around
the failure of the detention center to protect a kid or to have
staff trained in mental health issues in a way that made
them sufficient and capable of protecting a kid with serious
mental health problems. We succeeded in the litigation and
we succeeded in the appeal. 9
What's interesting is, in 2001, when Judge
Ciavarella was reversed on appeal in a fairly obvious
decision by the State Intermediate Appellate Court, he said,
"I will never again try a kid without a lawyer." That was
something that we paid attention to, because that was
reported in all of the press in Wilkes-Barre in Luzerne
County. So, now, six years later, we have a judge who is a
recidivist, and that caught our attention. We did some
investigation - and I say we, I'm here speaking but it was
largely others on the Juvenile Law Center staff; we have
9See generally J.M.K. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d
572 (3rd Cir. 2004).
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about ten attorneys who are really first-rate - and
interviewed Hillary and brought a writ of habeas corpus,
and Judge Ciavarella immediately granted it.
Now, this should have been a signal. You know, for
those of you who remember the Sherlock Holmes story
Silver Blaze about the dog that didn't bark in the nighttime,
there are signals, and when a judge immediately reverses
himself and grants a writ of habeas corpus for us, that
should have been a sign that something was amiss. But
Hillary said when we got her out, "I wasn't the only one
with a similar situation, there were a lot of other kids like
me." We said, "Have them call us and we'll investigate." So
she did, and we did. There was the case of the boy who
threw a steak at his mother's boyfriend during a domestic
dispute and was incarcerated. Now, we thought it must
have been like a javelin or something. But, actually, it was
a piece of raw meat that he threw at the boyfriend, and in
the heat of the domestic quarrel the police were called, and
took him in, Ciavarella adjudicated him delinquent without
a lawyer, and sent him away. There was the kid who was
arrested for conspiracy to shoplift when he was outside a
store that his girlfriend took a DVD from; he went away for
three months.
These were all first offenders. These are all kids
who had never been in trouble. While responses are
appropriate if they were in fact delinquent of they were
accused of being delinquent of, placement here was never
justified and also was done, again, without any process at
all, not unlike the truancy hearings that you described
earlier today that your students so well described, Dean.
We had a kid we call the scooter boy. He was told by a
next-door neighbor's kid, "I had a scooter I'll sell to you for
sixty bucks." He and his parents went over, saw it, it
seemed worth it, and the parents paid the neighbor sixty
dollars. It turned out the scooter was hot. Our client was
arrested and sent away for what ended up being a couple of
years because he didn't adjust well in placement, and his
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failure to adjust and his deterioration over time meant that
the judge kept ordering him replaced.
We heard lots of stories like that. We asked our
State Juvenile Court Judges' Commission to give us data,
because we had aggregate statewide data on waiver of
counsel, and we saw that about five percent of the cases in
Pennsylvania involved waiver of counsel. In Luzeme
County, the rate turned out to be closer to fifty-five
percent,' 0 all going back several years. This was troubling
particularly since starting in October of 2005 we had had a
new rule of procedure 1 that not only said that the right to
counsel was the kid's alone to waive, but set up an
elaborate colloquy process that the court must follow
before the kid gave up that right. None of that was followed
in Luzerne and they had a waiver of counsel rate of ten
times that of any other county in Pennsylvania. 12 We have
sixty-seven counties in our state. It also had what turned
out to be a placement rate of about two-and-a-half times
that of any other county in the state of Pennsylvania. 13
We sent a team - and I don't know, Austin, whether
you'll get a chance to do anything like this - we had some
summer law students stake out the courthouse there in
Luzerne and we set them up in disguise like with Groucho
masks outside the courthouse to interview people when
coming out, and to count to see whether there were fewer
coming out than went in, to get their stories. By the winter
10 Application of Jessica Van Reeth, H.T. & Similarly Situated Youth
for Exercise of King's Bench Power or Extraordinary Jurisdiction,
Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Exhibit E
Affidavit of Linda Bender, Director of Juvenile Justice Information and
Technology, Division of the Center for Juvenile Justice Training and
Research, Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Judges' Commission at 2, 2008,
availableat
http://www.jlc.org/files/luzernecounty/JLCLuzeme_Application Part
2.pdf [hereinafter Exhibit E].
" 37 PA. CODE § 152 (2005).
12Exhibit E, supra note 10, at 2.
U

id.
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of '07/'08 we had a pretty comprehensive idea of sort of the
railroad that was happening in the Luzerne County Juvenile
Court as kid after kid was being sent away for fairly trivial
offenses, including some that weren't even crimes under
our crimes code, like status offenses or things that just
didn't rise to a criminal level at all. There was one elevenyear-old who was locked up; had been ordered to make
restitution for riding a moped without a license, or to pay a
fine, couldn't pay the fine, and ended up spending many
months incarcerated. "I'm going to lock you up until you
have the money to pay the fine," was what the judge
ordered that eleven-year-old, and it was about a 400 dollar
fine, which is a mandatory riding a moped without a license
fine in Pennsylvania. We had a lot of stories and the trick
was what to do about it. We had enough data going back
several years, but the time for appeal had long lapsed.
Unlike statutes for adults which provide for post-conviction
relief along habeas corpus lines, we have nothing in
Pennsylvania that provides the collateral relief for juveniles
when the time of appeal has expired. So we ended up doing
what we always do when we don't know what to do, which
is make it up as we go along and used a relatively archaic
petition to our State Supreme Court asking it to assert or
assume its King's Bench jurisdiction. 14 You can see that
this goes back a ways. But it's a pretty powerful authority it
has when it does assume King's Bench jurisdiction because
it can do almost anything by way of equitable relief that's in
the public interest. So we had asked for it to assume
jurisdiction, figure out what to do, and provide relief for the
hundreds of kids whose rights had been violated by being
processed without lawyers in the Luzerne County Court.
We filed our King's Bench petition. We had a
couple of really useful allies, because we also thought that
Juvenile Law Center Petitions PA Supreme Court for Extraordinary
Relief for Hundreds of Youth Tried Without the Benefit of Lawyers,
available at http://www.jlc.org/news/luzemecounty/.
14

273

107

7.2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 274
asking for relief of this sort was as much a political act as a
legal act. "At least our Supreme Court," as Mr. Dooley
once said, "pays attention to the election returns." That's
probably not true here in Tennessee, but we had a
Republican Attorney General who is now our Governor as
of January. I called and asked whether he would file an
amicus on our behalf in the interest of justice, kids were
being treated unfairly, and, to his credit, he stepped up and
did, and he had a tough re-election campaign that year and
he was able to frame it saying I'm not condoning what the
kids did, but no kid should be treated unfairly in this way.
The State Department of Public Welfare under Democrat
Governor Ed Rendell at the time filed an amicus brief on
our behalf, too saying that the placement rate was so out of
line here; there's something rotten in Denmark, effectively.
Our court didn't act very quickly, but we did very,
very quickly get a call from the FBI wanting to know what
we knew. We said, "What do you know?," and they said,
"We're the FBI, we don't tell you what we know, we ask
you what you know." We blinked first and told them what
we had discovered and where our investigations had taken
us, and we also gave the FBI and the U.S. Attorney for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania where Wilkes-Barre is
located, near Scranton, a little primer on the juvenile justice
system. That summer of 2008 they got a warrant and seized
all the juvenile probation records in the juvenile court, so
we knew something was up. The press was giving us a lot
of very good coverage and we were hearing more and more
stories. Our Supreme Court didn't act at all during 2008.
December of that year we filed a supplemental
proceeding' 5 because we had had many, many more
juvenile cases of kids who had been locked up for trivial
offenses, that once Hillary and a few others came forward,
other parents felt comfortable stepping up. It was very odd
15

Post-Submission Communication, Dec. 2008,

http://www.jlc.org/luzernestatesupreme-court-litigation/.
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that the parents were ashamed and embarrassed; they had
not protected their kids, but nobody had said anything.
Now people were beginning to come out of the woodwork.
We filed a supplemental proceeding saying even though
Judge Ciavarella had stepped down from juvenile court
voluntarily that May, which was right after we filed our
pleadings, kids were still in placement and still had records,
many going back years, and these records were affecting
their ability to get into college, enter the military, get jobs;
their lives were effectively destroyed in many cases. The
Supreme Court in the second week of January of 2009 with
a one sentence per curiam order denied our application for
King's Bench jurisdiction. We didn't know why. We
thought we had lined up things pretty powerfully, but we
hadn't at least adequately made the case in their view.
Two weeks later the U.S. Attorney from the Middle
District held a press conference and announced that two
bills of information had been filed alleging that Judge
Ciavarella and the former president judge, Judge Conahan,
had received at that time 2.6 million dollars from the
contractor, builder, and owner of the for-profit detention
center to which many of these kids were being sent. Not
only were these judges engaged in wire fraud and tax
evasion, but they were part of a larger conspiracy to keep
the beds filled in return for the payments, and that part of
what was going on as the subtext for our work was a large
corrupt bartering that had led to the way the judge behaved.
Now, of course, all hell broke loose in the state. We
were aware that there was a new detention center. It turns
out that Judges Conahan and Ciavarella used that as an
opportunity to convince the County commissioners to enter
into a twenty-year, fifty-eight million dollar lease with the
for-profit entity that was building the new facility, after our
earlier litigation over the abuses at the former detention
center. What we also learned at the time, although it turned
out that there was no connection, was one of the two
primary owners of the for-profit facility was the son of a
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former Chief Justice on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
So we thought that there were connections there, and it
turned out that there's been no evidence to connect him at
all with this enterprise.
But everything was still unfolding at the time in
early 2009. The Supreme Court immediately reversed itself
and granted our petition. They did it two steps. First, they
granted our petition by press release, which was the
quickest way to let the world know that it would eventually
grant it officially through court order. 16 By mid-February
of 2009, it had assumed jurisdiction under its King's Bench
authority and appointed a special master, a wonderful
senior judge from Reading, Pennsylvania named Arthur
Grim who is also head of our Juvenile Court Judges'
Commission and was a very, very good jurist. What we
really have here is a Kids-For-Cash Scandal with what I
think of as four different story lines. One is what happened
in State court related to the King's Bench jurisdiction and
the Supreme Court's exercise of it. Two is the federal
criminal indictments. Three is a federal civil litigation that's
going on. And four are the legislative and rule-making
regulatory responses in the wake of that. So I want to take
each of those in sequence. First, as soon as the U.S.
attorney acted, we filed yet another amended King's Bench
application. 17 We knew we had a receptive audience at this
time. Even though it was untimely because we were now
three days past the fourteen day time limit, we were well
able to file a nunc pro tunc application asking for the Court
to treat it as though it were timely filed. There was no way
in the world they were going to dismiss this for being
untimely at this point because they had gotten a lot of bad
16PA

Supreme Court Order: Feb. 11, 2009, availableat

http://www.jlc.org/luzernestate-supremecourtlitigation/.
17JLC Application for Reconsideration to the PA Supreme Court, Jan.
29, 2009, availableat
http://www.jlc.org/pages/luzeme-state_supremecourt-litigation/.
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press for not acting on the original petitions. We spent the
next year litigating what was effectively 6,500 cases of
4,500 kids going back to 2000 when Judge Ciavarella
became administrative judge. We argued that all of these
kids had appeared before a biased tribunal, many of them
without counsel, and that under Pennsylvania case law 100
percent of the cases were tainted. The district attorney
fought to a degree. The original strategy of the defense and this was what we think of as the obscenity of this
whole situation - is that the DA's office opposed our
original motions saying we only named a few named
plaintiffs and that therefore we hadn't shown that this
scandal was wide and deep; this was from an office that
had a representative in the courtroom in every case for
every kid because they were prosecuting it. They changed
that actually after the indictments came down and there was
sequences of cases that we had to deal with, the kids who
were all sent to the for-profit facility without, in some
cases, lawyers were one category, and then there were other
more serious cases. But eventually, by January of last year,
on the one-year anniversary of the King's Bench petition
being accepted, the Court accepted all of the special
master's recommendations and ordered that all the
delinquency adjudications be vacated back to 2003 and all
of the records be expunged for all those kids. We got that
done without a single case being retried. That was a
particularly important step as part of the healing in
Luzerne.
Needless to say, there were also a lot of mental
health interventions and support from the Mental Health
Association in Pennsylvania. Frankly, there were also
interventions needed for original victims, because out of
those cases there were cases of kids who had hurt other
people or stolen or done things that required intervention,
and, in fact, the legislature last year created a fund for the
original victims' original crime for restitution purposes. But
the first thing was to get records expunged, and that's
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turned out to be a lot harder and slower than we thought
because we wanted the records wherever they were to be
erased, and it wasn't just finding the court records or the
State police records; we also had to track kids to wherever
they were. The collateral rippling effects of these orders are
still having an effect because some kids who were
subsequently arrested as adults who had their sentences
enhanced by juvenile record scores had to have
recalibration of their offenses.
There have been many other situations that have
had to be resolved, and we were too late for some kids. One
of the kids committed suicide last month in a horrible
situation; some of you may have seen his mother on TV
after the Ciavarella verdict on the criminal side. So this is
still a case that is having its impact.
We also filed in February of '09 a federal civil
rights damage action with pro bono counsel from a
Philadelphia law firm Hangley, Aronchick, Segal & Pudlin.
The Segal is a board member and brought the resources of
his firm to bear. There were many other lawsuits coming
out of Luzerne, some for private damage action on behalf
of individuals and at least one other class action. We
couldn't get a lot of help, actually, from people while we
were investigating up there, but as soon as the scandal
broke, there were bus ads for lawyers and TV ads breaking
out. The case is going on. We filed damage actions against
the judges' wives who were part of the money laundering
scheme because they set up the accounts, and the judges
got very rich, as did the owner, a former County solicitor,
who was the primary briber. They had condos in Florida,
bought a yacht called Reel Justice, R-E-E-L, I guess for
their fishing, and they made out quite handsomely.
The judges' wives are out from motions to dismiss.
The judges are in and out. As you know, judges have
absolute immunity for conduct taken while on the bench.
We thought we could pierce that immunity by arguing
essentially that what they ran was a star chamber, it wasn't
278

112

7.2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 279
a bench, the kind that we would recognize, and that in fact
corrupt conduct over a five-year period in 6,500 cases was
not the kind of conduct that the judicial immunity doctrine
was designed to protect. We had many former judges sign
on as amici to us, but the District Court judge rejected that,
absolute immunity is absolute immunity. The judges are
still in for their conduct as administrators, including their
work in getting the detention center built and getting the
contract in place and some of their other administrative
conduct. We can't appeal that until after the case ends. I'm
not sure how much it's worth. The judges will not have
money left by the time this case is over. While it turns out
that they are representing themselves on the civil side - I
guess once again demonstrating their appreciation for the
value of lawyers and replicating something that happened
in their court with kids - they are paying a lot of money to
be represented on the criminal side. There are lots of fines
against them as well. They're not going to have very much,
so this is largely a theoretical issue about judicial
immunity.
The County is the other defendant that was able to
drop out. We tried to create a Monell v. Department of
Social Services of the City of New York." I think it's a
circumstance that the State and County policies around
training affected the way that the County prosecutors
behaved and that that failure was in part a cause of what
happened in Luzeme, but the federal judge decided that the
prosecutors were, for purposes of this litigation, State
employees, not County employees, and that we couldn't
bring the County in.
All the other defendants are in, all our causes of
action are in, including civil RICO 19 claims, as well as

18 Monell

v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

19 Rackateer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.
§1964 (1995).
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claims against the defendants for depriving the kids of an
impartial tribunal in a number of other ways.
All of this, by the way, all the pleadings and the
stories behind this are on our Web site at jlc.org, and it does
make, I think, for pretty interesting reading; terrifying
reading at the same time.
The judges in their initial guilty pleas had agreed to
accept eighty-seven months in federal prison. Then they
started squirming. Judge Ciavarella basically was
pronouncing his innocence constantly and couldn't stop
talking to TV cameras. Judge Conahan was constantly
evasive in his negotiations with the federal probation
department. The result was that the federal judge rejected
the guilty pleas and gave the defendant judges the usual
options: "You could come before me on an open plea and
I'll decide your sentence or you can withdraw the guilty
pleas." The two judges at the time decided to withdraw the
guilty pleas. Judge Conahan reconsidered and pleaded
guilty last summer to one count of the many charges
against him, one RICO claim or wire fraud claim, I forget
which, that would expose him to up to twenty years in jail.
And Judge Ciavarella insisted on going to trial, and his trial
took place in February. It was a very interesting
proceeding, partly because of the choices the U.S. attorneys
made. I thought of this as something of an Al Capone-like
trial in the sense that they really focused on tax fraud, wire
fraud, and other kinds of fiscal evasions, and put on very
little evidence around kids for cash.
Ciavarella, I think, had wanted exactly that kind of
prosecution, because he had been saying all along that
basically, "Yeah, I broke the law but I didn't lock any kid
up for cash." I think he had convinced himself that he
wasn't that bad of a person and went to trial in a "don't
throw me in the briar patch" approach that the U.S.
attorneys bought into. They tried the case that played to
Ciavarella's interests in claiming as he did after he was
convicted, on only twelve of the thirty-nine counts that
280
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were brought against him, that he was vindicated. He's
facing about 150 years. He went before the cameras
afterwards to claim that the jury verdict, which acquitted
him of some of the extortion and bribery charges but not of
the tax charges to which he so readily admitted while on
the stand, was a vindication of him. That's what led the
mother of the boy who committed suicide to explode on
camera at the time that Ciavarella was holding his press
briefing after his conviction, and I think may yet not serve
him very well when it comes time for the federal court to
sentence him sometime later in the year. Ironically, he has
now replicated the exact conduct that led the federal judge
to reject his first guilty plea. One wonders exactly what he
and his lawyers' strategy is now for sentencing when he has
been telling the judge that you were wrong the first time
when you rejected my eighty-seven-month plea.
So, we have the King's Bench piece. We have the
federal civil damage action. We have the federal criminal
actions. And then we have a "what do you do to prevent
something like this from ever happening again?" I actually
am fairly proud of Pennsylvania's juvenile justice system as
a whole. We've done a lot of very good things. All public
systems are imperfect, some more or less so, as you know
in the child welfare side from what you've heard earlier
today, and the Pennsylvania system is generally judgebased - judges retain control of all cases in our system
from beginning to end exactly like they do in child welfare
cases. There's no state system or youth authority to which
kids get placed. Kids have a right to counsel at every stage
of the proceeding in dependency and delinquency
proceedings. It's a very community-based system as a
whole, a lot of private nonprofit resources rather than
training schools. But Luzerne was a stain on the state in a
way that had everybody do more than just lift eyebrows. In
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20
2009 the legislature created an Interbranch Commission
to investigate and to make recommendations. They did a
tremendous job. It was an eleven-person commission that
included some D.A.s, judges, defenders, and citizen
advocates. They took testimony; some of it was chilling.
The District Attorney said, "What is a person to do?," and
the head of the commission, a real gentleman, a senior
judge named John Cleland just exploded and said, "You
report what you see, that's what a person is to do. When
you're a D.A. responsible for ensuring that justice is done
in the courtroom!" The judges were silent in thousands of
cases; defense attorneys were nowhere. The public
defender in the county was perfectly willing, when his
attorneys came to him and said, "You know we have some
problems," to say, "It's not our cases." Seeing kids dragged
off day after day. "Not our cases." "We have a big enough
case load." Now, this is a public defender who resigned last
year because it turned out that he too had billed the County
for overtime and weekend work that as a manager he wasn't
entitled to bill for. But he also never really paid much
attention to juvenile court, neither did the D.A. for that
matter; it was a court that was out of sight and out of mind
as far as they were concerned, and Judge Ciavarella was
known as a person who didn't brook lawyers very much or
very well anyway. Private lawyers said nothing; they saw
what was happening. Juvenile probation said nothing, even
though they were asked to alter the court documents to
show that they had ordered detention when in fact they had
recommended community release. There was a whole
community conspiracy of silence in that courtroom. I don't
know if you remember "A Bad Day at Black Rock" with

Spencer Tracy - it's probably before your time maybe - but
The Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania, The Interbranch
Commission on Juvenile Justice,
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/Links/Public/InterbranchCommissionJuv
20

enileJustice.htm.
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you should watch it, it's a good movie, where Robert Ryan
goes down at the end. Communities of silence do a lot of
harm. And our legal community failed kids enormously by
not standing up. That was one of the chief findings: that
everybody failed. The judicial conduct board in our state
had received reports and complaints that it didn't act on
because it had heard that there was a criminal investigation
going on; "We can't get involved in judicial misconduct,
we'd rather let the judges stay on the bench than interfere
with a potential criminal prosecution." Unheard of
anywhere else in the world, but our guys let it happen. It's
very hard to change given the way our Judicial
Conduct
2
Board is embedded in our State Constitution. 1
There were many other problems that the
Interbranch Commission found. We submitted a lengthy
report that is also on our Web site 22 - the title of my talk
today is the title of our report, so it's easily found - in
which we talk about the importance of counsel for kids and
other things. At the end of the day the Interbranch
Commission made numerous recommendations, about forty
of them related to judicial training and training of lawyers.
We think training is important but doesn't go nearly far
enough. We asked for a number of things, for example a
ban on shackling of kids in courtrooms unless there's
necessity based on evidence related to risk of flight or
injury to others. We have 300-pound murder defendants in
adult court who aren't shackled when they're brought into
court; you protect the courtroom in other ways. Yet the
twelve-year-old mentally ill kid, eighty pounds of him, is
under wraps and metal. There's no excuse for treating kids
that way. The issue of a right to counsel is another
example. We recommended, and have been arguing fairly
21 See

generally Penn. Const. art. 5, § 18.

22 Lessons from Luzerne County: Promoting Fairness, Transparency

and Accountability,
http://www.jlc.org/files/JuvenileLawCenterReport.pdf.
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fiercely now, that not only do kids have a right to counsel
but they ought not to have a right to waive counsel in
juvenile court. It's the right from which all other rights flow
or are exercised. Kids are not informed enough. There's a
lot of pressure on them, including pressure from parents not
to pay for counsel or not to risk offending a judge. You
want lawyers who are at times offending judges, who are
making the cases for kids, who are putting in evidence.
That now is an issue of rule-making by our State Supreme
Court.23 We will get, I think, a presumption that every kid
in court is indigent, so appointing a counsel will not depend
on whether parents can pay.
We needed to set up an appellate system. We have
no appeals. As we had talked about on the child welfare
side, it's essentially a lawless system. But it's not only
Pennsylvania. There are very few appeals in delinquency
cases anywhere in the country. Issues like disposition,
whether this was the right intervention given this kid at this
time with these facts. We occasionally see appeals of the
adjudication based on "well it really wasn't aggravated
assault, it was simple assault." But you never see appeals
for "this kid should not have been sent to the training
school." Also, you need a quick appeal process. Even a
ninety-day process would not have helped most of the kids
that we represented in Luzerne. The beauty of Ciavarella's
work is that he sentenced almost all these kids to ninety
days at a time. They'd be out and their appeals would be
moot for the most part by the time they acted.
We want easier ways to get records expunged in the
State. We've made recommendations on that. We've talked
about opening up juvenile court in appropriate
23 In the summer of 2011, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted

many of Juvenile Law Center's recommendations. See generally New
PA Rules Require Juvenile Courts to Address Needs of Youth in Child
Welfare, Juvenile Justice Systems,
http://www.jlc.org/news/new parules requirejuvenilecourts-to-add
ressneeds of youth/.
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circumstances. It is really a court that has no public
presence. It's our fault as well. The press has had the right
to go into juvenile courts in Pennsylvania in serious cases
since 1996, but nobody shows up. It's a court that has really
been overlooked and abandoned by too many people in too
many places.
We have a series of recommendations. The
legislature has been slow to act. This spring, finally, we
have bills being introduced related to shackling, related to
waiver of counsel, presumption of indigence, expungement,
and we're beginning to make headway. We're working on
all four fronts with Luzerne. The first one on records and
expungement is almost done. The litigation may end in my
lifetime, I'm not sure. We still have to get through the
discovery and trial phases, as it looks like the civil case will
not be settled. And the judges have yet to be sentenced, so
await word on that this year. The legislative reforms are
still coming, but many of them are reforms that everyone
anywhere in the country should consider. Let me pause
there and take questions on the things that I have omitted,
left out, or maybe you think I exaggerated.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'm very glad that you came
down today and discussed this with us, because when I
heard you were from Pennsylvania, the first thing that
entered my mind was how people in Pennsylvania felt
about that. But I've noticed, being an attorney here in
Tennessee, we're not without sin either, as I'm representing
an adult in Tennessee, I can go over to the adult detention
facility, I can basically walk through the place without
being harassed, be treated very respectfully by everybody
there. When I see my client, I can go into a room, have a
private conversation with him, stay as long as I like, and, as
I said, be treated respectfully the entire time. I took on a
case of a juvenile that was an appeal and I went to
Mountainview and I went to see my fourteen-year-old
client over there. What impressed me was that the security
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was tighter there than it was at the adult prison where I was
representing some hardened criminals. When I went to
converse with my client, it was in a large room and, by the
way, I was told that I could only come to see him on
Saturdays between a certain time. I went to talk to him and
asked to have some alone time with him, because there was
a huge room where everybody, parents and everybody, was
visiting. I had a chair that I had to sit in and he had to sit
beside of me and we had to face forward and there were
folks all around us that could hear every word we were
saying. When I got up and sort of moved our chair over to
the comer of the room ROBERT SCHWARTZ: That got their attention, didn't it?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: - I was threatened. I was
threatened with arrest. There were about four guards that
came over to me, they didn't touch me, they didn't grab me,
but boy they sure as hell let me know that they were there
and that I was to comply with their rules. And I got sort of
into an argument with them over the fact that I was there on
business, I wasn't visiting my kid. In representing that
juvenile that turned out to be the most frustrating event of
my life, because I've never seen a place where children, and
attorneys for that matter, were treated with such disrespect.
The way that they acted is "this kid is here, he's going to
stay here." When I finally got my appeal before the Circuit
Court judge, it was a pretty brief appeal. The judge asked
me how my client was doing being there in that detention
facility. And I was proud to say, "Oh, he's doing great."
And he said, "Well good, let him stay there, case
dismissed." And when I stood there sort of stammering,
again I was told, "Hey this case is over, get out of here."
ROBERT SCHWARTZ: Yeah. I think what you're
describing is the power relationship that exists in the
juvenile court world. I've had similar experiences with my
286
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first visits to see kids in placement. And I didn't get a lot of
help from judges. I remember once very smugly saying to
the staff at the facility, "All right, you don't want me to see
my client alone here? Let's just call the emergency judge." I
was sure that any judge would order me to be able to see
my kid immediately. This is like never asking a question
you don't know the answer to on cross. The emergency
judge said, "What's the problem? Can't you work it out?
No, I'm not going to order them to do things." It took a lot
of work for me to get a culture change where lawyers could
go in places in Pennsylvania and see their clients and talk
to them alone. Many of these places make up their rules as
they go along, and that, again, contributes to the
lawlessness of our world. There are a lot of great judges,
there are a lot of great lawyers, there are a lot of decisions
that are correct; that's true in every aspect of our law. There
are also a lot of abuses of power and incorrect decisions.
And people ask me, "Can Luzerne happen elsewhere or is it
happening elsewhere in Pennsylvania?" It's not that the
bribes are happening; it's that there are cases in which some
judges act arbitrarily without anybody challenging them.
There are places where kids are sent where lawyers like
you can't speak to them. We have an obligation to step up,
because we're the last line of defense and we're all the kids
have quite often.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I've got a question for you,
please, about whether, due to the sheer number of cases
involving trauma to kids that you guys heard, there was any
secondary trauma that you observed in yourselves?
ROBERT SCHWARTZ: That's a good question. I don't
think so. I mean, when you do this work, you see a lot, and
I think we were constantly appalled. What we saw fueled
our anger and passion and we don't like to lose, for one.
And, two, we were determined not to let go. I was very
proud of our staff. They were like little terriers on the heels
287
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of these judges and they wouldn't let go. We just got
angrier and angrier and more focused. Once the FBI stuff
broke, all of a sudden we had a lot of backing and I don't
think we had any secondary trauma. I think we felt some
kind of vindication. Whatever the opposite of trauma is
then, that's what we had.
COLLEEN STEELE: Following up on that, what about
marriage rate and divorce rate in that area? A very hard
thing for a marriage to sustain is having a child who is
incarcerated for a length of time. Marriages will fall apart
as a result of that kind of stressor I would think.
ROBERT SCHWARTZ: That's a great question, and I don't
know the answer. It's something we should probably look
into. I think it's an important part of the story line. And,
actually, there are people writing things about this that we
could ask to look into it. A guy is writing a book. We
should say do a chapter on that.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Regarding expungements,
are you referring here to expungements on individual
delinquency matters or at the beginning of the eighteenth
year of the child?
ROBERT SCHWARTZ: We were talking about in
individual delinquency matters. Generally, the public has a
view that is incorrect in almost every state, that when a kid
turns eighteen, records disappear. In fact, as we know,
records don't disappear unless somebody makes them
disappear. In most cases, records are correctly kept. Serious
offenses, you want know that this was a serious offender,
and it's important to have a record. But for many minor
offenses, including a lot of arrests that have never led to an
adjudication, those end up really dogging kids for life. The
American Bar Association has a collateral consequences
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project now 24 that is looking at a fifty state review of the

way juvenile adjudications affect kids' lives from getting
into college, to drivers' licenses, to employment practices,
to almost everything, and expungement is one way to get
relief, but lawyers are needed in most cases to do that
because there's almost no automatic expungement for kids.
JESSICA VAN DYKE: Thank you so much. Please join
me in thanking him. At this point we are going to take a
break.
(A break was taken)
JESSICA VAN DYKE: Before we start panel three, I
wanted to very briefly mention that we started planning this
symposium last October/November, over Christmas
vacation. There have been many people who have been
incredibly helpful, including all the Journal members and
Jeff, who does all of the technical stuff that I could never
even begin to do. So, a lot of work has been done, and
we're thankful for all of those people. Also, when you
signed up for CLE credit, you signed up with Micki Fox.
Micki makes the world go round here at the College of
Law. We had over 100 attorneys that ended up signing up
and showing up today, and that's a huge amount of work
for one person. Her assistant, Kaitlyn, is also incredibly
helpful, so we're just so thankful for her.
Corinna Brock is Professor White's assistant and
works for the Center for Advocacy and Dispute Resolution.
And finally, we have Professor White, who was actually
named the Outstanding Professor of the Year this year by
her students. She's a real role model for all of us and really
strives to achieve justice and help out the College of Law.

Think Before You Plea: Juvenile Collateral Consequences in the
United States, http://www.beforeyouplea.com/.
24
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So please thank all these people. They've been tremendous
in putting today together.
JOHN EVANS: I'd certainly like to echo everything Jessica
said, and I'd like to recognize her because she put in
countless hours, especially this week, and I owe her that. I
think we've done an excellent job of covering the legal
aspects of protecting children, but as you notice, the title of
this symposium is "The Politics of Protecting Children,"
and one very important aspect of that is the political field.
So, we want to have one panel dedicated to some of those
issues in public budgeting and political aspects. So, we put
together what I believe is a wonderful panel to talk about
legal and ethical responsibilities of protecting children in a
political-type frame. With us on this panel is
Representative Sherry Jones. She's in the Tennessee
General Assembly representing District 59. We have
Connie Steere, who is an executive director for CASA in
Kingsport. And we have Mary Walker, who works with
Big Brothers and Big Sisters of Middle Tennessee, and she
was former general counsel for the Department of
Children's Services. So I'll turn it over to them. Thank you
all so much for being here.
PANEL DISCUSSION

3:

CONFRONTING POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

Representative Sherry Jones
Connie Steere
Mary Walker
CONNIE STEERE: The three of us have already discussed
that we don't know if we can sit there that long. I know I
can't. Anybody that knows me knows I'm a little hyper, so
I'm standing. I prepared a few slides just to give you an
idea of what CASA is, rather than me just talking. So if you
290
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will, just concentrate and speed read. (Whereupon a
slideshow was shown).
(Title of first slide) "Indispensable for Justice." Our
Bar associations work very closely with us. We're
stabilizing instead of moving up. There are more quotes
from guardians ad litem coming up so please read them.
Here is why I believe the CASA programs are effective.
Notice from left to right, we're having to do a whole lot
more fund raising to try to meet the need. One of our
judges, a Bristol judge, has a quote at the bottom. Here's
one of our programs serving Sullivan and Hawkins, but
there's twenty-five programs across the state of Tennessee
serving forty-two counties, not ninety-five, and this is
where I am right now.
With the topic that John Evans sent me, these are a
few things I'd like to go over. I'm mostly going to talk
about CASA because I've been the executive director of
CASA for Kids in Sullivan and Hawkins Counties for the
past fifteen years. I took the job after coming off residential
for over 1,000 teenagers, so I do know about children and
youth in state custody. I really thought that the CASA
Program, with what we do, serving abused and neglected
children and getting concerned citizens to want to help and because I can make connections, I can talk to
businesses, and I knew the judges already so we were
welcome in the courtroom - I'd only need about three to
five years, and we could be serving 100 percent of those
children. As hard as we've worked, we're only still at fortyseven percent, and that's probably one of the highest
percentages across the United States, well not the United
States, but in Tennessee because some state CASA
programs are 100 percent funded. However, you'll be
surprised to hear me say that I don't want to see 100 percent
funding. I really don't. Because we're a nonprofit of
concerned citizens, and we need the whole community,
every county in every state in the union, to care about
children, all children, whether they're your own children or
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not. Because if we don't, we all lose. The first day of the
month of April is Child Abuse Prevention and Awareness
Month, so that's why I wanted to come. I thought April, and
so I'm here. And as a legal body, a political body, we're all
involved in this whether we want to be or not or whether
we know it or not.
(Title of next slide) "Ethical CASA Confronts
Protecting Children in the Courtroom." These are some
points in ethics that will depend on the beholder. I looked at
the role of being a volunteer because that's what we are in
the CASA programs. We're volunteers, except for the staff
that we manage to hire like my host there, Amy Williams,
who used to be on my staff and is now in your College of
Law here at UT. They're volunteers that advocate for the
best interest of abused and neglected children in juvenile
court. One of the ethical problems is that you are only a
volunteer. We like to point out that our judges, the five that
we work with in Sullivan and Hawkins Counties, are not
just my special advocates, they've gone through over fifty
hours of professional training, and I just swore them in as
officers of the court. I want to hear what they have to say
because they're moms and dads, brothers and sisters, nieces
and nephews, business people, teachers, and nurses that
care about kids. I want to hear what they have to say
because they've done investigations, and they are only there
for the best interest of the child.
Another area you could call ethics, maybe as far as
the law, is confidential reports. Sometimes we are told that
our confidential reports to the court, which sometimes can
be thirty to forty pages long by the time we get all the
medical records, criminal records, employment records and
everything else to go along with our assessment and
recommendation, are full of hearsay. I'm not going to deny
that. It is hearsay, but it's reliable hearsay according to
Judges Toohey, Luethke, Lauderback, Kennedy and Taylor.
It's reliable because I just swore them in as officers of the
court, and I trust that they have done their homework and
292
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investigated well. And if not, it's up to executive directors
like myself to make sure that you've got a good, educated,
nonbiased, hard-working volunteer.
(Title of next slide) "Right of Discovery, Ethical."
Every attorney in that hearing has the right of discovery.
That is tough sometimes for volunteers to accept, but it's
the right of anybody who has counsel. However, we do
want the attorneys, the court and judges, and all parties to
realize that sometimes that right of discovery can
compromise the safety of the child as they go back home.
Also, as far as continuances, I think that can be an ethical
problem in regards to children brought to the attention of
the court due to allegations of abuse and neglect. The
child's sense of time is now. They need protection now.
They need their circumstances
improved now.
Continuances are continued and continued and continued,
and that thirty-day hearing becomes much, much longer
than before the adjudication and the disposition. That's
what we, as advocates, are not pleased about and are
disappointed for the child.
The next one (motioning to next slide). As part of
the legal community, I believe a guardian ad litem attorney
should be on every hearing, every single one. With CASA
and a guardian ad litem attorney working together, we can
help and present a lot of information to the judge. But
CASA cannot legally question or legally present the case.
At the same time, if you quickly read those quotes, you will
see our guardian ad litem attorneys, who we have worked
closely with for a long time, say right up front that we can't
do all that you do, and our judges say the same thing.
Attorneys don't have the time, and especially at the
payment base of what guardian ad litem attorneys make in
juvenile court, they do not always want to take the time
because they're not going to get reimbursed a whole lot.
Also, they can take other cases instead. So, I read up a little
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bit on that, and with that and D&N,1 and also with custody
and 40A, 2 every one of the custody cases that we work in
Sullivan and Hawkins Counties are allegations of neglect,
and sometimes they're more complicated and take longer to
really ensure the child's safety than your full D&N cases.
That's just the reality of how the petitions come in, whether
they're relatives or they're already removed from the home
and in the custody of Children's Services. So at the same
time, a guardian ad litem in custody cases needs to be able
to act as an attorney and really present the case, and right
now, my understanding of 40A 3 is that it isn't really a part
of it.
Now for a couple of illustrations of guardians ad
litem and CASA working together. About a month-and-ahalf ago now, I came in on a Sunday afternoon - I work
quite a bit on the weekends just to get all the grants and
fund raising and everything done - and there was our
newest guardian ad litem, who had been appointed to a lot
of our cases in Kingsport, the CASA volunteer, and one of
my volunteer coordinator staff sitting at the conference
table on the program suite side and working away on a
case. I left, and five hours later, they were still there
wanting to adequately prepare the defense of an in the best
interest of the child case that they were appointed to as a
special advocate and as a guardian ad litem attorney.
Another one was one of the vignettes that turned in
to IOLTA 4 with the Tennessee Bar Foundation that we
have a grant with. A lot of the CASA programs also have
IOLTA grants on the Interest on Legal Trust Account in
Tennessee. One of my coordinators on the vignette reported
how a guardian ad litem attorney had taken a private plane.
I meant to ask before I left yesterday and didn't, whether it
'Dependency and Neglect.

2 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40A.
3id.

4 Interest on Legal Trust Accounts.
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was his own or if it was a friend's, but he took, as a
guardian ad litem attorney, another coordinator on staff and
the CASA volunteer and flew to Charleston, West Virginia
to guarantee that the relative placement or custody was
going to be in a safe and permanent home and could
adequately report that to the court. It was all on their own.
He didn't bill it. He can afford it. The other illustration was
the first one regarding our newest guardian ad litem. It was
the one about a Sunday afternoon at CASA for Kids
headquarters. She's just out of law school, and we already
discussed among staff that she probably won't do it much
more than another year or so, because financially she's got
big debt from law school. But we needed her, and when I
say we, I mean abused and neglected children coming to
the attention of juvenile court.
(Title of next slide) "Political challenges." Well, the
State budget is one, and CASA's affiliation sometimes gets
lost in that State budget. Right now, we are under the
control of TCCY, that's Tennessee Commission on
Children and Youth, and we're happy and proud to be there.
Linda O'Neal is a great champion. However, amongst the
budget of TCCY, CASA is just where it is. It is DCSmoney that's channeled through. However, if I was over at
DCS, I certainly would want most of, or a high majority of,
that money going to DCS, not to CASA. In some states,
CASA is a line item on the budget for research. Again, I
really don't want it to be, and it would be nice if it was
enhanced a little bit more than it is. Instead of forty-two
counties, it could be all ninety-five, but I don't want it to be
because you can get a grassroots movement in each
community with CASA, a nonprofit.
Election changes are always a challenge because
when election changes come, administrations change,
policies change, and procedures change, and for DCS,
some of their practices change. All of that change is
sometimes good. However, sometimes it just kind of
revolves, and if you've been in the business of social
295
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services long enough, such as way back when the
Department of Human Services and the Department of
Children's Services was all one, you know.
Well, then we separated, and we had ACCT,
Accredited Care and Coordination Teams. Then we went to
DCS, and then we went back. Each time, it is challenging.
It is challenging to keep up with the politics of it. With
legislative changes in family law, you go from
grandparents, who have no rights in visitation and custody,
to grandparents certainly having rights, but only if it's in the
best interest. However, then you have to figure out whether
it is in the best interest of the child. Is it allegiance to the
mom and dad, or is it to the grandchild? So laws change
according to what the legislature constitutes as best. For
example, right now there is a custody change bill involving
termination of parental rights: the presumption that
returning an abused or neglected child to the custody of
abusive and neglectful parents is not necessarily in the
child's best interest. 5 Right, Sherry?
SHERRY JONES: That's absolutely right.
CONNIE STEERE: I'm sure you're going to talk about that.
SHERRY JONES: I have that CONNIE STEERE: Yes. Oversight on children's issues.
Again, there was a Select Committee on Children and
Youth, but now that's changed. Now it's the Tennessee
Commission on Children and Youth and the Judiciary
Committee maybe, but maybe not, and so we're waiting to
see exactly who has the oversight of children's issues in
Tennessee. When we come to children's advocacy daysand I hope that expands beyond just the Tennessee
Commission on Children and Youth, that's kind of a hope' H.B. 1332, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011).
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the more and more I hope it's guardians ad litem. I hope
DCS maybe even gets off for that day because it's a great
service continuing education for all of us, and also judges.
One of our representatives in the Northeast Tennessee area
said, "You know, if you really want to expand CASA," and, by the way, we do-"why don't you get all the judges to
come too?" Good point. Good point. So all of us going
together, I think, make a stronger advocacy.
Then there are DCS cuts, and the Brian A. lawsuit
compliance, and that's good, but in my opinion some of it's
bad. Yes, we don't want 12,000 children in foster care like
we did in 2001.6 And, yes, it sounds good that now we only
have 7,000 in Tennessee. 7 So abuse and neglect must have
suddenly gone down. It has not. And a month ago, well
maybe two months ago, in the paper we were third in the
nation for meth labs; we're now first. 8 And as far as
prescription drug abuse, you haven't given me enough time
to talk about that. We're number four in the nation for
infant deaths from abuse and neglect. 9
So maybe some of those cases-where there wasn't
a guardian ad litem like there used to be until they became
6 TENNESSEE COMM'N ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH, THE ADVOCATE:

Sept. 2000, availableat
http://www.tennessee.gov/tccy/adv0009.pdf; see also TENNESSEE
STATE CUSTODY ISSUE,

COMM'N ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH, THE ADVOCATE: CHILDREN IN
STATE CUSTODY ISSUE, May, 2004, availableat

http://www.state.tn.us/tccy/adv0405.pdf.
7 TENNESSEE COMM'N ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH, ANNUAL REPORT

2011 at 25, Apr. 15, 2011, availableat http://www.tn.gov/tccy/MAPrptl 1.pdf.
8 Jim Salter, Tennessee Overtakes Missouri in Meth Lab Seizures,
Busts, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, March 2, 2011, availableat
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2011 /mar/02/tennesseeovertakes-missouri-meth-lab-seizures-bus/.
9 Beth Warren, Tennessee Ranked Fourth in Child-abuseDeaths,
MEMPHIS COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Dec. 14, 2010, availableat

http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/20 10/dec/14/tennesseeranked-fourth-child-abuse-deaths/.
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delinquent, and now they are there for dependency and
neglect but maybe not getting paid what an attorney would
normally be paid-could have been caught earlier and
maybe not ended up in death. DCS needs help. I'm not here
to criticize the system. I'm here to say, and I thoroughly
believe it, that the system belongs to every one of us. Every
single citizen can help to make it better.
The economic challenge, in relation to being
effective, is just the state of the economy right now. And
with CASA, we have $15,000 per county. Ron Ramsey, my
friend and your Lieutenant Governor, likes to say in
groups-at least in our area he does-that we give CASA a
little seed money and it's one of the government programs
we can help and they can do a whole bunch. Well, just
think if that little seed money was a little bit more than
$15,000 per county. We could double what we can do and
maybe get closer to 100 percent of the cases having a
Court-Appointed Special Advocate to go along with
guardians ad litem.
I'm going to skip a little bit down here and maybe
some other things will come up. In your package you see
on
the Pew Commission and Recommendations
0
Safeguarding Children's Best Interest in Dependency.' It
came out in 2005 and some of that has already taken place.
Some of it is still being worked on as far as how we can
help children and maintain their best interest in juvenile
court. AOC, the Administration of Courts, has really
expanded training for judges in courtrooms and everything.
National CASA, which we're a part of, has 1,055 programs
across the United States and has received some money
nationally, but it trickles down in grants. So when it says
10 THE PEW COMM'N ON

CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE, FOSTERING THE

FUTURE: SAFETY, PERMANENCE AND WELL-BEING FOR CHILDREN IN
FOSTER CARE, availableat

http://pewfostercare.org/research/docs/FinalExecSum.pdf [hereinafter
Pew Report].
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that one of the things you can do to help children is to
expand the Court-Appointed Special Advocate program,1
we'd like to see that in Tennessee, expanded and increased.
And why? The Pew Commission and the Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention of the U.S.
Justice Department say fifty-three percent of abused and
neglected children, if circumstances are not improved,
become juvenile delinquents. 12 The kids I saw in residential
for five-and-a-half years, the ones that got the most
attention, were the delinquent. And you don't think those
kids in the system, when they would run from residential
and so forth, knew they'd get attention. We need to get
them in the beginning when we can prevent child abuse and
neglect. Of those fifty-three percent that become our
juvenile delinquents, according to William Nidiffer,
President of Turning Point Experience, each one costs the
State of Tennessee approximately $75,000.13 I've been
saying $54,000 because that's the latest I could pull from
the budget from Tennessee Commission on Children and
Youth. 14 It is now $75,000. That's your tax-paying money,
and it's a child who may very well have lost not only their
childhood but their productivity as a citizen and all that
they can be also. Then, beyond delinquency, we're paying
because thirty-eight percent of our delinquents nationwide
end up in our prisons, with a federal average cost of
$39,000 per child a year. So my whole point economically
is the UT College of Law can start right now with forgiving
" Id. at 20-21.

12 OFFICE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT,

et al., A

COORDINATED

RESPONSE TO CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE FOUNDATION FOR
PRACTICE, Ch. 6, availableat

http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/usermanuals/foundation/foundationf.
cfm#back onezerofour.
13Information contained in email correspondence between panelist and
William Nidiffer from July 27, 2011.
" TENNESSEE COMM'N CHILDREN AND YOUTH, 2009-20 10 ANNUAL
REPORT, at 7, availableat http://www. tennessee.gov/tccy/ar20l0.pdf.
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loans of students that are willing to go into juvenile court
and defend these kids. If they stay one year and they do a
good job, one year waived; two years, two years waived;
three years, all waived - and maybe then you can afford to
join us as CASAs and stand up for these children
effectively so judges have fact-based objective information.
And we're cost effective. The U.S. Justice5
Department says CASA returns forty times in investment'
- forty times - because if you saw one of those slides, how

many billions we have lost when we lose a child that could
be coming back to UT going to law school. So for CASAs
and guardian ad litem attorneys to be able through
legislation to better collaborate together to best represent
the dependent and neglected child in juvenile court, to
assist judges in administering justice, that would be one of
the most ethical and economically wise investments from
our Tennessee legislature and system for the future health
and welfare of Tennessee. Every child deserves a safe and
permanent home, not only deserves, but needs. The sooner
the better for Tennessee. Thank you.
SHERRY JONES: Hi. I'm Sherry Jones. I am a State
representative out of Nashville, Tennessee. I have been a
State representative for about seventeen years now and was
a metro council member for eight years before that. I am a
mother. I am a grandmother. I have three grandchildren and
a new one coming in July. My niche has kind of become
children in the General Assembly. I'm for working people
and working people's issues. I'm all about that, and health
care, but children's issues have really become the thing that
I do and that I am really, really passionate about. The first
thing I'd like to say is that I believe it's really hard to
protect children. Children aren't really considered people
with rights; at least that's the way I've come to see it
15 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A TRIBUTE TO COURT-APPOINTED SPECIAL

ADVOCATE

(CASA) VOLUNTEERS, ANNUAL REPORT 2003-2004.
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through all of my years of dealing with the systems. If I
came up and decided that I was going to slap John around,
John would have me arrested, and I would be arrested and
I'd wind up in court and I'd wind up with a serious problem.
But you can beat up your kids and you can beat them up
over and over again and the kid still goes back to that
parent.
We had, and I get, cases called in to me from all
over the state, and DCS has told me for the last several
years that I am their best friend because I help them in their
funding. But I am their worst enemy too, because when
they do something wrong, when they're not doing things
right, I point it out to them, and I don't have a problem
doing that. We had a gentleman who came to my office
who had two of his grandchildren living with him. His
daughter and her husband were both on drugs, and they
both were involved in an instance, actually two, where their
four-month-old went to Vanderbilt Hospital and had two
severe head traumas. Well, the little boy has lifetime
disabilities now, mental disabilities. DCS took custody
away from the parents and gave it to the grandparents. The
grandparents have been raising the children. At about, I
don't know, a year or so after the grandparents had had
them, the father decided that he wanted the child, both
children. So he goes back and he does what DCS always
tells them to do. Mary was at DCS, so Mary knows, and I
was a CASA volunteer, I know about CASA too - but DCS
goes in and says, well even though both parents are on
probation, the father wants the kids back, so we're going to
do what we always do - we're going to send that child's
parent to anger management, we're going to send that
child's parent to a parenting class, and we're going to have
that parent pass a few pee tests, and then we're going to
give that so-called parent back these children. And that
father has those children now. The grandparents are
devastated because they are scared to death that something
is going to happen to those kids. And from the things that
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I've seen, I believe that that's true, that something will
happen to those kids.
I have been on a Select Committee' 6 for probably
fourteen years or so, and have been Vice-Chair and Chair
of the Select Committee. I've been on Children and
Family' 7 for about ten years now and have chaired there,
and have been Vice-Chair also. And I see these instances
all the time. The only way that we, as legislators, can get
help when we bring these pieces of legislation to correct
these issues is for you to help us. The first thing you can do
is tell us what's going on - what terrible things, what good
things are happening, let us know. If you've got cases like I8
just talked about, let me know about that. I passed a law'
two or three years ago that allows us, as legislators, to look
at some of these cases that are being worked when there's
some sort of problem going on with them. And we have
found that by doing that, it makes DCS a little more
accountable to us with what they're doing, and they have to
do a little bit better. I haven't found that DCS is the world's
best at interviewing children when they've been abused,
severely abused, or sexually abused. So the CACs have
stepped in and they've been doing a lot of those interviews
now. They do about eighty percent of those, and they are
the people that are specifically trained to interview children
who have been through these terrible traumas. So what I'm
trying to do this year by legislation is mandate that all
forensic interviews are done by the CACs, everything is in
the same line, everybody has got the same training, and
they're good at it. 19
DCS isn't too cool with that, though. The new
and Connie spoke about new
commissioner
16 Joint Select Committee on Children and Youth, which is made up of
members of various committees of the Tennessee House and Senate.
17 The House Committee on Children and Family Affairs.
18 TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-5-107(d)(1) (2011)..
'9 See H. B. 1318, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011).
20
Kathryn O'Day.
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commissioners - the new commissioner wants to do her
own thing, she wants to make the decision, she wants to do
it on a case by case. And the liaisons that came down - I
said she wants to do every one of these - she wants to
determine herself for every one of these, what they're going
to do. Yes, she does. On a 24/7 basis - yes, that's what she
wants. I said, "Okay, nice to see you and I'll see you all
around the halls." I try my best to bring legislation that I
honestly believe helps makes children's lives better, that
protects them; that provides services. While we've been
doing some studies 21 on the Select Committee and we've
done a lot of things that we've passed and things that we're
finishing up, the multiple response we've done. Last year, I
passed a transitioning piece of legislature 22 to help kids
who age out of foster care be able to have a little more time
with services to help them get into schools, to help them get
into work, to help them find a place to live and to get
transportation, so we're still working on that. DCS has
really kind of dropped the ball on it. We should have had a
lot of kids in that program by now, and we don't have near
what we need to. With the Select Committee, we've tried to
save DCS from being cut, some of their programs from
being cut, because there are too many cuts to children's
issues now.
There are severe cuts to mental health issues now.
So if you're dealing with mental health, that's almost worse.
We helped save the Coordinated School Health Plan. I
passed restraint and seclusion. 23 One of the early speakers
addressed where kids with mental health issues have rights
21 See,

e.g., Public Chapter 1023: Human Sex Trafficking of Children,

http://secondlifechattanooga.org/wp-content/uploads/Public-Chapterl023-March-201 I.pdf.
22 2010 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1065, Tennessee's Transitioning Youth
Empowerment Act of 2010, codified at TENN. CODE ANN. §37-2-417

(2011).

2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 457, amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-101301 (2011).

23
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and we treat them appropriately. We'll probably go back
and amend that a little bit this year. We've done a mental
health study where we're trying to figure out: How do we
first see that a child needs mental health services? And then
when we think we've seen that, what do we do? How
quickly can we move to get those issues addressed, to get
the assessment, to get the services that we need that
hopefully will help that kid do better in their lives and have
their problems addressed a lot sooner? We passed a
resource mapping piece of legislation, 24 and with that we're
looking across the state, and we're still working on that - I
think we have one report out now but we're not through
with it - to see what services are out there, who has
services, who doesn't have services, and how we can kind
of help even things out across the state and be sure that all
children have access to services and to people that are
responsible to help them.
Like Connie said a minute ago, Brian A.25 was kind
of a hit for us. You know, we don't like to lose in the State,
but we did, and we deserved to. When the last
commissioner, Viola Miller, was hired she was hired
basically as the Brian A. attorney, and her job was to get us
out from under that Brian A. lawsuit. So what she did was
come in and tell staff, "Don't take any more kids. We don't
want any more kids in State custody." Now, the Select
Committee on Children and Youth, we meet across the
state. We meet with providers, we meet with DCS workers,
and we meet with public. We meet with anybody who
wants us to come, who has an issue, and we try to sort
through things and come up with what we can do to help. I
have an 8 1/2 x 11 sheet in my office with names of DCS
24 2008 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1197, amending scattered sections of Titles 4

and 37 relative to resource mapping of funds used to support children;
see also 2005 Tenn. Pub. Acts 391, amending scattered sections of
Title 37 and repealing part of TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-407 relative to
child protective services reform.
25 Brian A. v. Bredesen, 149 F. Supp. 2d 941 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).
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workers, front and back, who are dying to testify to things
that have gone on in DCS. The Brian A. settlement and the
commissioner not taking children into custody did nothing
but hurt children across this state. We left children in
homes where they continued to be abused and continued to
be neglected because we were trying to keep our numbers
down, and there is nothing in the world right about that. I
don't care if our numbers doubled. If you need to take them
in, if you need to save a child, you need to save that child,
and it's not about the numbers.
My legislation this year that has the CACs do all the
forensics 26 will maybe bring more kids into custody, who
knows, but it's the right thing to do, and we need to do
what's right by these children because in a lot of cases they
don't have anybody. We're it. If you're their attorney, you're
it. We've had Magistrate Judge Carlton Lewis, who is one
of the most respected, knowledgeable judges that we have
in Nashville in juvenile court, who knows juvenile law. But
we have a lot of judges that don't know across the state.
They don't have a clue. We have judges that hear domestic
violence cases, and they don't have a clue what the law is.
We, as the General Assembly, cannot mandate training to
them. I would like to see any judge who deals in children's
issues go back every single year and be updated on the law
and how that affects them. I want them to be studying that
all the time. I don't want them to give their personal
opinion. I want them to give the opinion of the law. I want
them to do what's right for these kids. We have judges in
domestic violence cases who don't know the law and don't
understand mental health. They don't have a clue about it.
They send kids back to places where they're going to be
hurt. Women go back to places where they're going to be
hurt. But I can't mandate that training. I've tried to, but I
can't mandate that training.
26

H.B. 1318, supra note 19.
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When you see that there is a piece of legislation up
that you think is important, that you think is either really,
really bad or really, really good, you can help. Every one of
you can help. You call your representative, you call your
senator, and you say, "This piece of legislation is really
good. I'm an attorney, I deal with this, and I do that, and
this is really going to help us, and I live in your district, and
I'm a voter in your district, and I hope that you'll vote for
this." Don't be too threatening. We get real annoyed about
that. But you do need to let us know that you live in the
district. And a lot of times people call up and say, "Oh, this
is Barry Sullivan and I live in your district." I say, "Where
do you live?" because I know the streets in my district.
"Well, I live on Torbay Drive." "Oh, yeah, Barry, how are
you doing?" And if they say, "Oh I live on 16th Avenue
South," I say, "Oh, okay, Barry, what can I do for you?"
because Barry doesn't live in my district, and I know he
doesn't. Now, I might be interested in what he has to say,
depending on where he's coming from, but he's not as
important to me as that guy that lives over there on Torbay
Drive. And that's what all of you guys need to remember,
whomever is your representative and your senator and you
can influence, you just need to do it because you can help
us a lot.
For those of you dealing with child abuse cases, too,
the 800 number, 27 and I don't know where you all have
seen it, but we're not real crazy about it where I am.
Because if the three of us call and report child abuse on one
kid that we saw in a parking lot where the parent grabbed
them and slung them up against the car and they fell down
and the parent kicked them, they will take one of our calls,
but the other two they'll throw out. And I think they need to
keep every single call. Anybody who wants to leave their
name, they need to write it down so they know that a lot of
people are seeing that and they will step up and do
27

Central Intake Child Abuse Hotline, 1-877-237-0004.
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something sooner, because a lot of times they don't. I had a
grandmother who came to me who said, "You know, my
two granddaughters are being abused. Their mother chokes
them, she kicks them when they are on the floor, she calls
them filthy names and says they're useless and they can't do
anything." DCS wouldn't go out and even see about that,
and it took us two years to even get them to go out and see
about it. And when they did, do you know what they did to
the mother? Thirty days anger management. That's what
they all get. And then she's off and she's back beating up
the girls again. And the grandmother has called and said
there's no need to call DCS because they're not going to
help. She said the girls won't tell them anything else
because it just causes them more trouble. So here we are, in
a place where we want to help and we can't help because
we're screening out too many things that we shouldn't
screen out. If I could have it my way - and I can't, but if I
could - I would have every call to the 800 number
investigated, because I think we miss so much and we
allow so many children to be hurt. We allow too many
children to die because of the way we handle these issues. I
would like to see you all really think about how you can
help and be sure that you call that 800 number with reports.
I've called it. When I get cases in my office where DCS
isn't going out to investigate, I'll call something in from my
office. And they'll say, "Well, do you want to leave your
name?" And I say absolutely so. And hopefully that makes
a difference. It doesn't always.
But, you know, these are important issues. We've
had cases, in Memphis in particular, we had a lot of issues
with - try not to be too offended -judges and guardians ad

litem, where the judge has a certain group of guardians that
they use. Those are the ones that they use for everything.
They're all a group of friends, and they all go out to eat and
they hang together. That doesn't give you fairness in how
you're handling these cases with the kids. You've got to be
doing what's best for the child. You can't be doing
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something because your friend thinks that it's the right
thing for you to do. Politics is really, really a tough
business, and you have to get kind of tough skin or you'll
be in tears half of the time.
This year we are doing a lot of things that are not
going to be good for the people of this state, and I don't
know that we can stop it, but I hope at some point that we
can go back and fix those things, because not everybody
understands children's issues. Not everybody in the General
Assembly understands that, it's not their thing. You know,
transportation may be their thing. Conservation or farming
may be their thing. And they don't understand how these
things impact children and how you impact the families and
how you lose productive citizens, and you wind up
spending more because of jail or mental health issues. And
I try to lobby as many of them as I can on the issues
coming around, but it would really help if you all would do
the same and spend some time knowing who those folks are
and letting them know what you think. Since you're in the
field, since you know what's going on, let us know. I'm
happy to hear from you anytime, and anything you have
that you think I might need to know. We were talking about
legislative changes. I'm for those. Anybody have any great
ideas, I'm all about them. If you're working with a case
where you see that we are absolutely not doing what we're
supposed to do and you see a way we can fix it, let me
know and we'll try to do that. I've done that for a lot of
people.
We had Josh Osborne back some years ago, and - I
don't know if you all read about him in the paper - he was a
fourteen-year-old boy, he had some physical disabilities,
but his father and his stepmother had chained him to the
bed. They didn't feed him; they didn't let him up. He was
no bigger than this (gesturing with hands) at the time that
he was removed from the home. DCS had been there, and
they had investigated and said everything was okay. He had
siblings who were being sexually abused. And Josh almost
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died before there was help for him and his siblings. And we
passed a piece of legislation for him a couple of years
ago,28 and we have another small piece 29 that we're passing
for him now. He comes to me all the time and he'll say,
"I've got something else, I've got something else." He's
about twenty years old now. He's not like this anymore
(gesturing with hands); they're feeding him now, but he's
had some heart problems, and he's on dialysis quite a bit
now. But he's a really good kid and he doesn't want to see
any other kids hurt like he and his siblings were, so we're
going back and we're trying to do as much as we can for
Josh to help him feel better and help protect children in this
state too.
Money is a serious problem, and we can't do
anything without money. You know, that's just the bottom
line. So I'm going to challenge all of you all today, go out
and find one thing that says, "Made in America" and buy it.
The more things you can buy that say "Made in America,"
the more we're going to get out of it. It creates jobs, and
what you're spending in tax dollars helps us fund these
programs, because we are cutting them like crazy. I
appreciate so much what this organization does for children
and the issues that you bring. We're hoping that some of
you all will come to Nashville at some point, maybe during
the summer or fall, and we'll have some sort of little
symposium and discuss some things that we need to discuss
and bring some legislators. You all are great. I'm glad that
all of you were here today. I hope you've learned
something. I've learned some things myself, and I've heard
a lot of things said during the meeting earlier that I've heard
plenty of. So thank you all so much for letting me come

28

2008 Tenn. Pub. Acts. 1024, amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-

401 relative to child abuse and neglect.

29 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 313, amending TENN. CODE ANN.

§§ 39-15-

401-402 relative to contact with victims.
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today. And, please, if you have anything that you think I
need to know about, I'm right over here. Thank you.
MARY WALKER: I think there are some advantages and
disadvantages to being last. Let me say I graduated from
UT School of Law in 1979, and I'm so delighted to be back.
I participated at the clinic and loved working with Jerry
Black in the neglect/dependent clinic at that time. And
since then - I sort of feel like I have a target on my back - I

was DCS general counsel for five years. I negotiated Brian
A 30 along with some folks from the attorney general's
office. I still think it's a good settlement agreement. When
we got sued, there are some things that you do, and I think
we came up with a settlement agreement that, if
implemented, would be a very good answer to some of the
problems in the State. I challenge you, if you have not been
32
31
to the DCS Web site, read the settlement agreement,
read the reports - at least the executive summaries for the
technical advisory committee. 33 I want to add one thing. I
was talking to Ann Barker, we worked together at DCS there are some advantages, as all of our panelists said, to
bringing either a class action lawsuit, bringing individual
lawsuits like Dean and his students were talking about, or
bringing specific issue litigation. How many law students
are here right now? We have a pretty good number. I hope
you will not feel discouraged by some of our comments
today. I hope you will feel encouraged that there is much
more to be done. And also over the years we've made a lot
of progress in the child welfare system. When I started
30

31
32

BrianA., 149 F. Supp. 2d 941.
http://www.tn.gov/youth/.
2008 MODIFIED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, Brian A. v. Bredesen, No.

3-00-0445, availableat http://www. childrensrights.org/wpcontent/uploads//2008/1 0/ex-e-small-file-size.pdf.
33 TAC MONITORING REPORT, Dec. 15, 2008, availableat
http://www.tn.gov/youth/dcsguide/fedinitiatives/TAC%20Monitoring%
20Report%2012.15.08.pdf.
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representing children and parents, most juvenile court
judges did not recognize a right to counsel, they didn't
recognize that in a termination of parental rights of course a
parent has to have a lawyer. There was very little training
for juvenile judges. There is a lot more now. There could
still be more.
The Department's case loads are at least cut down to
twenty, and they were eighty to 100 before. When I came
to law school, I had been a child welfare worker for ten
years, so I was kind of the old woman of the class. Penny
White and I played football together on the law school
team. We believed in sports rather than political issues. It
turns out, we all believe in political issues; we just needed a
little time.
I say all that to say you have so many opportunities
in front of you. I feel like because you're here, you are
interested in children's issues, and we need you to be
involved; we need you to be lawyers at the juvenile court.
We need really good lawyers at juvenile court. We need
lawyers who know how to file motions and do discovery,
and who believe that the Rules of Procedure apply in
juvenile court. Who when lawyers and judges don't follow
the Rules, you report it-you don't sit back and watch it
and say, "Oh that's okay, I can't do anything." When you
see a judge duct tape a kid in a hearing, you report it. You
act on what you know is wrong. And it still happens. Some
of you are in counties where some things happen to kids
and parents that should not happen. I just had to put in a
word of encouragement. You have to be brave. You have to
speak up. You have to file with the judicial counsel. And
on DCS issues, I was there five years to hire fifty lawyers.
They went from fifteen lawyers across the state to sixtyfive. We hired them and trained them. We still have sixtyfive to seventy DCS lawyers for ninety-five counties. I
know the five years that we were there, they improved
tremendously; they had training, they were able to handle
their case loads. It was an exciting time. I think they've
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continued to keep those positions. I don't know what you
think in terms of their quality of practice. But if it's not
what it should be, file your motions, get it before the court.
Take an appeal. Don't just accept it.
I'm supposed to be talking about Big Brothers Big
Sisters and prevention programs. You've heard a lot of
information about intervention. When a child is already in
the court, they're there on allegations of dependency or
neglect, delinquency, or truancies. There are programs that
deal with prevention - you know a lot of them - Boys and
Girls Club of America, Big Brothers Big Sisters, the
YMCA, the YWCA, lots and lots of programs in your
community. There are not enough, but there are programs
that you can put your clients in touch with. You've heard an
awful lot about children who are already in the court. The
CASA director Connie Steere did a great job of talking
about what she could do with more money, and I support
that completely. You know, if there are more CASAs, if
there are more people challenging what's happening in the
courtroom, then that's a good thing. But let's think a little
bit about how we can keep those children from going into
the courtroom in the first place. The topic of our discussion
is the politics of protecting children. When you look at
what I put in your notebook you may think, "Well, what's
she talking about." I included the Pew Commission
report, 34 which you should all read. It's five years old, but 35it
absolutely holds true. If you want to go on the website,
it's all there. It's a wonderful study that talks about foster
care, judges, lawyers, what should be happening, and
resources. So look at that, look at Brian A., 6 and figure out
what you can argue to be sure your client gets the services
that she's entitled to. Every child is entitled to enough food,
good schools, an opportunity to learn, and parents who take
34 Pew Report, supra note 10.
35 id.
36

Brian A., 149 F.Supp.2d 941.
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care of them, parents who love them. Not all of our
children have that. They should all have the opportunity to
succeed in school and in life. And if they don't, what can
you do about it?
Let's talk a little bit about nonprofits and
organizations that are really impacted by politics and
funding. I want to give you one example. Big Brothers Big
Sisters provides one-to-one mentoring, and we ask that a
volunteer from the community commit herself for at least
one year to a child and to spend six to eight hours a month
with that child. Our average match length in Middle
Tennessee is twenty-two months. So those volunteers who
commit to a year actually are staying longer. We ask them
to stay involved with their child through graduation, to be
involved with this child forever, whether they want to
continue to be involved with the agency or not. We have
gone from serving 500 children to 3,000 children in the last
five years. Now, how did we do that? We got some federal
funding from President George W. Bush, who believes in
mentoring, and who said if we're going to divert children
from the juvenile justice system, from going into the court
and then going on to be detained or confined, we need to
start much earlier. So he allocated forty-three million
dollars to serve children of prisoners, and he picked
children of prisoners because all the information that was
given to him and to that administration indicated that if
there is not an intervention for a child who has a parent in
prison, seven out of ten of those children will follow their
parent to prison. Now, the first time I heard that, I thought
that could not be right.
There's a statewide coalition of Big Brothers Big
Sisters agencies, and we're the administrator for that. As we
developed the Children of Prisoners Program in Middle
Tennessee and across the state, we have over the last five
years served over 4,000 children in a one-to-one mentoring
situation, and we're really proud of that. All children of
prisoners, 4,000 plus children, who we feel will have a
313
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better shot of not following their parents to prison and of
being successful. So about a month ago we got word from
the House of Representatives that HRI,37 the
appropriations bill, was passed and sent to the Senate. The
Children of Prisoners Program is gutted, completely gone,
if the Senate passes that appropriations bill. It's about
seventy million dollars total that was cut: a tiny, tiny part of
the federal budget. Also cut was Teach for America,
AmeriCorps, senior citizen programs that do mentoring,
and a huge list of domestic programs. I don't know what
your politics are and don't want to even address that, but I
want you to know what's being cut in the appropriations
bills that are going through - a lot of domestic programs
that involve volunteers, which doesn't make a lot of sense
to me. You have all this free labor. You have AmeriCorps
workers who are paid practically nothing to work in the
communities of poverty and with kids. You have Teach for
America that's proven to have done a wonderful job in
inner-city schools. You have Big Brothers Big Sisters that
has existed for over a hundred years and has a pre-/posttest, research-based, evidence-based program that is very,
very successful. So how do politics affect nonprofits?
Tremendously.
Now, we can go back to serving our 500 children.
We can raise enough money for 500 children. Our services
cost is a $1,000 per child, per year. That pays for the
professional staff that does the interviewing, the assessing,
the coaching, and all the things that go with a quality
mentoring program. But we can't raise $2,600,000 in
Middle Tennessee very quickly. I don't think we can do it
at all. I think the community is willing to give. I agree with
you, Connie, that you don't want to ever give up your
community involvement and investment. But to go to scale
and to really try to offer this program to as many high-risk
37

Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, H.R. 1 11 2th, Cong.
(2011), availableat http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?cI 12:H.R. 1.

314

148

7.2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 315
kids as we have, there has to be State or Federal support. If
Bill Gates wants to come in and he wants to do one-to-one
mentoring all over the country, or fund CASA programs all
over the country, that would be great. But short of that, I
think you have to look at the reality of where you want
your tax dollars to go. Do you want them to support quality
programs? You should demand quality programs. You
should ask questions; you should know what the outcomes
are. If Big Brothers Big Sisters in another part of the state
doesn't have twenty-two to twenty-four-month retention
rates for their matches, you should ask how much money
they should get. If you have a grassroots mentoring agency
that is very well-intended, but just doesn't have the
resources to make those quality matches, you should ask
some questions about that.
What I'm saying is that politics and funding have a
huge impact on the kids that you're interested in. We serve
only high-risk kids. We serve kids from single-parent
families who attend Title I schools, 38 or are children of
prisoners, and the reason we kept it so narrow is we don't
have enough volunteers and we don't have enough funding.
It's not that every child doesn't need a mentor. I think most
of you can remember the mentors you have or had. And
you need three to five mentors for a child to really have a
good chance of succeeding. We want to just give one good
quality mentor to that high-risk child who has a parent in
prison or a parent who is unable to parent completely. The
parent can be a partner with a volunteer, but they may have
a mental health issue, they may have an issue regarding
their own employment, or they may work three jobs to keep
3

Title One schools were established "to ensure that all children have a
fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality
education and reach, at a minimum, proficiency on challenging State
academic achievement standards and state academic assessments." See

20 U.S.C. § 6301 (1965).
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themselves in housing, and so that extra help from a
qualified volunteer who is committed to their child may
push that child to be successful. We're not a nonprofit.
We're a social profit. We are an organization that gives the
community better schools, safer communities, and
successful adults, because we intervene with that child in a
preventative way.
Representative Sherry Jones says we don't have any
money and they're cutting right and left, both in the Federal
and the State governments. What do we do? It's a hard
situation. We have huge deficits, but I think that to throw
away those programs that significantly impact our most
vulnerable children is not what we want to do. You should
treat every child the way you want your child to be treated.
They should have the kind of lawyers that you would hire
for your child. They should have the services that you have
for your child. They should have the teachers that care
about them. They should have the administrators who don't
look at five, eight, or ten absences and make a decision that
they're going to expel, suspend, or refer them to the
juvenile court; instead they're going to try to figure out
how to help this child.
I want to stop so you all have time to ask some
questions. I urge you to educate yourselves so you can
make the best argument you can make in court. Someone
was asking me earlier what the difference was between
"indicated" and "validated," and I thought, "I need to go
back and try to figure that out." But I said, "Look at the
policy, look at the statute, and make your best argument.
Think about what is it you're trying to show, what you're
trying to prove, and then make your best argument."
Let me say one thing. I was thinking,
Representative Jones, about your comments. I was at DCS
a short time. I was also a juvenile court referee in Davidson
County for about eight years, hearing all the neglect and
abuse cases. So I feel like I've come from a lot of different
perspectives. The child welfare system is a tough, tough
316
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system in which to figure out how we can make meaningful
and lasting change. I think everybody knows that. I think
what you need to do, what I ask you to do, is educate
yourselves, go down and talk to the commissioner. I'm sure
Representative Jones will talk to Commissioner Kathryn
O'Day, or Commissioner O'Day will talk to Representative
Jones, about how we can work out this difference on
forensic interviewing. You know, forensic interviewing
makes sense. If it's the issue of money, let's talk about that,
but educate yourselves. Don't presume that you know all
the answers. I guess I also want to put a pitch in for the
young lawyers that are coming out. Go into this area. There
is huge room for change. You can make a real difference. If
your judge is not any good, run for judge. Speak
respectfully of the DCS workers if you can. Speak
respectfully about what you're trying to do in the
community and then move forward with that. Make an
investment and maybe we'll make it a little different place
for the kids that we're trying to help.
JESSICA VAN DYKE: I'm Jessica Van Dyke. Something
that struck me especially during your panel, but also on
other panels today, is that the problem seems to be bad
parenting or a lack of knowledge about parenting. And I
know Representative Jones mentioned the parenting classes
several times. Are there parenting classes or programs that
you could recommend to the attorneys here today? It seems
like if that's a root cause of the problem, we also need to
direct our attentions toward that area. What can we do in
that respect?
SHERRY JONES: I think you need to start directing your
attention early to those children that are going to be having
children, because you just can't do a thirty-day parenting
class and get it all. You just can't; especially when
somebody has been so abusive, thirty days of parenting just
is not going to work. It never works. They need to be
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learning patience and love as they go. If you're going to
have a baby early, oh my God, you're not going to get to go
to the movie with your friends. I want everybody to have
one of those little toy babies that cries all night. When
you're in the ninth or tenth grade, I want you taking one of
those babies home for six weeks or something and seeing
what that's like, because it is stressful and you need to be
able to be patient and handle those things. That's just not
something that thirty days teaches somebody. I know that
the Exchange Club does some parenting classes too. People
are trying to help parents be better parents, but they've got
to want to be better parents. If they weren't parented well
and they think that's okay, they're not going to try, and it's
just not going to work for them. They've got to want it and
then go for it. It's just like a drug and alcohol abuse
program. You've got to want it. So you need to start early.
MARY WALKER: There are some resources in different
communities. I know in Nashville and I think several
others, Nurses for Newborns, 39 for example, starts when
the baby is born. They go home with the mom. They don't
live there, but they visit very, very regularly and are
involved for a long time. It used to be in the old days that
the public health department did that. That was part of the
charge to the county health department. They were
involved with helping moms learn how to breast feed, learn
how to discipline. Because of politics, the pendulum swung
back the other way and there was a lot of privatization.
Now, at least most urban areas in Tennessee have really
good resource manuals that list everything. The other thing
is, when you go to court to advocate, if you reach an
agreement, on disposition don't just leave it up to the judge
to order a thirty-day parenting class. Instead say, "I have
found a program that I would like for you to enter into the
order," if your parents agreed to that. I think in juvenile
39 Nurses for Newborns Foundation, http://www.nfnf.org/.
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court you're part social worker and you're part lawyer.
Regardless of which role you're playing, whether you're the
parent's lawyer, the child's lawyer, or the GAL, you really
have to know your resources. Sometimes DCS workers do;
sometimes they don't. Sometimes the foster care review
board or the citizens' members know some of the resources.
If there are not some out there, we started a renewal house
in Nashville because there was no long-term treatment for
moms addicted to crack cocaine. You have in Knoxville the
one we modeled after, Great Start, which is a wonderful
program. So, again, the challenge is: Do you really want to
be involved in developing community resources and how to
do that? I hope you will.
CONNIE STEERE: I'd just like to say also that with
parenting classes, lots of times all that is required, unless
there is real check up on it, is attendance. Attending a class
does not make a good parent. What you're looking for is an
improvement as far as good practice, behavior
modification, and getting your act together as a parent. A
part of what we feel is important in CASA is that you're
also the watchdog, not only facilitating the services, but
checking and reporting back to the court on that progress.
Not just the attendance certificate that goes into the court
file. The second part is that, unfortunately, if you did not
receive good parenting, because most behavior is learned
behavior, you repeat it. Again, the early intervention,
prevention, mentoring, and facilitation of services that
really do work and help are what that child needs. A foster
parent told me that her five-year-old foster child told her
that she was going to grow up to be a pimp. Now, Amy and
Naomi, we know that's not that surprising. Kids think, "I'm
going to make it. I'm going to make it." They're only
fifteen or seventeen and they're in the eighth grade or the
ninth grade, but if there aren't services that are going to
make that child really have a chance of making it, then
selling drugs, selling themselves, or someone else is how
319
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they're going to make it. Now, that's the parenting and
that's the learned behavior if that's what you've observed.
So we need to intervene and help prevent those
circumstances so they can grow up and know how to be a
good parent in the first place, and that's when it doesn't cost
so much money. If you're trying to rescue, unfortunately,
it's sometimes just too late.
BARBARA DYER: I'm Barbara Dyer. I'm from Johnson
City, but I'm an adjunct here at the law school. I just want
to add onto this discussion that I think that it's a deeper
subject. I think that until we, as a society, decide that
children are our greatest resources, and until we decide that
we're going to invest in them and in families and make it
possible for people to make a good living, I would add onto
the fact that children only do as they learn. If they have had
the possibilities of going to a good public school, and if
they have had the benefit of having parents who have good
jobs and who have financial support, then they're going to
end up in a lot better situation. I think that we as a group
and as a society have to decide that that's an important
thing and invest in it.
SHERRY JONES: Sometimes it's just a little bit of help
that they need just to get over the hump and move forward.
There are a lot of excellent social workers out there that
truly, truly care about the kids and the families who they're
helping. Sometimes it's policy from the top that prevents
that, but there are a lot of good people out there who do
want to help. As far as public schools, No Child Left
Behind 40 fixed it so that nobody can make a good grade
anymore. My kids teach. My son is an administrator. You
can be a failing school by a tenth-of-a-point because your
special-ed missed by a tenth-of-a-point in attendance. You
might have a non-English speaking class that misses math
40

No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. 6301 et seq. (2001).
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by a tenth-of-a-point. Everything else can be okay, but you
can still fail. That's not right. Public schools are much,
much better than what people give them credit for, and
we're making a big mistake in this state treating teachers
the way we are.
JOHN EVANS: I have a question. Given that our system is
becoming more and more partisan all the time, there are
very limited resources, and our legislative bodies are being
used on sometimes not substantive issues but more political
issues, how do we ensure that children, one, get the
attention they deserve, and, two, get the public budgeting
that they need?
CONNIE STEERE: Probably having more of these types of
symposiums and bringing your business people and those
foundation funders. You read that Pew Commission
report, 41 and with the Race to the Top, 42 Tennessee has a
lot more federal money coming in for education. What a
great foundation endowment it would be if it funded things
like young lawyers having tuition waived for going into
juvenile court, as well as things like Big Brothers Big
Sisters that are cost effective - $1,000 a year for a Big
Brother Big Sister mentor, and about $700 per child for a
Court-Appointed Special Advocate for abused and
neglected children. These programs work. You can take
some of those education funds and channel it to education
institutions. Those people who have the money, the
business industries and everything else, should also be at
these symposiums and hosting them. They could
underwrite the expense of having it in the first place, and
then come, and then you give them gratitude for doing what
41

Pew Report, supra note 10.

42

See U.S. Dep't of Educ., Race to the Top Fund,

http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/index.html; see also
Tennessee First to the Top, http://www.tn.gov/firsttothetop/.

155

7.2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 322
we want them to do in the first place. I mean, we've got to
communicate that this is a smart business move, and it is.
There are approximately one in 100 people 43 incarcerated
in the United States. That's how we're solving a problem.
That means correctional, probation, parole, everything.
Tennessee is one in forty. 4 So we've been spending money
someplace, but it's not helping. It needs to be prevention,
intervention, education.
SHERRY JONES: I just want to say as far as the budget
process goes, what you need to do is contact your
representatives and your senators. You have to let them
know where you have strong feelings and what you want
them to vote on and what you want them to support. That's
crucial.
MICHELLE HOLLAND: Hi. My name is Michelle
Holland and I'm a second year law student here. I was just
wondering how parenting classes were funded. Are they
mostly privately funded, or does the State fund them?
SHERRY JONES: Mary probably knows that more than I
do.
CONNIE STEERE: It's different. Some are nonprofits.
Some are through mental health institutions. Some are
created by the State themselves. Mary, do you want to say
more?
MARY WALKER: Yeah. Basically there are a lot of
sources of funding. It's not that it's just hanging on the tree.
43

THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN

availableat
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/One%20in%20100
.pdf.
44Id
AMERICA,
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Somebody has to raise some money, and they may get a
grant. Exchange Club 45 gets some grants from foundations
that believe in parenting. I think there is a real movement
away from thirty-day classes and a lot more towards
observing and interacting and going to the home, but that
costs a little bit more, so that's another choice that you have
to make. There's a piece in your notebook that's got a Big
Brothers Big Sisters logo that's an example on the Children
of Prisoners Program with the kind of information you need
to give Senator Lamar Alexander, Senator Bob Corker,
U.S. Congressman Marsha Blackburn, and the people who
voted against funding these programs to say, "We want you
to do this program. We know one-to-one mentoring
works." The things you believe in you've got to talk about
to people.
JOHN EVANS: One last question.
ELIZABETH MCDONALD: My name is Elizabeth
McDonald and I want to thank you, Representative Jones,
for your work with the CAC. I've had cases that were
thrown out because a DCS worker didn't have the training,
and by the time the kid got to the CAC, everything was so
tainted, out it went. Is part of your legislation 46 that those
interviews at the CAC have to be videotaped? Because the
videotaped ones seem to carry more weight than the ones
that aren't videotaped. They're more restricted to just that
one CAC interviewer's opinion, where the video speaks a
thousand words.
47
SHERRY JONES: This particular piece of legislation
doesn't have mandated videotaping, but I'll ask about that

45 Exchange Club Family Center, http://www.exchangeclub.net/.
46
H.B. 1318, supra note 19.
47 Id.
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when we get back and see if that's a possibility. You know,
we do videotape now.
ELIZABETH MCDONALD: And it works so much better
and it carries so much more weight.
SHERRY JONES: I think so too. Thank you. I'll check on
that.
LENNY CROCE: Lenny Croce from Anderson County.
I've gotten appointed recently to two very medically fragile
children who are homebound and need lots of care. In both
instances I think what has happened is that both of these
children are children of single parents who are very poor,
who depend upon TennCare, and neither one of these
children receive the services that they should have gotten
from TennCare. In other cases I've seen in juvenile court,
the parents tried to get the services, like residential
treatment for a mentally ill child, and have not been able to
and they've been told the only way you can get those
services is to put them into State custody. What are we
doing to bring TennCare onboard, to provide the services
that these children need to keep them out of State custody?
SHERRY JONES: Unfortunately, a lot of that can be done
administratively. We, as legislators, haven't really passed
any sort of legislation one way or the other on that because,
quite frankly, Governor Phil Bredesen, made those
decisions on TennCare and on what those cuts were. They
keep coming to us and telling us. "We're cutting, we're
cutting, we're cutting," and they keep cutting more, and we
don't have any money to put in it, or anything else for that
matter. So I would say right now that it's just a sorry
situation we're in.
(A break was taken)
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JOHN EVANS: Thank you guys for coming for our last
panel. To introduce our last panel today is the incoming
Editor-in-Chief for Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy,
the wonderful and talented Carrie Pond.
CARRIE POND: Hello. rm Carrie Pond and I'll be taking
the helm of this wonderful Journal next year, so hopefully
any symposium that we put on next year will be as
successful as this one was. I'll be brief since this is the last
panel. Our last panel is called "Best Practices in
Representing Children in Court." In this panel, members of
the judiciary will be offering insights into effective
practices for representing children in court, so they're going
to give you the inside scoop on how to handle some of
these ethical problems that child advocates face. On my far
right, we have Timothy Irwin, a judge for the Knox County
Juvenile Court. In the middle is Carlton Lewis, who is a
magistrate judge for Davidson County Juvenile Court.
Finally, we have Dwight Stokes, who is a judge for the
Sevier County General Sessions and Juvenile Courts.
PANEL DISCUSSION 4:
BEST PRACTICES IN REPRESENTING
CHILDREN IN COURT

The Honorable Timothy Irwin
The Honorable Carlton Lewis
The Honorable Dwight Stokes
MAGISTRATE JUDGE CARLTON LEWIS: I am really,
really thrilled to be here for two reasons. Number one, I
think this topic of the politics of protecting children is a
wonderful, wonderful topic. Secondly, I grew up here in the
city of Knoxville. This is my home, will always be my
home. I graduated from Holston High School. Our football
team lost consecutively to Central High School where
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Judge Irwin was all-city in high school. Any chance I get to
come home is a wonderful opportunity to me.
Let me thank from the previous panel Ms. Mary
Walker, who was Referee Walker when I started practicing
in juvenile court, and later went on to become General
Counsel for the Department of Children's Services, at least
for the Davidson County region. I think Ms. Walker had
some fantastic hires as attorneys for the Department of
Children's Services. Also thanks to Representative Sherry
Jones. You can never go into a committee hearing dealing
with children, youth, and families and not see
Representative Jones stick her head in at some point,
whether she's got a bill before that committee or not. I can
truly say that she is interested in children and families.
We've got ninety-five counties in the state of
Tennessee, all of which have a juvenile judge who hears
juvenile law cases either on a full-time basis or has some
other jurisdiction in addition to his or her juvenile court
jurisdiction. With those ninety-five counties and those
judges, you've got at least that many different personalities.
In order to be an effective attorney representing your child
client or representing your parent client, I strongly urge
you, especially in Davidson County, to find out what your
judge's hot buttons are and avoid those hot buttons if at all
possible. Find out what your judge's prejudices and
passions are, because we all have them. We try to hide
them the best we can, but we have them. The more you
know about our personalities, our likes, and our dislikes,
the more effective you are going to be in representing your
client. I had an attorney ask me several years ago, "What
does it take in your court for a parent who has been found
to have severely abused his or her child to get their child
back?" And I looked her in the eye and I said, "Quite
frankly, I don't think they can ever do enough." That's my
prejudice, people who harm young children and elderly
people. Had she wanted to use my statement to have me
recuse myself, I would have recused myself. What I wanted
326
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her to know, and what I want all attorneys to know, is when
they come into not only my court but to any courtroom,
they should always be able to expect consistency. Some of
us are going to be consistently one way or the other. As
long as you can tell your client that that judge is always
consistent when it comes to that issue, then you've done
your client a favor.
We've got difficult budgetary times in Tennessee
right now, and the vast majority of attorneys in Davidson
County who practice in the juvenile court are appointed and
are reimbursed for their services through the
Administrative Offices of the Court. You all probably
heard some discussion about reimbursement this morning.
There is an ethical dilemma that you as an attorney need to
be aware of and hopefully you will avoid at all times.
You're appointed by the court, you're reimbursed by the
Administrative Office of the Court, and you are reimbursed
at a particular rate for out-of-court and in- court time. The
more activity you have on your case, the more money
you're going to be reimbursed for your services. You have
another interest that should be at least as important as your
financial interest, probably superior to your own financial
interest, and that is the interest of your client. I'm familiar
with a situation where a mother was alleged to have
severely abused her children for a second time. For some
reason, notwithstanding the admissions that the mother had
made, she went to trial on that case. The court found that
the children were severely abused, and the court had to
remove those children after that finding. The problem with
that came to be the Department of Children's Services had
made an offer to the attorney representing the mother to
settle that case, and the settlement offer involved a finding,
but not a recommendation, for removal of the children. The
attorney tried that case rather than settle the case, and
maybe that was a decision that his client made, but I also
know that the attorney appealed that case, and appeals in
juvenile court are de novo, so he had a second trial that he
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billed to the Administrative Office of the Court. The judge
hearing the appeal affirmed the ruling of the magistrate. So
there is still a severe abuse finding and the mother has not,
and likely will not, regain custody of her children. I'm
concerned that because of difficult economic times the
attorney very well might have made a decision to try this
case, appeal this case, do post-dispositional work, and pad
his claim for fees to the Administrative Office of the Court
while disregarding the legal interest and the best interest of
his client, which was to resolve the case to retain custody of
her children. Be very, very careful ethically in making
decisions in the representation of your clients. Lawyers still
should not take on representation in matters with which
they are not familiar or confident. Juvenile court has
become a very specialized court. I frequently tell folks that
juvenile court judges can do something that Supreme Court
judges cannot do - that's terminate the rights of parents.
United States Supreme Court judges don't have that
authority. So what we do in juvenile court is very, very
important; it is becoming very, very specialized. I'd love to
have as many attorneys get experience in juvenile court as
would like, but it is very important to become very familiar
with the Rules of Juvenile Procedure. Ten years ago, you
probably would never find an appellate opinion addressing
a matter from juvenile court. Now we have a large body of
law from the Court of Appeals, particularly in the area of
dependency and neglect, as well as termination of parental
rights. So there's a lot to work on and be familiar with.
The last thing that I would like to caution you on is
there is a phenomenon in some counties - and it happens;
we may as well fess up to it - quite often, judges have a lot
of influence and a lot of authority because a lot of attorneys
depend heavily on receiving appointments in juvenile court,
in general sessions court, or wherever. I think, as a result of
that, sometimes an attorney's client may have a particular
interest and the attorney may not always be willing to shake
the walls as they need to because they don't want to run
328
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afoul of their judge. They depend heavily on their judge for
appointments. I don't know the answer to that situation for
you, particularly as young lawyers who might come in to
the juvenile court system. I understand that it is easy to
become friendly with other attorneys, particularly when
you work with the same small group of attorneys on a
regular basis, but try to the extent you can not to allow your
friendship or your personal relationship to cloud your
personal professional judgment as it relates to your clients.
When you are able to do that, I think you become a very
effective advocate on behalf of your client.
JUDGE DWIGHT STOKES: It's good to be here today. I'm
excited, like Carlton is. Carlton and I work together on the
Tennessee Commission of Children and Youth. We also
have a great experience there. They won't let us sit together
there because we cut up too much. We get in trouble just
like school kids. I wanted to just speak to you a little bit
today. I have an outline but the outline is too much for me
to cover. It does include some excellent resources because
they're not original from me. I don't have many original
thoughts, but I am a good collector of certain resources. I
wanted to talk about seeking justice for one child at a time.
The emphasis I wanted to make is that every one of us who
is interested in children and young people need to fully
understand what the juvenile justice system is about. We
don't have any choice but to be all in. We need to be a
hundred percent committed if we choose to serve in the
juvenile justice field. We must be fully aware of the fact
that we must fight to find resources, we must fight to
educate judges, and I really do challenge you to do that.
As Carlton mentioned, every juvenile court is
different across the state. That has many, many challenges.
But you need to fight to educate judges about the real
issues and point them to it. You need to educate
caseworkers, probation officers, and service providers as to
the specific needs of a case. The specific needs and the
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specific strengths of a child and family should be
emphasized. Lawyers and other advocates must know that
if justice and fairness are to be achieved, it must come
through hard work and an understanding of the juvenile
court system. You must not assume that anybody is going
to do her job. You must not assume that there's a
caseworker that's going to do her job; that a probation
officer, even the judge, maybe especially the judge, is
going to do her job. You must press to see that they
actually do it. You must be ready to fight hard with the
powers that be, whether it's an ornery judge like Judge
Irwin or me, you must be ready to stand up. I know you've
heard that several times.
Let me just hit a few highlights of what I have on
the outline. If you have that, you can just follow along with
me. Achieving justice is achieving what is just in
conformity with the truth and the facts, regardless of any
race, gender, socioeconomic status, or other potential bias.
It means doing right by each child and by the specific
circumstances. First off, I think all child advocates need to
know that the juvenile court is engaged in the work of
child-saving. We're here to save children. I've got a little
article there that talks about how, back in 1891, it was
originally started with the concept of we are to be childsavers, that all children should be treated as children. 1 I met
Judge Andrew Becroft out of New Zealand at a conference
and we became good friends, and he wrote an article 2 that I
have quoted in there, but he has a few very interesting
points that we really need to understand as we work in the
juvenile field. First, childhood is typified by risk-taking and
'Ann Reyes Robbins, Troubled Children and Children in Trouble:
Redefining the Role of the Juvenile Court in the Lives of Children, 59
Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 3 (Winter 2008).
2 Judge Andrew Becroft, Children and Young People in Conflict with
the Law: Asking the Hard Questions, 57 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. I

(September 2006).
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impulsive behavior. 3 That's going to happen. It's the norm.
Second, children do not have the same developmental level
of cognitive or psychological maturity as adults, and
therefore they are more vulnerable to provocation, duress,
or threatening behavior, and they're more impressed by
peer approval and a fear of rejection. 4 Third, offending by
young people is often symptomatic of care and protection
issues, as you've heard, to which a purely judicial response
is destructive and unjust. 5 Attempting to unravel and deal
with justice and welfare issues within a traditional
adversarial court system is very difficult. He talks about all
of us being willing to ask the hard questions; attorneys
being willing to ask the hard questions, and judges being
willing to ask the hard questions. But one of the best quotes
is the last one I have quoted there: he says the majority of
young people will grow out of offending if they are kept
away from the criminal justice system, are made
accountable for their crimes, and are given the right
support. 6 I think that's really important. You need to keep
young people out of the juvenile justice system. How do
you do that? You have informal adjustment. You have
ways of approaching people and caseworkers, and you find
out within your own system. You need to educate the
judges and the powers that be. We need to have people out
of the criminal justice system. The longer they're in it, the
more likely they're going to fail. The more we can get them
connected to services and to bring out the strengths of their
families, give them help within their families and put
people out in the field, the more likely we're going to make
an impact.
The second major point is that it's crucial for all
juvenile court professionals to understand the basic
3id.
4id.
5id.
6id.
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provisions and purposes of the juvenile justice system. You
can start off with T.C.A. section 37-1-101,7 which gives
you a lot of ammunition with anybody. It says that, first off,
the purpose is to provide for the care, protection and
wholesome moral, mental and physical development of
children coming within its provisions. 8 Secondly, it's
consistent with the protection of the public interest to
remove from children committing delinquent acts the taint
of criminality. 9 The judge starts off with that as the
objective: that we're trying to not criminalize these children
and we're not trying to make them think of themselves as
criminals; we want to give them an opportunity to turn
from their ways and help shape their lives, and we do that
in a family environment. It says in point three: removing a
child from the child's parents "only when necessary for the
child's welfare or in the interest of public safety,"' 10 whether
it's on the delinquency side or the dependency and neglect
side. "Provide a simple judicial procedure."" We should
protect all the rights of In re Gault; 2 the procedure should
protect all their constitutional rights.' 3 But also we should
keep it simple, and have cooperative measures interstate. 14
All judges know that's a joke. When we do things
interstate, it's a very difficult process and time-consuming.
We need to deinstitutionalize children. 15 I have a
practice point there I just want you to note with me.
Attorneys and juvenile court professionals must use their
skills in case preparation, including knowledge of their
clients and families, to help craft and shape remedies to
7

TENN CODE ANN. § 37-1-101 (2011).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-101(a)(1).

8
9

§ 37-1-101(a)(2).
§ 37-1 -101(a)(3).
11TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-101(a)(4).
12 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
13See TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-101(a)(4).
CODE ANN. § 37-1-101(a)(5).
laTENN.
15
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-101 (a)(6).
TENN. CODE ANN.

10

TENN. CODE ANN.
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address the problems of young people. I love attorneys who
come into the court and have interviewed people, know
about their clients, and can even file something with me
and just say, "Your Honor, what we have in mind is the
parents have already addressed it this way, we're already
doing this, we've already got the children in this kind of
activity, we're trying to do this," and how the attorney may
have helped the parents or somebody already gear up
toward a certain thing. That may not be able to happen
always, but there are those times where you can get
appointed and try to get in enough time into it to where
you're crafting a remedy and helping to shape it, that I can
see an engaged attorney, that I can see an engaged family
already trying to deal with it, and that can be extremely
impressive.
I talk a little bit about the role of a guardian ad
litem. Here is the simple rule I have: don't be a guardian ad
litem if you are not willing to do what it takes. Don't get
into it, because it takes really being involved. I had two
guardians ad litem recently that came in and filed a motion
because they did not feel that DCS was doing their job in
those particular cases. Now, we have a good DCS attorney
in our county who is very active and does a good job, but
it's good to have dissenting opinions. On one of the cases, I
found in favor of what the guardian ad litem was seeking,
and in the other, I did not. Both of them did a very good job
and both of them accomplished their purposes by getting
something filed in there for me to listen to. But that's very
important, just taking the initiative. I have a little bit in
there about In re Gault' 6 and the duties of attorneys. There
was a former law student here, Marcos Garza, who wrote
an article in the Knoxville Bar Association,1 7 and it really
impressed me just to hear what he said. He talked about
16In

re Gault, 387 U.S. 1.

17Marcos M. Garza, What It Means to be a Lawyer, 35 DICTA 8 (June

2008).
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how he worked out a deal on behalf of his client that he
thought was a really good deal. The problem is he didn't
really stop to think on that particular occasion about what
impact that good deal would have on his client. Then he
went back and talked to a professor here at the law school,
and she emphasized that you really need to tailor your
remedies toward the families, toward the individual people.
It made a big impression on him, and he realized that this is
not my case as a lawyer, it's my client's case, it's that
family's case, and it's that child's case. In that particular
case, it was an adult, but who was an a single parent who
had to work, and for her to be able to do something as
simple as attending classes at night was going to be an
impossibility with her family. Even though it would have
been a good result in many cases, it was not a good result.
Whether you're dealing with an attorney general or the
DCS, just because they come up with something doesn't
mean it's the right deal. I know you know that, but it's
trying to say I know this may be a good thing in most cases,
but it's not good in this case because of the transportation
problem my client has. So craft your own remedies and
impress the judges with how engaged you are in a case, and
that can go a long way.
I've got an article' 8 there about duties of attorneys
representing youth in delinquency cases. It applies both
ways: delinquency, dependent, and neglect. You must
zealously represent your client in these points. Have a
particular interest in youth and family systems if you're
going to do this. Investigate the client's case, and be
informed of special needs. We have people like Dean
Rivkin that are here in the law school that have spent their
lives and spent a lot of their time, and a lot of others, like
Ms. Barbara Dyer, that work on special needs. What are the
special needs? What are the interests of this family? What
18 NAT'L COUNCIL OF Juv. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, JUVENILE

DELINQUENCY CASES 30-31 (Spring 2005).

168

7.2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 335
do you need to do to try to make this family whole and give
them the resources necessary? File pretrial motions. If
you've got a judge that has a lot of issues, getting a judge's
attention early can go a long way. It can be very
impressive, particularly if it's individualized to that
particular case.
Thirdly, all juvenile justice professionals, beginning
with the judge, must see that procedural fairness actually9
occurs. Now, let me emphasize this. What these studies'
show is the more engaged the client is, the more that they
feel that the system is transparent, the more they understand
what's going on with the judge and the probation officer,
then the more likely they're going to comply with orders. If
they comply with orders, they're going to be more
successful: if they understand them, if they know the
decision-making process, even if they don't like the idea.
That's a big deal. Judges can be more clear, more precise in
their orders. We can try to make it clear and try to make it
transparent. It takes more time. I try to do that in every
case, juvenile or general sessions. I want them to know why
I'm making a decision - it helps them if they want to appeal
something - but I want them to know what's gone into it. I
want the juveniles and the parents and others that come
before the court to think that we are a benevolent court
system that wants to see good things for the young people
and for the families. Yes, there can be punishment
involved, but I think it's important for a parent to know
they will have an ally if they're doing the right things, and
maybe not so much if they're guilty of abuse or neglect, but
even those can see that there are resources that we're trying
to set up, if we do it right. The material talks about giving
them an opportunity to voice things. I see a lot of public
defenders, and a lot of counsel from time to time, say, "No,
19See Kevin Burke & Steven Leben, A White Paper of the American
Judges Association: The Voice of the Judiciary:ProceduralFairness:
A Key Ingredient in PublicSatisfaction, 44 CT. REV. 4 (2007).
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don't say anything, don't say anything." That is important
sometimes, but, every now and then, there is a time that's
very important for them to be able to voice it out and for us,
as judges, to be patient and willing to listen to what's going
on, feel and hear what they are feeling, and not be too
judgmental about it. Because it's very hard for a court
system to come into your home. It's very hard to have
people intervene in your lives. I can guarantee you, as a
parent, I would not have liked it. I would have wanted to
have it out as soon as possible.
We need to make sure that we have unbiased
decision-making, make sure we respect people that come in
front of the court, and that attorneys respect their clients
and their need to say some things, and to have trustworthy
authorities. But it's very important to show procedural
fairness. When they think that things are fair, when they
perceive that things are fair because they're getting an
opportunity to speak, they have a representative who is
appointed, you have a guardian ad litem in place, you have
the attorneys in place to represent, they get a better feel that
there is a fair system in place, that really helps them to be
able to comply with the decisions that are handed down.
Perceptions of procedural fairness differ dramatically
among minority and majority populations. Court systems
need to reach out. I serve on the Statewide Disproportionate
Minority Contact Task Force, and there are a lot of things
that happen in minority populations that are just not fair.
There are a lot of things that we need to reach out for with
populations to show them that we care. Most young people
who are black that step in front of a court system are
looking into the face of a white judge in Tennessee and
most other places. So we need to show them that we are
concerned enough, that we want to be prepared enough,
that we want to have people out in the field so that they
don't have to ask the question "What can that judge
possibly know about me? He can't possibly know much
about my neighborhood, or where I am, or what I've done
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with my life." No matter what race they are, people need to
feel like we're interested, that we want to get the real facts,
are willing to listen to them, and give them an opportunity
in the juvenile court system. I realize we have all types of
crimes that come up, and some may be particularly violent,
but we still have a duty to treat people with fairness and
make decisions that are right and based upon the facts.
I have some material there for you to consider about
foster care, in making sure you let people that are in foster
care have a voice and talk and speak up. The juvenile
courts should be the great leveler in our communities. In
other words, all participants in our judicial system,
including judges, district attorneys, defense lawyers,
guardians ad litem, probation officers, law enforcement
officers, school representatives, everybody, should advance
the cause of justice for all. One of my favorite quotes from
To Kill a Mockingbird 20 talks about how the court system
should be the great leveler, no matter what color, no matter
what race, no matter what background, we should be fair
and level the playing field. But that just isn't happening. It
doesn't happen. That presumes that a presiding judge is
really wanting to seek justice. It presumes that people have
effective legal representation. It presumes that law
enforcement officers are doing their job, and on down the
line. Cornel West says in Prisonersof Hope, "We need a
moral prophetic minority of all colors who muster the
courage to question the powers that be. The courage to be
impatient with evil and patient with people, and the courage
to fight for social justice.",2 1 We just need to question
what's going on when you have a system that has so many
flaws to it and ask, "What we can do to make it better?" I
20 HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD

(Grand Central Publ'g,

1960).

21CORNEL WEST, Prisonersof Hope, in THE IMPOSSIBLE WILL TAKE A
LITTLE WHILE: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO HOPE IN A TIME OF FEAR
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(Paul Rogat Loeb ed., 2004).
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really think that the people in this group are the best place
for that to start: people who are interested in kids and
representing young people. What can you do to make a
difference? I have a lot of material in here about
disproportionate minority contact, how a judge is supposed
to be over everybody and make sure they're doing their job,
and that each party, including people who are representing
people of color or people who are representing through the
guardian ad litem, that you are trying to make sure that
there is fair treatment and you're standing up for the issues.
I have some matters in here about the school
system, about certain policies we need to deal with. I talk
about a book written by Michelle Alexander, The New Jim
22
Crow: Mass Incarcerationin the Age of Color Blindness.
It's a great book primarily about adult incarceration of
minorities, but it also talks about how someday we're going
to have to look back on a system that totally failed millions
of people and wonder how we could have possibly let it
happen. Alexander concluded, "As a society, our decision
to heap shame and contempt upon those who struggle and
fail in a system designed to keep them locked up and
locked out says far more about ourselves than it does about
them., 23 One day our society, in particular juvenile justice
professionals, will be forced to look back on our current
system, which has failed to address DMC24 issues for many
years and many other issues we could throw out today, and
marvel at the thought that such a system of juvenile justice
is allowed to go on for such a long time. We all have to
look back on a system that incarcerated so many young
people who could have been treated more humanely and
wisely. We will see so many kids and young people utterly
betrayed by a disgraceful system. We will have to wonder
22

MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION

IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (New

Press 2010).

23Id. at 170-71.
24 Disproportionate Minority Contact.
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how we missed so many obvious signs that young people of
color and young people of poverty were being mistreated in
the juvenile justice system and given no chance to succeed.
And we're going to have to look at ourselves in the mirror
someday.
Finally, I have a few materials about the special
education needs. An advocate must be educated about
special education needs and understand all that there is to
know about what needs to be done when a case comes up
where there's a special education child. When you should
bounce that out of the juvenile justice system and what
steps need to be taken. You can read about those and/or talk
to some of the panel over here.
And I'll also talk about one other thing at the point
where I finally wind down - and I have one minute of time
- juvenile justice professionals, including judges, should
commit ourselves to seek justice for each child and try to
implement and individualize the juvenile justice plan. Dean
Rivkin was telling me about a resource he had read that had
about the same things that are in my materials, but we have
an IEP 25 in special education, and what I want to do in my
system is try to get as close as we can to having an
individualized juvenile justice plan for each child. And it
takes everybody working together. It takes attorneys being
attorneys and advocates. It takes probation doing what they
need to do. It takes youth resource officers doing what they
need to do, and all of us coming together to try to address
the issue. And you can read some of the quotes there. But
it's a fascinating idea that's in these materials that Claudia
Wright had written in an article I just recently read.26 She
concluded, "The choice is whether we can afford to try
25

Individualized Education Program.

26 Claudia Wright, Rethinking Juvenile Justice: Using the IEP Concept

to Createa New Juvenile Justice Paradigm,THE LINK: CONNECTING
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND CHILD WELFARE

(Child Welfare League of

Am.), Fall 2007, at 1.
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something that has a real chance of working. How much is
it worth to improve the quality of life in a society, to
eliminate inhumane treatment of children, and to create
productive citizens?" 27 She said it is worth everything for
us all to try to come together. 28 You know, the judge has to
be a judge. The judge has to enforce due process and has to
be willing to listen to cases, hear the burden of proof, and
make a decision. I'm not talking about advocating that, but
I am talking about a judge having a role of having to
supervise and make sure people are doing their jobs and
trying to create an environment that's fair for everybody.
And my last thought is, on the last page, I went to a
conference in Washington, D.C., The Cradle to Prison
Pipeline, and Judge Judith Kay was speaking there and she
told us that we should internalize this notion as we have a
case: Are the efforts that I make - the judge, the probation
officer, the attorney -are the efforts that I make good
enough for my child? If this was my child that I was
representing, if it was somebody representing my child, are
the efforts that I'm making good enough for my child? And
if it's not good enough for your own child, it's not good
enough for anybody's child.
JUDGE TIMOTHY IRWIN: How much of my time did he
take? Can everyone hear me? I'm a little tall for that
podium. Can you hear me okay in the back? In my
misspent years as an adjunct professor over here, I never
had any complaints. My students were consistently smarter
than I was, and it was very difficult to teach under those
circumstances.
I took a little different approach to today's topic.
And I have relatively little experience compared to the two
gentlemen who are up here with me. I've been a judge for
five years. But I think it's important that you understand
27 Id. at 6.
28 id.

174

7.2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 341
what I think will help you in Knox County Juvenile Court. I
know we have a lot of practitioners here. If you've
practiced in Knox County Juvenile Court before as
appointed counsel, as free counsel, as a University student,
hold your hand up just so I can see how many. Yeah, most
everyone. Okay. I want to tell you initially that my goal for
our children - I think it's important you know that, and I've
tried to cut through all the BS and I've tried to break it
down - and it's not possible for every kid, but I want our
children when they're eighteen years old in Knox County to
have a diploma. I want it to be a high school diploma. It
takes twenty-eight credits to get one. Sometimes that can't
be accomplished for a variety of reasons. But I think you're
facing an uphill challenge in this world if you try to raise a
family and support yourself without one. In this county,
you need to have a driver's license. Knoxville and Knox
County were not designed for mass transit to be effective.
If you want to work, you have to be able to get there. One
of the main problems we seem to have in Knox County
Juvenile Court is that we have a lot more resources than
some of our neighbors but we can't get our people to the
resources. It comes up over and over again. "It's not on the
bus lines, Judge." "I can't drive." "My mother lost her
driver's license." "Our car won't work." You can very
easily find yourself being a shuttle service as an appointed
counsel in Knox County. I'm sure some of the people in the
education practicum that are working in my court know
exactly what I mean. It's a problem. So I want my kids to
try to have a driver's license. The third thing, perhaps the
most important, and I always try to ask them when I get the
time: "Tell me about your life plan."
I have a great job. I get paid to wake up in the
morning and go into work and try to figure out how to
make a child's life better. Yeah, we have to protect society
sometimes from children, and Dirk Weddington gets to do
most of that, but I get to try to figure out how to make a
child's life better. And I can tell you in five years I believe
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in my heart I have made more mistakes of omission than
commission. I've waited too long. I've been too patient. I've
tried and tried for Mom and Dad. I've tried to hold things
together with Band-aids. I think I would have been better
off a lot of times striking like a cobra, just right now, you're
gone, it's over. I hate to admit, I'm part of a bench that
enabled services to go on in a family for ten years, where
five kids - not all five at once, but over ten years, five kids
- eventually all had to come into custody. Since they've
been in custody, they're doing great. I let that go on too
long. Maybe I didn't have the wisdom. Maybe I didn't have
the opportunity. Maybe I didn't believe the law. But
sometimes I feel like I'm too slow to strike. The reason I'm
telling you this, I think it's important you know what makes
me tick, what makes my magistrates tick.
We have 31,000 matters coming through this
county's court; 31,000, from child support, to traffic tickets,
to termination of parental rights, to transfer hearings for
murder. We have a plethora of sexual stuff right now. I
don't know what's going on in the world. I don't know if
people are just finally telling the stories and they've always
been there, or we got more of it. You know what the pills
and the pill mills are doing to our court. Dependence and
neglect was up nine percent last year in Knox County. Your
fees aren't going up. One of the things I want to remind
you, when you appear in our courts and you have private
counsel in there with you, you jump up and you stomp your
feet and you ask me to set aside money for you now. I will
always do that. I want you to get paid. I don't want to lose a
single one of you. You're my heroes. Being a judge in a
county of this size, it's not a monarchy; it is just a member
of a team. I have to rely on five lawyers from the
Department of Children's Services. I have to rely on people
willing to come down and work for forty to fifty dollars an
hour because they love children and love the work. Maybe
some of them can't get anything else, but I don't believe
that to be the case. They are passionate about what they do.
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I have partners like Helen Ross McNabb who provide
mental health care to indigent people. I have Boys and
Girls Clubs who pick the kids up from school and try to fill
that void. I'm part of an elaborate team, and a lot of that
team is in my building. I think it's important that you all
know who's in the building with you, where you can go get
a mental health evaluation. What does Assist do? Assist is
that group of interns from the good ole University of
Tennessee headed by Marie Bly that can get you quick
mental health assessments, that can steer you in the right
direction, can tell you how to get stuff paid for. We are
practicing in a world of shrinking resources. We don't have
enough to go around. You've got to fight and scrap for your
client to make sure they get their part. You may need
expertise from Marie Bly, or someone like her, to tell you
how to get TennCare to pay for something. Twice, since
I've been a judge, I have issued subpoenas for gatekeepers
from insurance companies to come to my court and tell me
why, as a retired radiologist gatekeeper, they disagree with
two mental health professionals that say a child needs
inpatient, residential care. They caved on the courthouse
steps both times and never appeared in my court, but they
paid for the child's treatment. Don't be afraid to do that. I've
got your back if you want to do that.
Judges hate surprises. We hate surprises. I, at seven
a.m. in the morning, when I walk in, want to try to figure
out how my day is going. I really want to know what I'm
going to have in front of me that day, and I do my best to
figure it out. I want you to take care of the surprises early. I
want you to get all that worked out beforehand. I don't
think we exercise motion practice enough in Knox County.
I don't think we - and I think partly because our department
is pretty receptive, if you ask them for something, they'll
generally give it to you - but I don't think we exercise our
motion practice enough on the delinquent side, or on the
civil side. I'd like to see more of that. I would like to see
you have the ability to have pretrial conferences before it's
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time to go, which would mean a lot of times three attorneys
all had to show up there before the whistle. I think it's a
good idea to be early in my court. If I see you poke your
head in there on a busy day and sit down in the back and
wait until I see you and kind of nod, your case is going to
be called shortly thereafter. If you want in and out of my
court, let me know you're there. Let me know you're there.
Again, 31,000 matters, no sense in you being last.
Understand the frustration of your clients.
Understand what it's like to get a letter in the mail that says
you're a father. "Oh, yeah, that was ole what's her name.
Oh, no, I'm not." "Okay, well, sir, then you need to go
down to these lawyers' offices on Gay Street and get a
paternity test." "Yeah, I'm going to do that." A few weeks
later, the mail comes - congratulations, 99.9 percent likely
to be this child's father, we can't rule you out. Then you get
a court date for child support. You come down to child
support, the judge says, "Mr. So and So, you make X and
we've put these numbers in the income shares model and
you're going to pay X." And you say, "If I've got to pay, I
want to see my kid." That's how our cases start, now. You
need to know this. "I want to see my kid if I've got to pay."
"Oh, well, we don't do that at this location. Judge Irwin will
not allow us because of our high volume to sign anything
but agreements on visitation or custody of a child in this
court. You need to go to Division Street." So I truck down,
get on the bus, and ride that bus to Division Street. I get
out, I walk in, and I meet one of my nice ladies in intake,
who are very experienced workers - It's headed by Mary
Lindsey - and I go into intake, and the intake worker says,
"Can I help you?" I say, "Yes, ma'am, I want to see my kid.
I'm the dad, I want to see the kid." "Well, fill out this form,
sir, and petition for custody visitation. By the way, it will
be $136.00." "What do you mean? They saw me up there
for free." "That's right, you were the respondent. It's
$136.00." "All right. So let me take the bus back and get
this check cashed and I'll be back." So I do all that, and
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come back, fill all this out, and turn it in with $136.00. This
is a big deal, now, and they've gotten this done, and they're
feeling pretty good. "Okay, sir, before the court will agree
to hear your case, they require cases coming from child
support to be mediated." Mediation is next door in that
trailer. So you walk out and go over to the mobile building,
and you see Jackie and have your case mediated, which
takes a while. They're pretty quick. They send the case
back to us, and if you don't have a resolution, then finally
you get a court date. And, of course, in the meantime, if
there are allegations of dependence and neglect, we go
down a whole other road.
I understand, and I feel the parent's pain sometimes.
I understand how difficult it is to even get in front of one of
us. And I believe we're pretty much an open enrollment
court. Any private citizen can come down there and file a
petition about anytime they want. Again, it's getting there,
it's paying for it, it's figuring out how, and doing all that
without the advice of counsel. It's tough. I said it before, I
don't want a bunch of surprises and ambush. We're dealing
with children's lives here. I want to know all the factors so I
can make a good decision. I want you to agree on as much
as you can before the day of court. I want you to talk to
Ralph Maylott, David Hull, Susan Kovac, Barbara Johnson,
or Kathleen Parsons. I want you to talk to each other. I
want you to see what the guardian's position is. I don't want
you to be surprised. I don't want a guardian in my court that
has to be introduced to their child at the time of trial. I'm
not interested by that. If you're going to be a guardian,
you've got to go. You have got to go if you're going to be a
guardian. You've got to go to the child and family team
meetings. You've got to go to the foster care review board.
You've got to see your child at school. There are easier
ways to see a child than others, but you've got to go.
You've got to let me know you've gone. Let me know what
you know. You are my eyes and ears. I would have liked to
have heard Lucie Brackin's talk, because I feel like I know
345
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Lucie Brackin very well. I've never seen her, but I have
talked to her for hours because we were both on the 40A
Supreme Court panel looking at that law and trying to fix it
so it will work. I would have very much liked to hear her
speech. She knows a lot about the roles of a guardian, what
a guardian needs. Know where the DA and the Public
Defender's offices are. Know how to get back and see DCS.
Know all nine probation counselors and all eight family
service workers. Know their supervisors. Know the court
directors. Know the thirteen security officers and two
bailiffs and the PBS guys out front. Know my paralegal,
Barbara Miller. Know my cell number. Know my direct
office number. Know how to get a hold of the people you
need to get a hold of to help the kids. Help the kids. That's
what we're there for, that's what we wake up for every day.
Nobody in this room is getting rich in this field. You wake
up every day because you have a passion to help children.
If you can make a living along the way, that's great.
I want to back up just a minute and I want to talk
about Assist. They get a tremendous volume of cases.
Remember, that's a great resource. It's free. It's six
master's-level social workers, almost licensed clinical
social workers, that work under Marie Bly, who has thirty
years of experience. They can get you a mental health
assessment quickly. They'll help parents. They'll help kids.
They help families. Don't forget about that resource. It's
underutilized.
Who knows what the expungement powers of the
juvenile court are? I think I got the most power of any
judge in the system. I can expunge a conviction. Find me
another judge that can expunge a conviction. I won't even
say what Dr. Bill Cherry used to say; that wouldn't work in
this crowd. But find me a judge that can expunge a
conviction. Your judge can. We can only expunge the
records that we have on site. I can't order law enforcement
to expunge their arrest records, but I can expunge juvenile
court records. And I can tell you, in Knox County if you
346
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want to help your client and you got one you think you can
get in the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, anything short
of murder and rape, I'll make it go away if you show me
that they're in. If they pass the ASVAB, 29 if they pass the
physical, if they feel the call to serve their country, I will
make things happen for them. I will seal it. I will expunge
it. I'll extinguish it. I'll shred it myself. I'll burn it. Anything
short of one of the old X crimes, it will go away. I promise
you I can do that under the statute. 30 Read it. To my
knowledge, no data from Knoxville Juvenile Court has ever
been entered into a Cray computer anywhere, thanks to
Judge Garrett. He refused to let information out of that
building. I am doing my best to follow in his footsteps. It
does not need to be entered in a database where it can come
back and haunt these children for the rest of their lives. If it
gets in that database, no one can get it out. That's why
JASIS 31 is a closed system. But I can wipe JASIS clean.
The statute says I can. I don't do that enough because
people don't ask me to do it enough. People don't ask me to
do it enough. I would do it more. I would do it in every
case I had when they turned nineteen. Even if I said no, I
would ask me to think about it.
If you come up with an alternative, I will listen. If
you can show me a way to save that child's life without
placing that child in custody, I will listen. If you show me a
treatment alternative, I will listen. Understand the
Department of Children's Services. I believe this was when
R.A. Chapman was running things over there, I asked for a
flow chart because I wanted to understand who worked at
DCS and just what they did. I got a flow chart back, and
they were divided up into five clusters. That was the name
of their work groups; they were clusters. And I thought that
29 Armed Service Vocation Aptitude Battery test.
30 TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-153(0 (2011).
31Journal of the American Society of Information Science.
32 TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-153(0.
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was very apt. I love my Department of Children's Services.
The reason for our court's existence is the deterioration of
the family unit in our community. Three magistrates
working full-time hearing child support cases of unmarried
parents in this county - every day, all day, as many as they
can hear. One magistrate working hearing the married folks
and divorced folks cases, and our people all hear about
twice what she hears - not that she is slack, I mean, she just
doesn't have as many cases.
Don't set two cases at the same time. Keep your
calendars accurate. Don't make me go down and beat up
Kay Kaserman or Irene Joseph to get you in my court,
because they're probably going to win anyway because they
have probably forgotten more than I'll ever learn.
Remember why you chose this field. Every day when you
wake up, make a kid's life better. Some of them just need
somebody in their life. I would say most of them just need
somebody in their life. And if you don't feel you have the
resources to help, ask somebody that works in the court. If
they refuse to help you help your child, let me know about
it, let me know about it. My mission as judge of the
Knoxville Juvenile Court is to be standing out there, maybe
with a cane, when they shut those doors and padlock them
because there's no more need. That's what I'd like to see
happen. I would not like to expand it. I would like it to
shrink from disuse. Thank you all for being part of the
team.
JOHN EVANS: Thank you to you guys. We'll do questions
in just a minute. But that was very lively so I didn't know if
you guys wanted to respond to each other - that's also fine.
JUDGE TIMOTHY IRWIN: We'll just take some questions
from the floor.
JOHN EVANS: I'll start off then. I'm about to be an
attorney graduating here in a couple of months. Do you
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guys have any pet peeves, maybe common mistakes, that
new attorneys make in your courtrooms, given how some
of us may be appearing in your courtrooms in just a matter
of a few months from now?
MAGISTRATE JUDGE CARLTON LEWIS: I think Judge
Irwin hit on one of the things that's probably a pet peeve for
everyone. There's an anxiety about getting appointed and
getting paid in a juvenile court case. There's a ton of
activity that goes on between getting appointed and getting
paid. And, as Judge Irwin alluded to, if you haven't done
everything in between, you don't deserve to get paid.
Because a child or a family comes into the court, there's the
intake process, there's the adjudication, and there's the
disposition. If there's a commitment, there's the child and
family team meeting, the permanency staffings, and the
permanency hearings. It takes a lot to get away and attend
each of those staffings. But if I'm having heart surgery, I
want my surgeon involved in every step of the process.
And these clients have a right to have their attorney
involved at every step of the process. So my pet peeve is
for a family or a child to come in to court and, A, say
they've never met their attorney, or, B, it's been six months
since they last talked to their attorney and there have been
fourteen or fifteen other meetings. So an attorney not
fulfilling his or her responsibility is a pet peeve. And, like
Judge Irwin said, we're not getting rich doing this. None of
us have got into the juvenile court system to make a
fortune.
JUDGE DWIGHT STOKES: I'll just add to be on time, or
have permission not to be on time, because you have to be
somewhere else that's urgent, at least in our court. And,
also, let your client know what they need to do when
they're in court. I see way too many attorneys that may not
talk to their clients about how to behave in court. If my
own children would have come into juvenile court, they
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probably would have leaned on the podium, and they would
have probably been slumped over. That's how teenagers
act. It just is helpful if you just tell them how to address
"Yes, sir," or "No, sir," or "Yes, Your Honor," or "No,
Your Honor." Just let them know in advance so that they
can just be a little step ahead. I had to go over in Blount
County in front of the former Judge Crawford over there,
and he was a stickler. The very first time I appeared in front
of him, I went up there, and he said, "Approach the bench."
His bench was this high, and I leaned on it. He said,
"Adjourn court." And we adjourned. And then his clerk
came up to me and said, "Don't ever touch his bench, just
never touch it." So I wish somebody had told me that and I
wouldn't have touched his bench.
And then I had a client that was like talking to a
gourd - he really was - but I took him over to Blount
County and we had the first plea of the day worked out. I
was from Sevier County and I was going to be able to leave
and go home, so I was there entering a plea. And I said,
"Say 'Yes, sir' or 'No, sir,' 'Yes, Your Honor' or 'No,
Your Honor,' you've got to say that, do you understand
that?" "Yeah." "Do you understand that?" So I went over
that ten times. We got in there as the very first case, so I'm
going to get out of there, because we had the plea
agreement worked out. And Judge Crawford says, "Do you
understand your constitutional rights?" And he goes,
"Yep." He tried that one more time, and he got another
"Yep," and he said, "Mr. Stokes, take your client out in the
hall and instruct him on proper courtroom decorum and
then come back." Well, at twelve p.m. I got to come back.
But, anyway, help yourselves out and help your client out
by just giving them a little bit, because that will really help
them and go a long way.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE CARLTON LEWIS: Just to
follow up on that, and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the code of ethics for attorneys, actually
350
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instructs you - and I wish I had brought it with me - but it
tells you that you are to in effect instruct your client on the
facts of life, and you don't necessarily have to do it in
language that you would use in polite company. And that's
basically what the Rules say - if your clients understand
something in a certain vernacular, it's your responsibility as
the lawyer to explain to your client in language that he or
she can understand.33 If I go to a mechanic and I've got no
oil in the oil pan in my car, I don't want my mechanic
having me guessing as to whether I ought to drive my car
with no motor oil in it. If I'm getting ready to go before a
judge, I want my lawyer to explain to me in no uncertain
terms what I can expect from this judge. So you, as
attorneys, have an absolute ethical obligation to fully
inform your client of everything that you can possibly share
with your client.
MABERN WALL: My name is Mabern Wall. I'm a 2L
here at the College of Law. And as a law student you have
the opportunity to take many classes in a variety of
different topics of law. But, to my knowledge, there may
only be one class here that you can take in juvenile law,
and I'm actually enrolled in it. Do you have any advice on
how new lawyers - I guess a follow-up to John - can gain

expertise in this area? And, like John, in a year I may be
practicing in front of you all. How do you suggest we learn
the basics of procedures that may actually take years for
attorneys to?
JUDGE TIMOTHY IRWIN: Come up and hang around.
It's real easy. Be there. If you want to work up there, show
your face enough, we'll give you the cases. You need to be
there. If you get a case appointed to you and you come up
and do a good job and nobody sees you around, you might
get another one when that long list comes up again. But if
33 TENN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmts. (2011).
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you're there and we've got to find a third attorney because
Dad has shown up for a hearing and Mom has already got
one appointed and there's already a guardian ad litem, and I
have to make this hearing go, I can't continue it again. If
you're out in that lobby and I send my case manager and I
say, "Find me a lawyer," guess who they're going to find, if
you're there. Or you can be in the courtrooms watching.
You can come now. We welcome you to sit in the
courtrooms and watch. Some attorneys come on truancy
day and pick up cases and sit and watch. Some days you
get one; some days you don't. But hang around, be visible,
and be seen. Familiarize yourself with the court staff.
Know the nine probation officers, the eight family service
workers - that's the level that the cases get assigned -know
the magistrates, and make sure they know you. You've got
a distinctive name; it will be easy to remember. Get down
there and get in front of people. That's how you get
opportunities. Show me that you're interested, and I'll
believe you after a while.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Good afternoon. We've
heard so much today about what certain resources are
available for children as well as for parents who are having
problems parenting. Is there any place in this state a similar
handbook to the one that is put out by the Office on Aging
for Senior Citizens that would actually point parents to
resources before their children end up facing you three?
JUDGE TIMOTHY IRWIN: There is in this county. It's put
out by the Compassion Coalition. That's the parent group.
I'm not sure the name of it. But it's put out by the
Compassion Coalition.
34
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Salt and Light.
34

COMPASSION COALITION, SALT AND LIGHT GUIDEBOOK (3d ed.

2010).
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JUDGE TIMOTHY IRWIN: Salt and Light is the name of
it. And it is faith-based organizations. But many of the
organizations that serve our courts and our kids and
families are faith-based. It's a great resource guide. I get
one every year. If you're by, I'll be glad to let you borrow
my copy. I think there is a small charge for them. It's a
pretty thick detailed book. But the Compassion Coalition and I don't have their number right off - but you could call
Cokesbury 35 and ask how to get in touch with them and
they could tell you for sure.
JUDGE DWIGHT STOKES: We have one in Sevier
County too. 36 That is an excellent resource you're talking
about. I'd like to add, too, that for anybody who wants to
come to Sevier County, I have my address, phone number,
and e-mail. If you'd like to come and participate in court or
sit in on general sessions or juvenile, if you make
arrangements, or if you want to come down and talk about
the law, I'll be glad to. I've worked with Professor Rivkin,
and he has that information. But I'll be glad for you to come
by and spend some time talking about the profession, if
you'd ever like to.
JUDGE TIMOTHY IRWIN: If you want to do that, make
an appointment. But if you want to just come by and see
court, there will always be one running, most all the time
all of them are running, except for Dirk, he's kind of gotten
a pass right now because he doesn't have a lot of business
on the delinquent side. Are you all seeing that in Nashville,
slowed down over there?

35 Cokesbury United Methodist Church, http://www.cclive.org.
36 SEVIER Co. COMMUNITY RESOURCE GUIDE

(2009), availableat

http://www.sevier.org/PDF/crguide_2009.pdf.
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MAGISTRATE JUDGE CARLTON LEWIS: Not really. I
wish we were.
JUDGE TIMOTHY IRWIN: I'd like to take credit for that,
but I don't know that we can. But our felonies are down
from 650 two years ago to 223 this year, forty percent last
year, twenty-eight percent last year. So good job. I think it's
an endorsement of people that have been working with the
kids in the community. Something good is going on. I'm
not quite sure why. I just know that we're seeing the results.
We could jump back up there this year, but who knows.
But the other side of things is more than making up for it
right now. Does everybody know where child support is?
It's in the old courthouse here. Does everybody know that?
Okay. Some of you do.
AUSTIN KUPKE: Hi. My name is Austin Kupke. I'm a 2L
law student here at the University as well. And I was just
wondering- and, Judge Stokes, you touched on this a little
bit - what are your perceptions in your respective
courtrooms of differing socioeconomic backgrounds and
whether children show up with parents who have resources
for them, or can afford private attorneys, versus those who
cannot?
JUDGE DWIGHT STOKES: Do I start off with that?
JUDGE TIMOTHY IRWIN: She asked you.
JUDGE DWIGHT STOKES: Obviously, many times there
is a tremendous lack of resources in this day and time;
that's one reason I was emphasizing trying to get a handle
on that, on the needs, and trying to look it up in advance.
We have a very receptive staff at our juvenile court. They'll
try to match anybody up - and I think these two judges
have the same type things - but trying to match up with
resources and get some. And we like to do a lot of
354
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prevention. In other words, if somebody does have issues
like you're talking about and if they want to check out any
resources through the juvenile court or get with us about
some prevention services, those are very good. We try our
best, like Tim talked about, you try your best to match up
with resources and get anything available. But it is a
challenge, and that's one reason that attorneys finding out
the needs and finding out the strengths of families and
where they'd like to go-we will try to help that in any way,
even prior to the hearing date. The more we can put things
in motion from the time of a charge or the time of
something coming up, putting services in as promptly as
possible, it can be of great assistance. But it's a challenge to
do that. And there is a big difference in people that can go
out and hire a very expensive attorney, and they can come
in and say, "Well they've already been in rehab for X
number of days and X number of months." And with those
that don't have those resources, it's a matter of trying to get
on them as promptly as possible, and see what we can set in
as far as mental health assessments and drug and alcohol
assessments and try to get some services in, because we've
had some success to getting those in early, even prior to
hearings taking place.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE CARLTON LEWIS: And anytime
there is a budget cut, social services are always the first
victims, and among the social services, prevention services
are the first to go. What I have been able to do occasionally
is sort of leverage the Department of Children's Services.
The Department of Children's Services has a responsibility
to look for any less drastic alternative to custody, and I will
frequently mention to a case manager, if there appear to be
no other services available, that I am considering
committing a child to the custody of the Department of
Children's Services, and ask them if they would like to look
for noncustodial services for the child or the family.
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Generally, noncustodial services are far less expensive to
the Department than providing custodial services.
JUDGE TIMOTHY IRWIN: Often a good way to play the
game - and you as attorneys can certainly be key players in
that - you can go to the Department before the date of the
case, say, "Look, I need some help, you're going to have
another kid dumped on you in custody," which they don't
want. I promise you, they don't want. When it was possible
to do this before the influx of TFACTS,37 I was able to
look on my computer and determine the number of Knox
County children in State custody every day. And I looked
at that number not to base my decisions on how many I had
in there, but to remind myself that I'm in charge of a
delicate resource. There are only so many beds out there;
there's only so much money. There are only so many
treatment centers and treatment beds, only so many foster
families. We try to come up with solutions that avoid
custody whenever possible. Columbus Home was
reactivated. Columbus Home is the round building that's
right next to court that's an assessment center where we
hold children overnight or sometimes two or three days.
They have to have a hearing after the first night they come
in there. They're not in custody, they're being assessed, and
while they're being assessed, we're looking for grandma
and grandpa, aunt, or uncle. I'll be glad to share that
resource with my neighbors in other counties, to tell them
how we do it. We think it saves a lot of custody beds at a
very good price. That's why that place is there. It's there to
prevent kids from going through the trauma of custody
when we've got somebody that's coming in from New York
who's going to be suitable and we feel pretty good about.
Sometimes we'll leave them in there ten days or two weeks.
They go to their own schools. They get driven back and
forth. They are well cared for. But it keeps us from having
37

Tennessee Family and Child Tracking System.
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a custody event. So we look at that. And DCS was a little
shaky about it at first; it took some salesmanship. And they
have embraced it and are quick to point out, "Well
Columbus Home is empty; you know, we have room at
Columbus Home," when you start facing them with
custody. We're not omniscient because we get robes and we
sit on a bench. Sometimes we don't know. And what a great
deal for us to sit back and go, "Man, I get another day to
figure out what to do with this kid." And sometimes you
may be telling us one thing in our heart - that it's a good
solution for everybody to have the extra time to wait. I
think it could be used not so much as a model, not so much
we're doing it right, but it could be used and shared with
some other counties and I think it would greatly alleviate
their burden. And I'll be glad to do that. And I'm waiting on
an attorney to talk to a judge and say, "They have this place
where they'll just hold them for a few days until you figure
it out, can we use that?" And I certainly will talk to the
people that run Columbus Home and see if they can't make
that happen.
Also, we tried to get Magistrate Lewis's children at
the time of the big flood; we tried to get them here in
Knoxville. We have a beautiful detention facility. If you've
never toured it, Mr. Bean 38 would be glad to give you a
tour. It's really well run and well-maintained. It
accommodates 120 kids. There are twenty-one in it today.
We have a lot of empty beds. I think it's eighty boys and
forty girls, or eighty and twenty right now, but there's room
to expand to have twenty more and we just never needed it.
But it's important you understand how that place works.
Can you imagine - let me put this in perspective for you.
This is something that blows my mind. Two brand-new
rubber basketballs every month. In one month's time, the
skin is worn off the basketballs. Think about that. I played
with balls all my life on asphalt, and I don't ever recall
38 Richard Bean, head of the Richard L. Bean Juvenile Service Center.
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weanng one out. They wear out one a month back there.
And I want you all to know that goat therapy is well and
alive in Knox County Juvenile Court. If you don't know
what I'm talking about, you haven't had the experience of
having a very young child who needs to step out of court
and go back and spend some time with my paralegal in our
private petting zoo back behind. That started - I read a
unique article about children that were paired with dogs
from an animal shelter that weren't able to be adopted. 39 It
was in New Mexico. And it was a wonderful program and
it just warmed my heart. And I went in to Mr. Bean, and I
said, "Richard, look at this." An animal shelter, as you
know, is just right next to juvenile court. I said, "Richard,
go and let's talk to these people - I mean, we can put a kid
with a dog, and the kids train the dogs, and the dogs train
the kids, and it's an hour, you know, one night a week."
And the next Monday I went out and there were three goats
in a pen. That's the truth. That is the honest truth. So, we do
have goats at Knox County Juvenile Court.
JESSICA VAN DYKE: I don't know how to follow up with
any story about goats. And I don't know if there are a lot of
juvenile courts in the entire United States that have their
own goats, so I think that really says something. I'm going
to ask you all the same question I asked the last panel, and I
think it's just the frustrations of parents that aren't parents
and bad parenting - do you all have any advice for
attorneys on how to handle parents or about observations or
beliefs that maybe you hold that can help us who are going
to be practicing in your courts and dealing with these
people on a regular basis?

39 See Tami Harbolt and Tamara H. Ward, Teaming IncarceratedYouth

with Shelter Dogsfor a Second Chance, availableat
http://www.animalsandsociety.org/assets/library/436_s925.pdf.
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JUDGE DWIGHT STOKES: How to deal with parents in
general? I just think the main thing is to start off respecting
them, trying to find out what they're all about, trying to find
out as much as you can about their background. If you see
strengths in their family, being able to emphasize those,
and to find common ground. Not to be demeaning, to take
the time to sound receptive, to be able to work with
individual families and individuals, and just be generally
interested and try to understand where people come from
and the opportunities and the obstacles and some of the
things that they're facing that we may never come close to
facing. And sometimes you have some ground. But I think
starting off that way, where you're genuinely interested,
give them an opportunity to talk and speak without your
having to say much, and let them get it out of their system,
is a good gift to have. And then go from there.
PENNY WHITE: Does anyone have another question?
MAGISTRATE JUDGE CARLTON LEWIS: Let - okay.
Go ahead.
PENNY WHITE: I'm sorry.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE CARLTON LEWIS: No, Judge
White, I probably -

PENNY WHITE: No. Again, I've sat here all day and
maintained silence and I'm going to do that for a little while
longer.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE CARLTON LEWIS: The problem
is, if somebody will shut me up, I'll get out of here without
getting into trouble. But if you don't shut me up, I'm going
to say -

PENNY WHITE: Bring it on.
359
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MAGISTRATE JUDGE CARLTON LEWIS: - something
that I'm going to get in trouble for.
JUDGE TIMOTHY IRWIN: Let me respond to that young
lady's question with: brutal honesty early. Three words:
Brutal. Honesty. Early. Tell them. Nobody likes surprises.
Tell them. Tell them exactly what they're up against and
exactly what's going to happen. It's not like you don't know.
I mean, you've seen it before. You can tell them, "This is
our best shot, this judge is going to do this." Nobody keeps
this - we haven't kept anything secret. We're doing it right
out in the open. Oh, secrets. Secrets. I hate the fact that
juvenile court doesn't have a court reporter down there fulltime. I understand some other courts are losing their court
reporters. You can walk up to my bench in plain view and
set a tape recorder up there whenever you want. I don't
want to be videoed - that's a personal preference - but I
don't want to be sneak-recorded. I want it done in plain
view. I want everybody to know about it. And if somebody
makes a recording, it's shared by all. You can do that
whenever you want. I think you're crazy not to do it. It
wouldn't insult me a bit. Bring your recorder, set it right up
there, and we'll treat it for what it's worth. At least it may
give you accurate information with which to do your
orders, if nothing else. It may be you're having that
discussion with your client. The client says, "Well he said
so and so," and you say, "No, he didn't," and you play it
back. I think it's just good to protect you. I mean, you guys
get a ton of Bar complaints that are unmerited. You've got
a ton of really ticked-off parents that are mad at you, that
say, "It's my lawyer's fault." And I think this is a great way
to protect you, to show that you're zealous. And also, at
least at the next de novo hearing in circuit court, that
recording would get a lot of respect just like it does in
sessions court. Everybody understands the economics.
Nobody has the money to pay a court reporter on 31,000
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cases, but it won't hurt my feelings a bit. And I'm sure I've never tried it in Sevier County but I doubt - if I told
you about it, you'd probably be all right with it, wouldn't
you?
JUDGE DWIGHT STOKES: Yeah, we do tape everything
but JUDGE TIMOTHY IRWIN: Well, you're in sessions court
a lot of the time and you have a tape running.
JUDGE DWIGHT STOKES: - Right. We do tape and all
in juvenile court, but yeah, you can ask me about it in
advance. We'll have one but it JUDGE TIMOTHY IRWIN: Again, don't surprise us. Don't
surprise us. I learned I was being filmed about halfway
through, and I wasn't a happy camper. It was a young
lawyer and he had a very fancy-looking recorder I thought
it was a telephone. But it wasn't - it was going, it was
recording. But we took care of it. He brought it back there
and we erased it. He showed me how he did it, but it still
was uncomfortable.
PENNY WHITE: Judge Lewis, really MAGISTRATE JUDGE CARLTON LEWIS: I'm okay.
PENNY WHITE: I just want to tell you what a privilege it
has been to hear all the panelists today and, an even greater
privilege, to work with the student members of the
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy who I quasi-advise.
So I'd like for all of the student members of the Policy
Journal to stand up and be recognized and thanked by this
audience, please. (Applause). There usually aren't that
many students total in this building at four-forty-five p.m.
on a Friday afternoon. They have worked their socks off,
their hearts out. They have been so passionate about this.
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And I've been saying all day long, "No symposium next
year, I'm so tired, no symposium." But after a turnout like
this and a day like today, it would be very hard not to let
them fly and soar again next year the way that they've done
this year. So I want to thank everyone for coming, and
especially hats off to the Journal staff. And I think John has
a final presentation.
JOHN EVANS: Yeah. We want to present you guys with a
couple of little mementos you can take with you. Just one
more round of applause for our final panel. (Applause) I've
just got a couple of quick announcements before we let you
guys go. We'd also like to recognize - I said it earlier but
we didn't really do it as much as we needed to - Jessica
Van Dyke is our symposium editor. I don't think there's
anybody else in this planet that has put more into this
symposium than her. Basically since the idea was formed,
she's done everything from name tags, to materials, to
calling the speakers, just pretty much everything all around
to make sure this happens. Professor White went ahead and
got her some flowers. We just want to present that to her.
(Applause) Thank you again for coming. We really
appreciate it. Have a good rest of the evening. (Whereupon
the symposium was concluded).
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ESSAY
IS PARENTING AUTHORITY A USURPATION OF
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY? HARMONIZING AUTHORITY
FOR, BENEFITS OF, AND LIMITATIONS ON THIS
LEGAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL HYBRID

Joi T. Montiel l
ABSTRACT
A "Parenting Coordinator" assists high-conflict
parents in resolving disputes that arise in the parents'
efforts to jointly parent their children after a divorce. The
Parenting Coordinator simultaneously educates the parents
to minimize the degree and frequency of future conflict.
While Parenting Coordination is not mediation or
arbitration, it is also not counseling. Instead, Parenting
Coordination is a "legal-psychological hybrid."
A trial court's delegation to a parenting coordinator
to determine a fit parent's access to her child is arguably an
improper delegation of judicial authority. While thirteen
states have comprehensive schemes setting out their
Parenting Coordination programs, other states are utilizing
Parenting Coordination without statutory or rule-based
authorization. Appointments without statutory or rule-based
authority are particularly vulnerable to challenge.
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encouragement; Assistant Professors Jocelyn Hedlund-Limmer and
Eric P. Voigt for their valuable feedback on this Article; Stephanie
Stephens for her research support; and Dr. Karl Kirkland for generously
sharing his work on this issue.
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Whether a Parenting Coordinator's appointment is
an improper delegation of judicial authority depends on the
authority for the appointment in the given jurisdiction and
the terms governing the specific appointment. This Article
analyzes the use of Parenting Coordination in jurisdictions
that appoint Parenting Coordinators both with and without
specific authority. From that analysis, this Article offers a
paradigm for constructing an appointment that does not
constitute an improper delegation of judicial authority. The
paradigm will be useful for judges and practitioners
attempting to utilize Parenting Coordination without
specific statutory or rule-based authority. It will also be
useful for courts and legislators considering adoption of a
Parenting Coordinator rule or statute.
The Article proposes that, where a trial court has
some inherent authority to ensure the best interest of the
children, with or without specific statute or rule-based
authority, Parenting Coordination can be sustained.
Combined with the substantial benefits of a qualified
Parenting Coordinator, imposing appropriate limitations on
the Parenting Coordinator's role can incrementally
diminish the argument that the appointment is an improper
delegation of judicial authority. Achieving an appropriate
balance of benefits and limitations, in light of the basis for
appointment authority, achieves a sustainable appointment.
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I. Introduction
A Parenting Coordinator assists high-conflict
parents in resolving disputes that arise in the parents'
efforts to jointly parent their children after a divorce. The
Parenting Coordinator also educates the high-conflict
parents to minimize the degree and frequency of future
conflict. Parenting Coordination is not mediation or
arbitration, or counseling. Instead, Parenting Coordination
is a "legal-psychological hybrid.",2 Because it does not fit
into a category of familiar extra-judicial roles, Parenting
as being an improper
Coordination is subject to challenge
3
delegation of judicial authority.
Whether appointing a Parenting Coordinator is an
improper delegation of judicial authority depends on the
authority for the appointment in the given jurisdiction and
the terms governing the specific appointment. Although
thirteen states have adopted court rules or statutes
authorizing the appointment of a Parenting Coordinator,4
courts in many states are appointing Parenting Coordinators
without authority from a statute or court rule.5 This Article
analyzes the use of Parenting Coordination in jurisdictions
that appoint Parenting Coordinators both with and without
specific authority. From that analysis, this Article offers a
paradigm for constructing an appointment that does not
constitute an improper delegation of judicial authority. The
2 Karl Kirkland & Matthew

J.Sullivan, Parenting Coordination (PC)

Practice: A Survey of Experienced Professionals, 46 FAM. CT. REV.
622, 633 (2008); Matthew J. Sullivan, Ethical, Legal, and Professional
Practice Issues Involved in Acting as a Psychologist Parent
Coordinatorin Child Custody Cases, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 576 (2004).

3Association of Family and Conciliation Courts ("AFCC"), Parenting
Coordination: Implementation Issues, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 533 (2003)

[hereinafter AFCC, Implementation Issues]; Christine A. Coates et al.,
Parenting Coordinationfor High-Conflict Families, 42 FAM. CT. REV.
246, 249-50 (2004).

4See infra note 28.
5See infra note 29.
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paradigm will be useful for judges and practitioners who
are utilizing Parenting Coordination without specific
statutory or rule-based authority. It will also be useful for
courts and legislatures that are considering adopting a
Parenting Coordinator rule or statute.
II. Background and Summary
Parents have due process rights to make decisions6
about their children under the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, based on the doctrine of parenspatriae, the state
may in certain instances permissibly invade the otherwise
high walls of the family in the best interest of the children.
Given the parents' submission to a court's jurisdiction in a
divorce proceeding, it is accepted that a trial court judge
will make decisions regarding the parents' access to their
children. However, when the trial court judge delegates the
power to determine a fit parent's access to her child to a
third party such as a lawyer or a psychologist who has not
been selected in the same manner that a member of the
judiciary has been selected, 7 the decision-making by that
third-party delegee raises concern.
Nevertheless, when parties divorce, people other
than the judge, the parents, their lawyers, and the children
frequently become involved in the process. For example,
the court may appoint a guardian ad litem, special master,
custody evaluator, or mediator. Courts frequently delegate

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) ("[Tlhe Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of
parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of
their children.").
7See Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 851 (Utah 1994) (stating
that non-judges cannot properly be assigned core judicial duties
because "[t]here are no provisions which subject them to the
constitutional checks and balances imposed upon duly appointed judges
of courts of record.").
6
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what might appear to be judicial functions, even decisionmaking authority, to such third parties.
A relatively new third-party delegee is the Parenting
Coordinator. 8 A Parenting Coordinator assists high-conflict
parents after their divorce in resolving disputes that arise in
implementing the parenting aspect of their divorce
judgment. Parenting Coordinators also educate the parents
to minimize the degree and frequency of future conflict.
The Association of Family and Conciliation Courts
("AFCC") defines Parenting Coordination as:
[A] child-focused alternative dispute resolution
process in which a mental health or legal
professional with mediation training and
experience assists high-conflict parents to
implement their parenting plan by facilitating the
resolution of their disputes in a timely manner,
educating parents about their children's needs, and
with prior approval of the parties and/or the court,
8

Although the role of a Parenting Coordinator is somewhat similar

across jurisdictions, the nomenclature used in the various jurisdictions
has "almost been one for each different jurisdiction." Karl Kirkland,
Parenting Coordination (PC) Laws, Rules, and Regulations: A
Jurisdictional Comparison, 5 J. OF CHILD CUSTODY 25, 28 (2008)
[hereinafter Kirkland, PC Laws, Rules and Regulations]. The AFCC
has noted that a Parenting Coordinator may be called a "special master"
in California, a "med-arbiter" in Colorado, a "wiseperson" in New
Mexico, a "custody commissioner" in Hawaii, to list a few. AFCC,
Implementation Issues, supra note 3, at 534 n.3. This difference in
nomenclature has been recognized as a problem; inconsistent
nomenclature has been found to be a risk for board complaints and civil
lawsuits against the Parenting Coordinator, presumably because the
inconsistency causes parties to misunderstand the role. Karl Kirkland &
Kale E. Kirkland, Risk Management and Aspirational Ethics for
ParentingCoordinators,3 J. OF CHILD CUSTODY 23, 30-31 (2008) (in a

section of the article cleverly entitled "A Rose by any other name does
not smell as sweet"). The AFCC Parenting Coordination study group
has recommended the use of the term "Parenting Coordinator." Id.
(citing AFCC, Implementation Issues, supra note 3, at 533).
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making decisions within the scope of the court
order or appointment contract.9
Although it might be viewed as an alternative dispute
resolution process, Parenting Coordination is not mediation
or arbitration. It is also not counseling. Parenting
Coordination is a "legal-psychological hybrid."' 0 Because
the role of a Parenting Coordinator does not conform to the
role of any familiar extra-judicial delegee such as a
mediator or special master, Parenting Coordination is
subject to challenge as being an improper delegation of
authority, "
legislative
lacking
authority
judicial
particularly where no statute or court rule specifically
authorizes the appointment of a Parenting Coordinator.
While thirteen states have comprehensive schemes
setting out their Parenting Coordination programs,1 2 other
states are utilizing Parenting Coordination without statutory
or rule-based authorization.' 3 The results of implementing a
Parenting Coordination program on such an ad hoc basis
are inefficient testing of the legality of Parenting
Coordination 14 and inconsistent use of Parenting
9 AFCC Task Force on Parenting Coordination, Guidelines for
Parenting Coordination, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 164, 165 (2006)
[hereinafter AFCC, Guidelines].
10Kirkland & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 633; Matthew J. Sullivan,
supra note 2, at 576.
1 Coates et al., supra note 3, at 249-50; AFCC: Implementation Issues,
supra note 3, at 533.
12 See infra note 28.
13 See infra note 29.
14 A leader in the Parenting Coordination movement and an attorney in
Oklahoma, the first state to pass a Parenting Coordination law, noted
that in the process of developing a Parenting Coordination program in
Oklahoma, they realized that they had to have a new law to legally do
what they were trying to do. Without a new law allowing for a
Parenting Coordinator, a court cannot delegate decision-making
authority to a third party that invades the "high walls of the family."
Kirkland, PC Laws, Rules and Regulations, supra note 8, at 29.
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Coordination, thus diminishing the perceived and actual
utility of Parenting Coordination. 15 Parenting Coordination,
properly utilized, provides substantial benefits for dueling
divorced parents, their children, and the court system.
However, if Parenting Coordination is hastily implemented
on an ad hoc basis - without fully considering the basis for
the authority and the proper limitations on the role confusion among parties, practitioners, and courts will
result,' 6 the "brand"' 17 of Parenting Coordination will be
damaged, and the opportunity to reap the benefits from
Parenting Coordination will be lost. Thus, the paradigm

15Elayne E. Greenberg, Fine Tuning the Branding of Parenting
Coordination: "... You May Get What You Need," 48 FAM. CT. REV.
206, 206 (Jan. 2010) (asking how Parenting Coordination professionals
might address the "cacophony of discordant expectations and disparate
practices about parenting coordination that are eroding the integrity of
the parenting coordination process"). But see Karl Kirkland, Positive
Coping Among Experienced Parenting Coordinators: A Recipe for
Success, 7 J. OF CHILD CUSTODY 61, 64 (2010) [hereinafter Kirkland,
Positive Coping] (opining that the diversity of experience "ultimately
benefits the larger practice community" by providing learning
opportunities through the comparison of the varying practices but also
recognizing that there should be "movement toward greater uniformity"
in the practice of Parenting Coordination).
16Leslie Ellen Shear, In Search of Statutory Authority for Parenting
Coordination Orders in California: Using a Grass-roots, Hybrid
Model Without an Enabling Statute, 5 J. OF CHILD CUSTODY 88, 91
(2008) (stating that appointment of a Parenting Coordinator "requires
clear, highly-detailed ground rules, so that the litigants and a nonlawyer PC will understand them, know what to expect, and understand
the waivers of formal due process rights"). "Litigation and appeals to
resolve ambiguities, inconsistencies and uncertainties about the scope
of the PC's authority ...will defeat the purposes of the appointment."
id. It has been suggested to the author by practicing attorneys that they
and their clients are reluctant to object to the appointment of a
Parenting Coordinator for fear of alienating the Parenting Coordinator
whose decisions will be so vital to the parties' relationships with their
children.
17Greenberg, supra note 15, at 209.
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offered in this Article should be carefully considered in
advance of an appointment.
This Article proposes that a trial court can use
Parenting Coordination, without a Parenting Coordination
statute or court rule, in circumstances where a trial court
has some inherent authority to ensure the best interest of
the children. Combined with the substantial benefits of a
qualified Parenting Coordinator, imposing appropriate
limitations on the Parenting Coordinator's role can
incrementally diminish the argument that the appointment
is an improper delegation of judicial authority. In light of
the basis for appointment authority, reaching an appropriate
balance of benefits and limitations achieves a sustainable
appointment.
Part III of this Article acknowledges the argument
that Parenting Coordination might constitute an improper
delegation of judicial authority. Part IV of this Article
recognizes that lack of statutory or rule-based authority for
the appointment poses an additional obstacle for Parenting
Coordination. However, even where authority for the
appointment is somewhat lacking, Parenting Coordination
is defensible if appropriately limited because of the benefits
it bestows.
The benefits of Parenting Coordination are
discussed in Part V. In determining the sustainability of a
Parenting Coordination appointment, the benefits that
Parenting Coordination can provide must be accorded due
weight. Most importantly, Parenting Coordination benefits
the children of high-conflict parents. Exposure to conflict
is one of the most detrimental factors in a child's postdivorce development, and it is the State's duty to ensure the
furtherance of the best interest of those children. Second,
Parenting Coordination benefits the judicial system by
preventing the trial court from becoming a revolving door
for the high-conflict parents that Parenting Coordination
serves. Third, Parenting Coordination benefits the highconflict parents themselves by providing a timely and cost-
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effective means of dispute resolution that also educates the
parents in ways to avoid or resolve conflict on their own in
the future.
Significantly, as discussed in Part VI of this Article,
a Parenting Coordinator must have adequate qualifications
so that he can provide the benefits referenced above. Those
benefits may be realized only when the Parenting
Coordinator has adequate qualifications to serve in the
"legally-psychological hybrid" role of a Parenting
Coordinator. If the Parenting Coordinator does not have
adequate qualifications, the proposition of this Article does
not hold true. The Parenting Coordinator's ability to
provide benefits are a significant part of the equation:
benefits of Parenting Coordination combined with
limitations on Parenting Coordination overcome the
arguments against Parenting Coordination considered here.
Limitations on Parenting Coordination are
discussed in Parts VII through X of this Article. These
limitations on Parenting Coordination abate the argument
that the appointment is an improper delegation of judicial
authority. First, as addressed in Part VII, a Parenting
Coordinator should be appointed only after a trial court has
entered a custody order, and the Parenting Coordinator's
role should therefore be limited to disputed issues regarding
implementation of that trial court's order. Second, as
discussed in Part VIII, a Parenting Coordinator should be
appointed only under certain conditions, such as consent of
the parties or a trial court finding that the parents are "high
conflict," so that the appointment is in the best interest of
the children who would be otherwise exposed to chronic
conflict. Third, as discussed in Part IX, a Parenting
Coordinator's decision, if he has decision-making
authority, should always be subject to review by the
appointing court. Thus, the trial court retains its judicial
authority. As addressed in Part X, Parenting Coordination
can be even further limited by allowing a Parenting
Coordinator to decide only minor issues, which might be
373
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specified by the appointing court or by court rule or statute,
where there is one. Some jurisdictions further limit the
instances in which a Parenting Coordinator may have
decision-making authority by requiring that the parties
specifically consent to the Parenting Coordinator's
decision-making authority, a step further than consent to
the appointment, before the Parenting Coordinator may
have that authority.
Combined with the substantial benefits of a
qualified Parenting Coordinator, imposing appropriate
limitations on the Parenting Coordinator's role can
incrementally diminish the argument that the appointment
is an improper delegation of judicial authority, and a
sustainable appointment can be achieved even without a
Parenting Coordinator statute or court rule.
III. Problem: Delegation of Judicial Authority
Powers of a court are generally nondelegable.
18See, e.g., Morrow v. Corbin,

8

A

62 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Tex. 1933)

("[T]he power thus confided to our trial courts must be exercised by
them as a matter of nondelegable duty, that they can neither with nor
without the consent of parties litigant delegate the decision of any
question within their jurisdiction, once that jurisdiction has been
lawfully invoked. . . ."); Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 851
(Utah 1994) (stating that non-judges cannot properly be assigned core
judicial duties because "[t]here are no provisions which subject them to
the constitutional checks and balances imposed upon duly appointed
judges of courts of record"); In re S.H., 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 465, 471 n.l I
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003) ("Under the separation of powers doctrine judicial
powers may not be completely delegated to, or exercised by, either
nonjudicial officers or private parties.") (citing Cal. Const., art. II, § 3
and Cal. Const. art. VI, § 1); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Kendrick, 780 So. 2d 231, 233 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) ("A trial court
cannot delegate the sole authority to perform 'a purely judicial
function."') (citing Larson v. State, 572 So.2d 1368, 1371 (Fla. 1991));
D'Agostino v. D'Agostino, 54 S.W.3d 191, 200 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)
("A court cannot delegate or abdicate, in whole or in part, its judicial
power.") (citing S.K.B. v. J.C.B., 867 S.W.2d 651, 658 (Mo. Ct. App.
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trial court's authority is "constrained by the basic
constitutional principle that judicial power may not be
delegated."' 19 However, a trial court may properly delegate
certain limited functions. 20 Although a state's constitution
may generally prohibit the delegation of judicial authority,
the delegation of some authority to a third party may be
permissible or even necessary in some instances.21
1993)); Tabor v. Hogan, 955 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997)
("Those enumerated powers are non-delegable[;] [slimply put, the trial
judge may not relinquish them to others.").
'9 Ruisi v. Thieriot, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766, 772 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
20 While a core judicial function cannot be delegated, other duties
might be properly delegated; the courts may receive assistance from
others in performing core judicial functions. "The term 'judicial power
of courts' is generally understood to be the power to hear and determine
controversies between adverse parties and questions in litigation;" the
nondelegable judicial powers include the authority to hear and
determine justiciable controversies, the authority to enforce a valid
judgment, and the power necessary to "protect the fundamental
integrity of the judicial branch." In re Adoption of E.H., 103 P.3d 177,
182 n.7 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Ohms, 881 P.2d at 181-82 n.6);
see also Morrow, 62 S.W.2d at 645 n.17. However, core judicial
functions, "do not include functions that are generally designed to
'assist' courts, such as conducting fact finding hearings, holding
pretrial conferences, and making recommendations to judges." State v.
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 302 (Utah 1998) (quoting Ohms, 881 P.2d at
851 n.17).
21 In re J.S.P., 278 S.W.3d 414, 422 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008)
("We
recognize that under our Constitution, once the jurisdiction of the court
has been invoked, it is the trial judge who possesses the judicial power
to hear cases, decide disputed issues of fact and law, enter a judgment
in accordance with the facts and the law, and enforce its judgment once
entered ..... .While we cannot, and do not, condone a wholesale
delegation of judicial authority ... we recognize that there are limited
circumstances ... where delegation of some authority to a third party
may be necessary.. . ."). The court pointed out, however, that the trial

court's ability to delegate is not limitless. Id.; see also, e.g., In re
Donnovan, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 714, 716 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (stating
"[a]lthough a court may base its determination of the appropriateness of
visitation on input from therapists, it is the court's duty to make the
actual determination" and holding that an order providing that the
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Thus, Parenting Coordination is subject to challenge
as an improper delegation of judicial authority that lacks
legislative authority, because it does not "fit" within the
parameters of familiar extra-judicial roles. The process
varies across the jurisdictions utilizing Parenting
Coordination. Different jurisdictions may delegate different
types of duties to a Parenting Coordinator. 22 In addition,
jurisdictions may tolerate delegations of judicial authority
to varying degrees.23 Thus, a trial court's appointment of a
Parenting Coordinator in any jurisdiction raises the
question of whether the appointment violates the general
principles regarding delegation of judicial authority
applicable in that state. 24 Below, this Article addresses the
father have "no visitation rights without permission of minors'
therapists" was an improper delegation of judicial authority). A court
delegating some authority must nevertheless be more than a reviewing
court. Russell v. Thompson, 619 P.2d 537, 539 (Nev. 1980) (holding,
where the trial court gave the master the authority to find facts and
decide substantially all issues in the case, the trial court's function has
been reduced to that of a reviewing court and thus was an "abdication
b2y a jurist of his constitutional responsibilities and duties").
See infra Part IX and note 155 (Parenting Coordination statutes and
rules in Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, North Carolina, and
Oklahoma allow for decision making by the Parenting Coordinator,
while Parenting Coordination statutes and rules of Louisiana, Oregon,
Texas, and Vermont do not allow for decision-making authority).
23 See Coates et al., supra note 3, ("The degree to which [Parenting
Coordination] is seen as a usurpation of the court's inherent decisionmaking authority depends on a jurisdiction's interpretation of applicable
laws and the local legal culture. The more that third-party professionals
(e.g., evaluators, mediators, therapists, special masters, and referees)
are looked to for assessment of a family's situation and relied on for
recommendations as to "best interest" determinations, the more likely
the PC model will be accepted as yet another valuable intervention at
the court's disposal to assist in dispute resolution.").
24 The AFCC Guidelines also recognize that a Parenting Coordinator's
exercise of decision-making authority - by court order or consent could be statutorily or constitutionally impermissible in the given
jurisdiction. AFCC, Guidelines, supra note 8, at 172. ("The scope of
the PC's decision-making authority may be limited in some
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issues to be considered in answering that question. The
answer will depend on (1) the source of the trial court's
authority to make the appointment, which is discussed in
Part IV, (2) the benefits to be bestowed by the appointment,
which are discussed in Part V and VI, and (3) whether the
role is properly limited, which is discussed in Parts VII
through X. An appropriate combination of authority and
limitation can withstand an argument that Parenting
Coordination is an improper delegation of judicial
authority.
IV. Problem and Possible Solutions:
Authority to Appoint the Parenting Coordinator

Finding

25
Parenting Coordination is "an ADR activity."
However, it is not mediation and it is not arbitration. It
cannot be understood as anything other than a hybrid role
combing aspects of familiar alternative dispute resolution
processes and adding a dose of education, or counseling.26
Thus, Parenting Coordination does not "fit" within the
parameters of familiar legal processes.27 Thirteen states

jurisdictions by constitutional law or statute. A PC should be
knowledgeable about governing law and procedure in the PC's
jurisdiction regarding decision-making or arbitration by the PC.")
25 Kirkland & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 633.
26 Although a Parenting Coordinator is often a psychologist, "PC is not
therapy." Id. (explaining that Parenting Coordination is distinct from
psychotherapy in many respects). One Parenting Coordinator stated:
"As a PC, I'm a junior judge, not an evaluator or a therapist." Id. at 629
(quoting a Parenting Coordinator who holds a J.D. and a Ph.D.).
Perhaps most significant for the instant purposes is that, in Parenting
Coordination, the focus of the service is on the best interests of the
children and on reorganized family; it is not on any one of the parents
seeing the Parenting Coordinator. See id.
27 Shear, supra note 16(explaining statutory schemes such as
those for
mediation, child custody evaluation, child custody counseling, and
judicial reference have specific and mutually exclusive requirements
and therefore cannot be merged to create the Parenting Coordination
model).
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have adopted statutes or court rules permitting Parenting
Coordination, some with and some without decisionmaking authority. 28 At least ten states, however, are
specific
utilizing Parenting Coordination without
authority. 29 Where the Parenting Coordinator's role is

completely dependent on a court order - that is, where
28

Arizona: ARIZ. R. FAM. L. PROC. 74; Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT.

ANN. §§ 14-10-128.1, 128.3 (West 2010); Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. §
61-125 (West 2010); Idaho: IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717D (2010);
IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(l)(3); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:358:1
(2010); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1659 (2009);
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.1751 (West 2010); North
Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-91 (West 2010); Oklahoma:
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.1 (West 2010); Oregon: OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 107.425 (West 2010); Texas: TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
153.605 (Vernon 2009); Vermont: VT. FAM. P.R. 4(s); West Virginia:
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-208 (West 2010).
29 It is difficult to ascertain precisely how many states are using
Parenting Coordination without statutory or rule based authority
because, in a jurisdiction utilizing Parenting Coordination, there may
not be published decisions reflecting the appointment and, even if there
are published decisions reflecting the use of Parenting Coordination,
those decision are not easily identifiable if the decision does not use the
term "Parenting Coordinator." See Kirkland, PC Laws, Rules and
Regulations, supra note 8, at 28, regarding inconsistent nomenclature.
However, ten states utilize Parenting Coordination with specific
statutory or rule-based authority authorizing the appointment of a
Parenting Coordinator. Alabama: G.R.V. v. M.V., 825 So. 2d 116,
118 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001); California: Shear, supra note 16, at 90
(referencing California's then-fourteen years of experimentation with
Parenting Coordination without enabling legislation); Delaware: D.W.
v. R.E., No. CN07-03739, 2009, WL 6303016 (Del. Fam. Ct. July 28,
2009); Illinois: In re C.N., 752 N.E.2d 1030 (Ill. 2001); Indiana:
Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, 822 N.E.2d 609 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004);
Kentucky: Telek v. Bucher, No. 2008-CA-002149-ME, 2010 WL
1253473 (Ky. Ct. App. April 2, 2010); Nevada: Pierce v. Ciccarone,
No. 52515, 2008 WL 6124780 (Nev. Dec. 18, 2008); New York: L.S.
v. L.F., 803 N.Y.S.2d 881 (Sup. Ct. 2005); Pennsylvania: Yates v.
Yates, 963 A.2d 535 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008); Tennessee: Nesbitt v.
Nesbitt, No. M2006-02645-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 112538 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Jan. 14, 2009).
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there is no statute or rule that provides for its appointment the question is whether the court has the authority to order
the appointment. Can that authority be based on existing
laws permitting a trial court to send a matter to mediation
or arbitration, or to appoint a special master? Can that
authority be based on a trial court's inherent authority?
These questions make Parenting Coordination vulnerable to
challenge as an unauthorized delegation of judicial
authority.
Parenting Coordination borrows aspects of different
extra-judicial devices that trial courts are authorized to
utilize. For example, a Parenting Coordinator assists parties
in an attempt to "mediate" a dispute and, when he makes a
decision, acts similar to an arbitrator or special master.
However, a Parenting Coordinator differs from a mediator,
arbitrator, or a special master in fundamental ways. Thus,
statutes and court rules that authorize a trial court's use of
authorize a trial
those alternative devices do not necessarily
30
Coordination.
Parenting
of
court's use
If a Parenting Coordinator is appointed under a
statute or rule authorizing some other process, the
Parenting Coordinator will and should be expected to
adhere to the procedures prescribed by the authorizing
statute or rule; and if he does not, will be subject to
allegations that he has violated the statute or rule that
served as the ostensible basis for the appointment. 3 At the
30

A leader in the Parenting Coordination movement and an attorney in

Oklahoma, the first state to pass a Parenting Coordination law, noted
that in the process of developing a Parenting Coordination program in
Oklahoma, they realized that they had to have a new law to legally do
what they were trying to do. Without a new law allowing for a
parenting coordinator, a court cannot delegate decision-making
authority to a third party that invades the "high walls of the family."
AFCC, Implementation Issues, supra note 3, at 537.
31Shear, supra note 16, at 92 (explaining that the practice of invoking
laws governing or processes such as mediation as the basis for authority
for Parenting Coordination "opens the door to court challenges on the
grounds of non-compliance with the governing law for each of those
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same time, if the Parenting Coordinator does adhere to the
procedures prescribed by a statute that authorizes mediation
or arbitration, for example, he is not conducting Parenting
Coordination with all of its benefits. 32 Furthermore,
qualifications that are needed in a Parenting Coordinator
differ from qualifications required for other roles such as
mediator, arbitrator, or special master. For these reasons, a
Parenting Coordination appointment should not rest on
statutes authorizing a trial court to utilize other processes
such as mediation, arbitration, or reference to a special
master. Problems in relying on such statutes are examined
more closely below in Parts A, B, and C. In addition, as
discussed in Parts D and E, other potential sources of
authority exist that can support the appointment of a
Parenting Coordinator.
A. Statutes and Rules Authorizing Mediation as
Potential Sources of Authority for Parenting Coordination

models"). See, e.g., Heinonen v. Heinonen, 14 P.3d 96, 98-99 (Or. Ct.
App. 2000) (rejecting the idea that the delegation of authority to the
Parenting Coordinator was a permissible form of mediation because the
mediation statute did not authorize a trial court to delegate authority to
a mediator to make a binding ruling "against the wishes of one of the
parties").
32 He also risks accusations of legal and ethical violations due to
confusion about the varying. See Kirkland, PC Lavs, Rules and
Regulations, supra note 8, at 28 ("Inappropriate and inconsistent use
of titles and functions in this arena has been found to be a major risk
for board complaints and civil lawsuits.") (citing Kirkland, et al.,
Quasi-JudicialImmunity for Forensic Mental Health Professionals in
Court-Appointed Roles, 3 J. OF CHILD CUSTODY 1 (2006)); see also
Sullivan, supra note 2, at 576 (explaining that the lack of coordination
of review processes creates a "minefield of professional risk" for a
psychologist servicing as a Parenting Coordinator). In addition, if
Parenting Coordination is hastily implemented on an ad hoc basis, the
"brand" of Parenting Coordination is subject to damage, and the
opportunity to reap the benefits to be gained from Parenting
Coordination will be lost. Greenberg, supra note 15, at 209.
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Statutes or rules of court that authorize a trial court
to order mediation should not be construed to also approve
of Parenting Coordination. 33 Of course, where a Parenting
Coordinator has decision-making authority, statutes
authorizing mediation, which do not allow for decisionmaking by a mediator, cannot be the basis for the
authority. 34 Even where a Parenting Coordinator does not
have decision-making authority, a mediation statute is not a
sound basis for authority to appoint a Parenting
Coordinator. 35 The processes of mediation and Parenting
Coordination are fundamentally different. A Parenting
Coordinator's role is similar to that of a mediator in that the
goal is to facilitate the parties' mutual agreement regarding
the resolution of a given dispute. 36 The methods by which
those disputes are resolved are also somewhat similar.
Parties typically communicate ex parte with a mediator in
mediation and with a Parenting Coordinator in Parenting
Coordination in an effort to reach a mutual agreement.
33 Heinonen, 14 P.3d at 98 (rejecting the argument that the delegation

of authority to the Parenting Coordinator was a permissible form of
mediation and recognizing that the statutes contemplated mediation to
resolve parenting time and visitation issues but that they did not
authorize a trial court to delegate authority to a mediator to make a
binding ruling "against the wishes of one of the parties.") (citing OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 765(1) (West 2010). See also Shear, supra note 16,
at 94 (explaining that invoking a mediation statute as the basis for
authority to appoint a Parenting Coordinator is "problematic" because,
among other things, mediation is confidential).
34 Id.
35 id.

AFCC, Guidelines, supra note 9, at 165 ("Parenting coordination is a
child-focused alternative dispute resolution process in which a mental
health or legal professional with mediation training and experience
assists high conflict parents to implement their parenting plan by
facilitating the resolution of their disputes in a timely manner ....").
37 AFCC,Guidelines, supra note 9, at 170-71 (stating in Guideline X
that "[b]ecause parenting coordination is a non-adversarial process
designed to reduce acrimony and settle disputes efficiently, a PC may
engage in ex parte (individual) communications with each of the parties
36
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However, the roles are significantly different with regard to
reporting to the court about the results of the process.
Mediation of child custody matters is generally
confidential.3 8 A mediator typically may not report to the
court any information beyond whether the matter was
settled through the mediation process. In contrast,
Parenting Coordination is not confidential; the Parenting
Coordination may file reports with the court or even be
called to testify. 39 Because of these fundamental differences
between mediation and Parenting Coordination, statutes or
rules of court that have authorized a trial court to utilize
mediation cannot be construed to also approve of a
Parenting
of
process
different
fundamentally
Coordination.
B. Statutes or Rules Authorizing Appointment of a
Special Master as Potential Sources of Authority for
Appointing a Parenting Coordinator
To the extent that a Parenting Coordinator does
make recommendations to the court or decisions in the
parties' dispute, his role might be compared to that of a

and/or their attorneys, if specified in writing in the order of
appointment, PC agreement or stipulation").
38 Carrie-Anne Tondo, et al., Mediation Trends: A Survey of the States,
39 FAM. CT. REV. 431, 433 (2001).
39 Kirkland, PC Laws, Rules and Regulations, supra note 8, at 42
(explaining that this "reporting back to the court feature" distinguishes
Parenting Coordination from mediation and is the "teeth" that compels
the parties to respect the Parenting Coordination process).
40 Authority for ordering mediation is particularly weak as a source for
ordering Parenting Coordination if the trial court seeks to appoint a
Parenting Coordinator with decision-making authority. Mediators do
See id. ("Unlike mediation, PC includes
not make decisions.
investigative, probative, evaluative, reporting, and decision-making
components designed to help post-divorce couple navigate parenting
disputes.").

382

216

7.2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 383
special master.4 1 Thus, it is prudent to consider whether a
decision-making Parenting Coordinator could be appointed
under the same authority that allows a court to appoint a
special master.
Most states provide some procedure that allows
courts to appoint special masters to handle certain aspects
of litigation. 42 Twenty-three states have a rule of civil
procedure that nearly mirrors the pre-2003 amended
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53.43 A special master
statute or rule that is modeled after the pre-2003 Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 53 would limit the matters that can
be referred to a master. 44 Under Rule 53, in a non-jury case,
such as a divorce action in state court, reference to a special
master may be made only upon a showing that "some
exceptional condition" requires the reference.4 5 Thus, a
child custody or visitation matter is not appropriate to refer
to a special master unless there is a showing of an
"exceptional condition" requiring the reference. Limited
available court time and overloaded dockets do not
constitute "exceptional conditions" warranting referrals of
family court matters to a special master.4 6 Thus, such a rule
Terminology varies among the states; the same role might be called a
"referee" or "commissioner." See Lynn Jokela & David F. Herr,
41

Special Masters in State Court Litigation:An Available and Underused
Case Management Tool, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1299, 1300, 1325
(2005) (chart summarizing each state's form of Rule 53).
42 Id. at 1301-02. Illinois is the only state that does not have any
mechanism governing appointment of special masters. Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
46 See, e.g., Ex parte

Mobayed, 689 So. 2d 890, 892 -93 (Ala. Civ. App.
1997) (refusing to allow routine reference to a special master, noting
that if congestion was an exceptional circumstance to warrant a
reference, "present congestion would make references the rule rather
than the exception," which is contrary to the language of the rule itself
that requires that reference be the exception not the rule) (citing La Buy
v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957)).
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is not likely to provide the rationale for appointment of a
Parenting Coordinator. At least four of the states that have
been identified4 7 as utilizing Parenting Coordination
without specific authority have adopted the pre-2003
version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 as their basis for appointing a
special master; 48 thus, a Parenting Coordinator's
appointment in those jurisdictions (and any jurisdictions
similarly situated) could probably not be based on the
state's special master rule.49
Some states have rules or statutes providing for
special masters that are substantively different from the
pre-2003 federal rule discussed above. 50 Whether
appointment of a Parenting Coordinator can be based on a
court's authority to appoint a special master will depend on
each state's special master authority. California is one state
that has specifically determined whether the appointment of
a Parenting Coordinator may be based on the state's
authority to appoint a special mater, or "referee" as it is
called in California, and decided that it does not.51
In California, the appointment of a Parenting
Coordinator is dependent on California's special master
statute. However, California's special master statute allows
47 See supra note 29.
48

Alabama:_ALA. R. Civ. P. 53; Indiana: IND. R. TRIAL. P. 53; Nevada:

NEV. R. Civ. P. 53; Tennessee: TENN. R. Civ. P. 53. See Jokela & Herr,

supra note 41, at 1325 (listing those states as adopting the pre-2003
amended version of the federal rule).
49 Interestingly, in 2003, Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, was amended to allow courts to appoint special masters to
assist with pretrial and post-trial work; adoption of the current version
of Rule 53 might therefore provide some basis for authority for
appointing a Parenting Coordinator to oversee implementation of a
court order. When courts appoint a special master to address pretrial or
post-trial matters, it is usually because the court cannot efficiently
address the matter. Jokela & Herr, supra note 41, at 1301 (citing FED.
R. CIv. P. 53 advisory committee's note to 2003 amendments).
50
Id.
511Id.

at 1322-23.
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reference to a special master in limited circumstances.
Those limitations make Parenting Coordination impossible
without consent of the parties. 52 For example, a Parenting
Coordinator necessarily has to interpret existing court
orders. The California Court of Appeals in Ruisi v. Thieriot
viewed interpretation of existing orders as a question of
law, which cannot be referred to a special master without
consent. 53 Also, appointment of a Parenting Coordinator
contemplates that he will address disputes that are, at the
time of the appointment, unknown. California's special
master statute, however, does not provide authority to refer
unknown future disputes to a special master.54 Thus, the
court determined that, without consent, the role of
Parenting Coordinator, which would interpret a court order
and address future 55
disputes, could not stand without
parties.
the
of
consent
Where a special master rule might provide some
authority for the appointment of a Parenting Coordinator,
he should follow the procedures of that special master rule
that forms the basis for the appointment. 56 However, in
order to bestow all of the benefits of Parenting
Coordination - specifically, the educational and counseling
component - resort to a special master rule may not be
workable.57 The counseling and educational components
52

Ruisi v. Thieriot, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766, 774 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)

(stating that the distinction between reference to a special master with
consent and reference without consent is "carefully preserved in the
statutes in order to comply with the constitutional mandate").
53 Id. ("The trial court has no authority to refer questions of law....
Disputes involving interpretation of the existing custody orders, for
example, may present questions of law.").
54 Id. ("The trial court has no authority to compel a reference of
unknown future disputes.").
55
56 Id.

See generally id.
See In re Marriage of Rozzi, 190 P.3d 815, 821 (Colo. Ct. App.
2008) (holding that the trial court could not combine appointment of
Parenting Coordinator under Colorado's Parenting Coordinator statute,
57
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that are unique to Parenting Coordination necessarily
involve ex parte communications. A rule or statute that
authorizes appointment of a special master may not tolerate
such ex parte communications. 58 Because of that
fundamental difference between the role of a Parenting
Coordinator and that of a special master, the special master
rule or statute is not a well-founded basis for appointment
of a Parenting Coordinator.
C. Statutes or Rules Authorizing Arbitration as
Possible Sources of Authority for Parenting Coordination
When a Parenting Coordinator does have decisionmaking authority, his role is somewhat like an arbitrator in
that he is making a decision. However, statutes or rules of
court that authorize a trial court to order arbitration cannot
necessarily be construed to also approve of Parenting
Coordination. In determining whether an arbitration statute
can form the basis for Parenting Coordination, it is relevant
to consider whether the state allows arbitration of child
custody issues.
Some states that provide for court-ordered
arbitration, generally, nevertheless prohibit arbitration of
child custody and visitation issues. 59 Even parents'
agreements to arbitrate custody have been held invalid. It
which does not allow for decision-making authority, with decision-

making authority of a special master provided for by Colorado's special
master rule).
58 Horton v. Ferrell, 981 S.W.2d 88, 91 (Ark. 1998) (holding that a
special master is a judge subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct and
therefore should disqualify after relying upon ex parte
communications); State ex rel. Hamrick v. Stucky, 640 S.E.2d 243, 249
(W. Va. 2006) (holding that a special master is a pro-tempore part-time
judge and must comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct).
59 See, e.g., Toiberman v. Tisera, 998 So. 2d 4, 15 (Fla. App. 2008)
(citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.104(14)(West 2011); Pulfer v. Pulfer, 673
N.E.2d 656, 659 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Glauber v. Glauber, 600
N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 (N.Y. 1993).
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has been held that parents can never finally contract with
respect to the custody of their children because the courts
stand in the relation of parens patriae to minor children,
and therefore, must determine questions of custody and
visitation according to the welfare and best interests of the
children. 60 Where a jurisdiction prohibits arbitration of
child custody and visitation issues, the court should tread
lightly in appointing a Parenting Coordinator and look to
other sources of authority to support the appointment.
By agreement of the parties, some courts have
allowed arbitration of child custody and visitation. Where
See, Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 742-43 ("A court cannot be bound by
an agreement as to custody and visitation, or either custody or
visitation, and simultaneously act as parens patriae on behalf of the
child."); Kelm v. Kelm, 749 N.E.2d 299, 301 (Ohio 2001) (declining to
allow arbitration of child custody issues, which go to the "very core of
the child's welfare and best interests," because that would "encroach
upon the trial court's traditional role as parens patriae"). The court in
Kelm was not convinced by the argument that the opportunity for
judicial review of the arbitration award cured the defect; the court was
of the opinion that the opportunity for de novo judicial review of an
arbitration award destroys the parties' expectation that an arbitration
award will be final, therefore, the court said, it is, is wasteful of time
and duplicative of effort. For that reason, it was not "advantageous to
the best interests of children." Id.
61 See, e.g., Fawzy v. Fawzy, 973 A.2d 347, 360 (N.J. 2009) ("The right
60

to parental autonomy subsumes the right to submit issues of child
For us,
custody and parenting time to an arbitrator for disposition ....
the bundle of rights that the notion of parental autonomy sweeps in
includes the right to decide how issues of custody and parenting time
will be resolved. Indeed, we have no hesitation in concluding that, just
as parents 'choose' to decide issues of custody and parenting time
among themselves without court intervention, they may opt to sidestep
the judicial process and submit their dispute to an arbitrator whom they
have chosen.") (quoting E. Gary Spitko, Reclaiming the "Creaturesof
the State": Contractingfor Child Custody Decision Making in the Best
Interests of the Family, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1139, 1210 (Fall
2000)). For further discussion regarding the differing views as to
whether to allow arbitration of child custody disputes, see George K.
Walker, ArbitratingFamily Law Cases by Agreement, 18 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIM. LAW. 429, 431-33 (2003).
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such precedent exists, a court might more reasonably rely
62
on arbitration authority to order Parenting Coordination.
Nevertheless, there remains the substantive problem with
the differences in the procedures. Ex parte communications
between the parties and the Parenting Coordinator is
troubling when the Parenting Coordinator does have
decision-making authority, as he would under authority to
arbitrate. In that situation, the parties are, in essence,
communicating ex parte with the decision maker. When the
judge is a decision maker and parties communicate with
him ex parte, he must recuse himself.
If a Parenting Coordinator may serve where a judge
could not, any court rule or statute to which a court resorts
for appointment authority should clearly contemplate the
appointment. Moreover, it must make additional provisions
to compensate for the risks inherent in such an
arrangement. Thus, authority for appointment of an
arbitrator to decide an issue regarding child custody and
visitation should not be resorted to as a basis for authority
to appoint a Parenting Coordinator.
D. Trial courts' Equitable or Inherent Powers as
Possible Sources of Authority for Appointing a Parenting
Coordinator
There are some arguments to be made that a trial
court has authority to appoint a Parenting Coordinator
without specific authority provided by a statute or court
rule. In some jurisdictions, a trial court's authority to enter
orders regarding custody and visitation of children is based
on a court's general equity powers. 63 In such jurisdictions,
62 Kentucky, for example, allows arbitration of custody matters,
Masterson v Masterson, 60 S.W. 301 (Ky. App. 1901), and also allows

for Parenting Coordination, see Telek v. Bucher, No. 2008-CA002149-ME, 2010 WL 1253473 (Ky. Ct. App. April 2, 2010).

Alabama: Snead v. Davis, 90 So. 2d 825 (Ala. 1956) (stating that a
court of equity awarding custody of children in divorce proceeding is
63
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the appointment of a Parenting Coordinator could be
upheld as allowed under the court's broad inherent equity
powers, acting as parenspatriae in the best interest of the
children. 64 Also, it might be upheld as allowed pursuant to
the trial court's 65inherent authority to enforce its own orders
and judgments.
In some jurisdictions, however, trial court authority
to make determinations about child custody and visitation

exercising its inherent powers); Missouri: Urbanek v. Urbanek, 503
S.W.2d 434, 441 (Mo. App. 1973) ("The right and power to determine
custody and maintenance of children is not born out of statute, but
exists because of the inherent power of courts exercising equitable
jurisdiction to care for and provide for a minor child."); I. v. B., 305
S.W.2d 713, 722 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957) (holding that, in determining the
custody of a child of divorced parents, the jurisdiction of an equity
court is not limited to the express provisions of a statute, but is broad
enough to accomplish what is necessary to make a correct
determination with respect to the child's custody and welfare); New
Jersey: Henderson v. Henderson, 91 A.2d 747, 750 (N.J. 1952) (stating
that the court has "general equity parens patriae jurisdiction" in child
custody cases, predicated upon minor's residence in State); see Clemens
v. Clemens, 90 A.2d 72, 76-77 (App. Div. 1952) (stating that a statute
granting authority in divorce actions to make orders touching the care,
custody, education, and maintenance of children was not intended to
restrict the court's general jurisdiction over child custody).
64See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 682 So. 2d 1051, 1054 -55 (Ala. Civ. App.
1996) (stating that, under the statute that provides that, in conjunction
with a divorce, a court has "wide discretion" to "make such orders in
respect to the custody of the children as their safety and well-being may
require").
65 See, e.g., Telek, No. 2008-CA-002149-ME, 2010 WL 1253473
(Ky.
Ct. App. April 2, 2010) (indicating that the appointment of a Parenting
Coordinator might be proper under the trial court's inherent authority to
enforce its own orders) (citing Akers v. Stephenson, 469 S.W.2d 704,
706 (Ky. 1970)). But see Ruisi v. Thieriot, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766, 772
n.10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting the argument that the court had the
authority to refer the matter to a Parenting Coordinator under the statute
that allows the court to enforce its orders by any such orders as it
determines necessary because the statute does not give the trial court
explicitly authority to direct a reference of family law issues).
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is statutory. 66 Thus, the court has no power to do anything
other than what is conferred upon the court by statute,
perhaps even with consent of the parties. 67 Under that
approach, a Parenting Coordinator probably cannot be
permissibly appointed where no statute specifically allows
it.6 8 The logical extension of this view is that, even an
agreement of the parties to allow a Parenting Coordinator
to make decisions is not allowable, because such
assignment of a judicial role to a non-judicial designee
would be an abridgement of the trial court's statutory
authority to make determinations on69custody and visitation
of a child in the child's best interest.
66

Colorado: In re Marriage of Trouth, 631 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Colo. App.
1981) (relying on a statute granting the court the authority to award
custody to grandparents); Connecticut: Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 362
A.2d 889, 891 (Conn. 1975) (relying on a statute granting the court the
authority to award alimony and support through a pendente lite
hearing); Maine: Roberts v. Roberts, 697 A.2d 62, 64 (Me. 1997)
(stating that "the custody and support of minor children must be found
in the statutes or it does not exist."); Michigan: Merchant v. Merchant,
343 N.W.2d 620, 623 (Mich. App. 1983) (reasoning that the court's
authority during divorce proceedings is "purely statutory."); New
Hampshire: Stetson v. Stetson, 171 A.2d 28, 29 (N.H. 1961) ("[T]he
power of the Superior Court to award custody of minor children and to
make provisions for the support of the wife and the children is wholly
statutory, and ... the court has no independent equity jurisdiction.");
Virginia: Cutshaw v. Cutshaw, 261 S.E.2d 52, 54 (Va. 1979) ("The
jurisdiction of a court to provide for child support pursuant to a divorce
is purely statutory.").
67 See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 97 N.E.2d 213, 216 (Ohio 1951)
("no
jurisdiction other than that granted by statute can be conferred upon
such a court even with the consent of the parties to an action").
68 Cf Avila v. Leonardo, 128 P.2d 43 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942)
(stating that authority of the court in a divorce action to make necessary
orders for the support of the minor children of the marriage is conferred
by statute and its exercise cannot be limited or abridged by the parents).
69 See, e.g., Heinonen v. Heinonen, 14 P.3d 96 (Or. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that, because the trial court's authority is purely statutory and
no statute authorizes the trial court to delegate that authority to a
Parenting Coordinator, the trial court could not so delegate because
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Depending on a jurisdiction's view of the authority
of the appointing court - that it can exercise equitable
powers as necessary to ensure the best interest of the child
on the one hand or as constrained by statute on the other Parenting Coordination may be sustainable without a
specific authorizing rule or statute.
E. Other Statutes as Basis for Authority or
Providing Analogous Support for the Authority to Appoint
a Parenting Coordinator
A state might have some other statute or court rule
allowing a third-party judicial designee that could provide
the basis for the appointment of a Parenting Coordinator.
For example, Kentucky does not have a statute specifically
providing for the appointment of a Parenting Coordinator.
However, a court identified as one possible source for the
authority to appoint a Parenting Coordinator a statute that
grants the trial court's authority to order a local child
welfare department, for example, to exercise continuing
custodial or
supervision over the case to assure that the
7°
visitation terms of the decree are carried out.
Similarly, New York has allowed appointment of a
Parenting Coordinator under a court's authority to appoint a
"case manager," although the Parenting Coordinator cannot

delegating that authority would deprive the trial court of its statutorily
mandated authority to determine issues of child custody and visitation
time). But see Polacek v. Polacek, 222 P.3d 732 (Or. Ct. App. 2009)
(allowing delegation of decision-making authority to a Parenting
Coordinator post-Heinonen where the trial court would subsequently
review
that decision).
70
Telek v. Bucher, No. 2008-CA-002149-ME, 2010 WL 1253473 (Ky.
Ct. App. April 2, 2010). The statute allows such an appointment "[i]f
both parents or all contestants agree to the order, or if the court finds
that in the absence of the order the child's physical health would be
endangered or his emotional development significantly impaired."
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make decisions. 7 1 New Jersey has allowed appointment of a
Parenting Coordinator under the court's authority to
appoint an expert to assist the court in making decisions,
although such a Parenting Coordinator could not make
decisions.72
71

In New York, which does not have a Parenting Coordination statute,

it has been held that allowing a Parenting Coordinator to make
decisions is an improper delegation of judicial authority, but that a
Parenting Coordinator without decision-making authority may be
appointed. Edwards v. Rothschild, 60 A.D.3d 675 (N.Y. 2009) (relying
on cases that have held that it is improper to condition future visitation
on the recommendation of a mental health professional or to allow a
child's treating clinical to decide future custody issues); see also L.S. v.
L.F., 803 N.Y.S.2d 881 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (taking the "unusual
step" of appointing a Parenting Coordinator and granting no decisionmaking authority to the Parenting Coordinator but appointing him to
assist the parties in re-establishing visitation between the child and his
father) (citing Zafran v. Zafran, 761 N.Y.S.2d 317 (N.Y. App. Div.
2003) (holding that it was not an improper delegation of judicial
authority to appoint a "case manager," which has no decision-making
authority)).
72 Lindsley v. Lindsley, No. 2006 WL 157316 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Jan. 23, 2006). The husband argued that the use of a Parenting
Coordinator was an impermissible delegation of judicial authority. Id.
at *6. The court decided, however, that the appointment of the
Parenting Coordinator was the appointment of an expert provided for
by New Jersey court rules. Id. The court recognized that a court was not
to abdicate its decision-making role to an expert but held that it was
clear that the trial court did not cede his authority to the expert; instead,
he relied on the expert's report and had carefully defined the expert's
role and preserved the court's role as the ultimate decision-maker in the
case. Id. at *7. The trial judge had said:
the [Parenting Coordinator] will offer you a
recommendation, not a decision. And you can agree
with it, resolve it, it's done. Or one of you can say,
we didn't like that, we're going to the judge .... I'm
not abdicating my decision-making authority to that
person, but I'm giving him an opportunity to funnel
through your dispute as parents without involving
me, who wears this black dress.
Id. at *1.
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Not all courts agree, of course, that a statute other
than a Parenting Coordinator statute can allow for the
appointment. 73 Moreover, where another statute is relied
upon as the basis for the appointment, the Parenting
Coordinator should adhere to the procedures and
requirements of that statute, which may not be consistent
with the goals and procedures of Parenting Coordination.74
A more sound approach might be that taken by the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which determined that
allowing a Parenting Coordinator to make decisions about
issues that are "ancillary" to the trial court's order was not
an improper delegation of judicial authority.75 Although
73 Heinonen v. Heinonen, 14 P.3d 96 (Or. Ct. App. 2000). The court in

Heinonen recognized the statutory authority for the trial court to use
services of a psychologist or a mental health expert to evaluate
parenting time requests, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.425 (West 2010),
and to modify parenting time provisions by stipulation subject to the
court discretion to hold a hearing, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.174
(West 2010), and that the statutes provide for an expedited procedure to
resolve disputes, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.425 (West 2010). 14 P.3d

at 98-99. However, the court rejected any idea that what the trial court
had
74 done in Heinonen fell within the ambit of any of those statutes. Id.
See supra Parts IV.A., B., and C.
75 Yates v. Yates, 963 A.2d 535, 540 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008). The
Pennsylvania Superior Court also noted that at least one Pennsylvania
County had adopted local rules authorizing appointing of a Parenting
Coordinator and setting out the role of a Parenting Coordinator. It also
noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Domestic Relationships
Procedural Rules Committee was considering a proposed Rule of Civil
Procedure and a model order to unify parenting coordination
procedures across the statute of Pennsylvania. Id. at 539 n.2. Yates has
been cited by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals as instructive in
that court's decision that a trial court's delegation of authority to a third
party to oversee family therapy was not improper. Meyr v. Meyr, 7
A.3d 125, 139-140 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010). Because the trial court
had resolved the primary issues regarding custody and visitation and
the third-party's role involved "merely the coordination of family
therapy," which the court viewed as "ancillary" to custody and
visitation, it determined that the trial court had not improperly
delegated its judicial authority. Id.
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authority for the appointment of a special master and a
hearing officer did not provide the authority for the
appointment of a Parenting Coordinator, those provisions
for the "limited" delegation of
were at least precedent
76
authority.
judicial
As the Pennsylvania court recognized, the
delegation of authority to a Parenting Coordinator is a
"limited" delegation, and there is undoubtedly precedent in
any jurisdiction for some limited delegation of some tasks
related to a judge's disposition of his duties. That rationale
- that the role of a Parenting Coordinator is limited and
there is analogous authority for a limitation delegation of
judicial authority - combined with the idea that the court
does have some parenspatriae authority to protect the best
interest of the children and to enforce its own orders,
provides a valid argument that Parenting Coordination is
sustainable without a specific statute or court rule
authorizing the appointment. 77 Where a trial court has some
inherent authority to ensure the best interest of the children,
with or without specific statute or rule-based authority,
Parenting Coordination can be sustained. Combined with
the substantial benefits of a qualified Parenting
Coordinator, imposing appropriate limitations on the
Parenting Coordinator's role can incrementally diminish
the argument that appointment is an improper delegation of
76

Yates, 963 A.2d at 541.

It might be argued that the role is narrow enough that the Parenting
Coordinator's role is merely ministerial and not judicial. In deciding
whether an improper judicial delegation has occurred in different
contexts, courts have focused on whether the action delegated involved
a "judicial function" or the "ultimate decision-making authority," or
involved merely ministerial matters or "details." See, e.g., United States
v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the delegation
of the details of court-ordered therapy, including choosing a provider
and schedule, was permissible); United States v. Grant, 52 F.3d 448,
451 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the trial judge did not delegate a
judicial function by directing the jury to tell the reporter to go faster or
slower as the jury listened to testimony read-backs).
77
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judicial authority. Achieving an appropriate balance of
benefits and limitations is discussed in light of the basis for
appointment authority, which achieves a sustainable
appointment. The benefits and limitations are discussed in
the remainder of this Article.
V. The Benefits of Parenting Coordination in HighConflict Cases
Unlike a judgment in almost every other kind of
litigation, a divorce judgment is written at a specific point
in time and attempts to address the relationship of the
parties at that specific point in time and in the future.
78
However, that relationship is not static; it changes.
Ideally, a parenting plan would specify in detail the terms
governing the post-divorce relationship, such as the
visitation schedule, so as to avoid opportunities for frequent
conflict. However, often times a parenting plan is not
sufficiently specific, thus allowing for frequent
opportunities

for conflict. 79 Furthermore, for divorced

couples who have not developed the ability to resolve
78

Kelm v. Kelm, 749 N.E.2d 299, 304 (Ohio 2001) ("[A]s a practical

matter, a custody and visitation order is never absolutely final.").
79 Linda D. Elrod, A Minnesota Comparative Family Law Symposium:
Reforming the System to Protect Children in High Conflict Custody
Cases, 28 WM. MITCHELL. L. REV. 495, 529-30 (2001) ("Highly
structured parenting plans that help parents disengage may be valuable
tools to deal with high-conflict parents. A lengthy and detailed
parenting plan gives less room for each parent to manipulate or feel the
other parent is manipulating them."). It has been suggested that a
Parenting Coordinator assist in the process of drafting such a detailed
parenting plan. See, e.g., Cassandra Brown, Ameliorating the Effects of
Divorce on Children, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 461, 478 (2009)
(suggesting that a Parenting Coordinator could add "increased structure
and detail in the parenting plan") (citing Coates et al., supra note 3, at
249-250). Such a role, however, is not consistent with the typical
Parenting Coordinator's role which arises after a court order is entered.
See infra Part VII.
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conflict between them, even a parenting plan with intricate
details cannot eliminate all possibility of conflict. Even the
most detailed parenting plan cannot contemplate every
situation that will arise: children's ages, interests and
activities change over time, and parents may remarry and
relocate. A parenting plan that appeared to contemplate and
address every opportunity for conflict when the children
were three and five years old will not necessarily
contemplate and resolve every conflict that will arise when
those same children are thirteen and fifteen years old.
Parenting Coordination is intended for high-conflict
divorced parents - those who otherwise would repeatedly
be in court seeking intervention in their daily lives. If the
divorced parents do not have the ability to resolve the
conflicts that arise during that period, they will frequently
be back in court. These high-conflict parents use a
amount of the court's time and
disproportionate
80
resources.
While Parenting Coordinators address what may be
81
perceived as minor conflicts between the parents,
depending on whether and how these conflicts are resolved,
80 Coates et al., supra note 3, at 246-47; see also Wilma J. Henry et al.,
ParentingCoordinationand Court Relitigation:A Case Study, 47 FAM.
CT. REV. 682, 682-83 (October 2009) (stating that family courts and
associated professionals spend approximately 90 percent of their time
on about 10 percent of parents).
81 Coates et al., supra note 3, at 247 (noting that disputes between highconflict parents are often minor, involving such things as one-time
changes in a visitation schedule, telephone access, and vacation
planning). See also infra Part VII, discussing that, properly utilized,
Parenting Coordinator will encompass only assisting the parties in
implementing a well-drafted, detailed parenting plan that has been
incorporated into a court order and will, thus, address only minor
issues. Parenting Coordinators should be involved when the rights at
stake are relatively insignificant in comparison to a right such as the
right to custody or visitation in toto. If Parenting Coordinators are
being used in a different capacity the balance maybe tipped against
granting decision-making authority to the Parenting Coordinator.
However, such is not the proper role of a Parenting Coordinator.
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the conflicts can have a major impact on the children of
those parents. The level and intensity of the parental
conflict prior, during, and after divorce proceedings, rather
than the divorce itself, is thought to be the most dominant
factor in a child's psychological and social adjustment postdivorce. 82 Exposure to conflict can result in problems such
as perpetual emotional turmoil, depression, substance
abuse, and educational failure. 83 Thus, it is imperative to
avoid even those conflicts regarding minor issues, and
implement mechanisms of resolving those conflicts
amenably. However, the typical mechanism for resolving
conflict - the adversarial process of our court8 4 system encourages combat and discourages cooperation.
82

See, e.g., Elrod, supra note 79, at 497; see generally John H. Grych,

Interparental Conflict as a Risk Factor for Child Maladjustment:
Implicationsfor the Development of PreventionPrograms,43 FAM. CT.
REv. 97, 99 (2005).
83 Elrod, supra note 79; see generally Grych, supra note
82.
84
See, e.g., Joan B. Kelly, Psychological and Legal Interventions for
Parents and Children in Custody and Access Disputes: Current
Research and Practice, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 129, 131 (2002) ("It
has long been noted that the adversarial divorce process exacerbates
the conditions that create risk for children, and often undermines
parental efforts to maintain protective conditions for children after
separation.") (citing JANET R. JOHNSTON & LINDA G. CAMPBELL,
IMPASSES OF DIVORCE: THE DYNAMICS AND RESOLUTION OF FAMILY
CONFLICT 38-44 (1988)). Kelly explains the failings of the adversarial

process:
The central failings of the adversarial process with
respect to custody disputes are the inherent
mechanisms and practices that escalate conflict,
diminish the possibility of civility between parents,
exacerbate the win-lose atmosphere that encourages
bitterness and parental irresponsibility, and weaken
important parent-child relationships. The basic nature
of the adversarial process pits parents against each
other, encourages polarized and positional thinking
about each other's deficiencies, and discourages
parental communication, cooperation, and more
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In response to the detrimental effects of the
adversarial process and parental conflict, multiple means of
alternative dispute resolution have developed, such as
mediation and arbitration of child custody cases. Parenting
Coordination, however, is different from other alternative
means of dispute resolution; it looks to the future beyond
the instant conflict. 85 In addition to addressing the instant
conflict between the parents, Parenting Coordination
further seeks to avoid future conflict. Parenting
Coordination sets out to teach the parents to make
decisions and resolve conflicts among themselves.86 This
"teaching" 87 component of Parenting Coordination
separates Parenting Coordination from other alternative
dispute resolution processes. It provides benefits that other
alternative dispute resolution processes do not to the court

mature thinking about children's needs at a critical
time of change and upheaval. Possible future
constructive relationships between parents are often
thus destroyed.
Kelly, Psychological and Legal Interventions, 10 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. at 131.

85 Other differences between Parenting Coordination and familiar
alternative dispute resolution processes are discussed further in Parts
IV.A, B., and C above.

Kirkland, Positive Coping, supra note 15, at 62 ("Parenting
coordinators attempt to teach divorced parents how to function
independently of the court to resolve conflicts and implement their own
parenting plans."); Shear, supra note 16, at 90 (explaining that
Parenting Coordination incorporates elements of "parent education and
coaching, mediation, arbitration, judicial reference and child custody
evaluation"); Greenberg, supra note 15, at 208 (cleverly using in this
context the Chinese proverb: "Give a man a fish and he will eat for a
day. But, teach him to fish, he will eat for a lifetime.").
87 In interviews with Parenting Coordinators in North Carolina, most
Parenting Coordinators agreed that their primary issue is making clear
to the parents the effect that their ongoing conflict would have on the
children. Sherrill W. Hayes, "More of a Street Cop than a Detective":
an Analysis of the Roles and Functions of Parenting Coordinators in
86

North Carolina,48 FAM. CT. REV. 698, 702 (October 2010).
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system, the children of divorce, and the high-conflict
parents.
Parenting Coordination also provides a benefit to
the court system. With the proper utilization of Parenting
Coordination, the court system does not become what it
otherwise would - a type of social service agency."8 In the
short term, the Parenting Coordinator will assist the parties
in mutually resolving a given conflict, or making a decision
that will resolve the instant conflict. Thus, the parties will
not appear before the court for the given conflict.
Secondly, there are longer-term benefits to
Parenting Coordination. Ideally, throughout the course of
working with the Parenting Coordinator, the parents will
develop the skills and abilities to resolve conflicts on their
own. This in turn reduces the need to resort to the judiciary
- or even a Parenting Coordinator - when future conflicts
arise. A study on the effectiveness of Parenting
Coordination determined that, after the appointment of
Parenting Coordinators in high-conflict cases, there was a
"near 25-fold" decrease in court appearances in those
cases. 89 A more recent study indicated a reduction of
88

See Dana E. Prescott, When Co-Parenting Falters: Parenting

Coordinators, Parents-in-Conflict, and the Delegation of Judicial

Authority, 20 ME. B.J. 240, 243 (2005) (stating that because "courts
will continue to be the vessel into which all this chaos is poured,"
"courts will evolve as more of a social service agency th[a]n a separate
constitutional branch of government charged with the issuance of
judgments within the traditional boundaries of the law").
89 Psychologist and Parenting Coordinator, Terry Johnston, Ph.D.,
analyzed 166 cases over a two-year period. AFCC, Implementation
Issues, supra note 3, at 534 (citing Johnston, T., Cost Effectiveness of
Special Master Use, unpublished report, 1994). In the year before
appointment of a Parenting Coordinator, those 166 cases had 993 court
appearances among them, an average of six court appearances per case.
Id. In contrast, in the year after appointment, those cases had only
thirty-seven court appearances among them, an average of .22 court
appearances per case. Id.; see also Elizabeth Kruse, ADR, Technology,
and New Court Rules - Family Law Trends for the Twenty-First
Century, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW, 207, 217 (2008) (citing
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approximately seventy-five percent of child-related court
filings after Parenting Coordination was implemented. 90
Parenting Coordination also benefits the children of
divorced parents. The use of a Parenting Coordinator can
allow for a more harmonious - or at least a less hostile -

environment for the children. If parents proceed to deal
with conflicts on their own by hiring their own attorneys
and resolving disputes in the adversarial system, it becomes
unlikely that they will develop the skills and abilities to
resolve the conflict on their own. In the meantime, that
litigious environment in the respective households is not in
the best interest of the children; it is in the best interest of
to be able to amicably resolve
the children for their parents
91
arise.
they
as
conflicts
Parenting Coordination also benefits high-conflict
parents. As a purely practical matter, when small postdivorce conflicts arise between parents, the parents need a
speedy resolution. They often cannot get in front of the
court soon enough to meaningfully resolve the conflict. A
Parenting Coordinator is much more easily accessible than
a judge. A Parenting Coordinator can help the parties to
make decisions expeditiously or quickly make a decision
when the parties are unable to do so.92 For example, assume
Johnston's study as evidence that Parenting Coordination is an effective
tool for reducing repeat litigation among parents).
90

Henry et al., supra note 80, at 682.

9'See discussion infra Part V regarding the detrimental effects on
children of post-divorce conflict. At least some courts take the same
view. See, e.g., Cichocki v. Mazurek-Smith, 8 Pa. D. & C. 5th 361, 377
(2009) ("Hopefully, the [Parenting Coordinator] will be able to
facilitate the interaction of the parties. Beyond that, this court believes
that co-parenting counseling is imperative. The parties need to begin to
understand the other's point of view, which will hopefully soften their
stance against each other and benefit the minor child.") (footnote
omitted).
92 Shear, supra note 16, at 91 (parents using Parenting Coordination
"trade off one set of risks and benefits for another - giving up formal
rights and guarantees of fair play and accountability for informality,
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that a parenting plan prescribes that the father shall have
visitation with the children on alternating weekends. The
same parenting plan also provides that the mother shall
have the children on Mother's Day weekend. The parenting
plan, however, does not address what will happen when
there is a conflict between alternating weekend visitation
and Mother's Day weekend visitations. Four weeks from
Mother's Day weekend, the parents realize there is a
conflict and are unable to resolve it. The likelihood of
presenting the issue to the court before Mother's Day is
slim. However, the Parenting Coordinator is available
much sooner. 93 Ideally, he can help the parties reach a
mutual decision. If not, he may 94 be able to make a
decision. Either way, the matter is resolved in a timely
manner. The parents also benefit from the process in that
the Parenting Coordinator can equip them with the ability
to resolve future conflicts on their own.
Ideally, the Parenting Coordination process will
also be less expensive for the parents than resolving their
disputes in the adversarial system by hiring an attorney. If
parents seek to resolve their dispute in the adversarial
environment of the court, they would each be paying their
own attorneys. Furthermore, by using the adversarial
system rather than a Parenting Coordinator, they would be
more likely to return to court again and again, paying their
lawyers again and again. 95 Of course, where the Parenting
quick decisions, and a decision-maker who has substantial experience
in child custody issues, and incremental decision-making").
93 See Hayes, supra note 87, at 699 (one of the three major roles
identified in interviews with Parenting Coordinators in North Carolina
was resolving issues in a timely manner).
94 Whether the Parenting Coordinator has decision-making authority
depends upon the terms of the appointment and any governing
Parenting Coordination statute or court rule in the jurisdiction.
95 See supra note 89 (discussing study that showed that parents using
Parenting Coordination returned to court an average of only .22 times a
year, as compared to six times a year without use of Parenting
Coordination).
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Coordinator does not have decision-making authority but is
simply a "hoop" through which the parties must jump
before getting before the court, 96 with their lawyers in tow,
this does not hold true.
Thus, some of the practical benefits of Parenting
Coordination are eroded if the Parenting Coordinator does
not have decision-making authority. Consider the above
hypothetical. If the Parenting Coordinator does not have
decision-making authority and the parties are unable to
reach a mutual decision about who has the children on
Mother's Day weekend, the parties will have to resort to
court. Thus, (1) the court is left to resolve the conflict; (2)
more time has passed, making it even less likely that the
parties will get before the court in time for the court to
meaningfully resolve the conflict; (3) the children have
possibly been exposed to conflict; (4) the parties' acrimony
has increased; and (5) their expenses have been duplicated.
There are, nevertheless, some benefits of Parenting
Coordination even when the Parenting Coordinator does
not have decision-making authority. Merely recommending
solutions when the parties encounter conflict will help the
parties resolve the immediate problem. Furthermore, it will
help the parties to develop guidelines and strategies that
97
will help them to avoid similar problems in the future 98
and further to develop strategies to avoid future conflict.
However, the substantive benefits that justify Parenting
96

This is the result if the Parenting Coordinator does not have decision-

making authority; thus, this Article recommends Parenting
Coordination with decision-making authority.
97 In re Marriage of Rozzi, 190 P.3d 815, 821 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008)
(discussing the provision of Colorado's code that allows for
appointment but does not provide the Parenting Coordinator with
decision-making authority and noting that having a Parenting
Coordinator merely assisting the parties in resolving current and future
conflict was the legislative intent in passing the Parenting Coordination
statute).
98 Id.
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Coordination are even greater when the Parenting
Coordinator has decision-making authority.99
VI. Parenting Coordination Qualifications: Vital to
Benefit Realization
As discussed in Part V above, one of the primary
benefits of Parenting Coordination is that it provides highconflict parents with the skills to avoid or resolve future
conflicts on their own. Thus, for Parenting Coordination to
bestow its full benefits on its intended beneficiaries, the
Parenting Coordinator must be qualified to equip the
parents with those skills. Without a qualified Parenting
Coordinator, the benefits of Parenting Coordination erode.
Parenting
Coordination is a "legal-psychological
hybrid."00 Thus, a Parenting Coordinator must have
adequate training in both areas.
The AFCC Task Force on Parenting Coordination
requires that a Parenting Coordinator have "training and
experience in family mediation" and that the Parenting
Coordinator be certified as a mediator in his jurisdiction if
certification is available.' 0 ' In addition, the Parenting
Coordinator shall be either (1) a licensed mental health
professional, (2) a legal professional in an area relating to
families, or (3) a certified family mediator under the rules
or laws of the jurisdiction with a master's degree in a
mental health field. 102 Furthermore, the Parenting
99 Shear, supra note 16, at 90 n.4 (stating that, although the AFCC

Guidelines treat decision-making authority as an optional component of
Parenting Coordination, California's family court community, who has
experimented with Parenting Coordination for more than a decade, has
seen Parenting Coordination decision-making authority as "essential to

deterring re-litigation").
100 Kirkland & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 633; Sullivan, supra note 2, at
576.
'0' AFCC, Guidelinessupra note 9, at 166.
102 id.
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Coordinator should have "extensive practical experience in
the profession with high conflict or litigating parents" and
"training in the parenting coordination process, family
dynamics in separation and divorce, parenting coordination
and
techniques, domestic violence and child maltreatment,
0 3
court specific parenting coordination procedures."'
Parenting Coordination has been described as
"practicing at the interface of the legal/psychological
fields."' 0 4 Without requirements that a Parenting
Coordinator have the education, training, and skills to
practice at this interface, the benefits of Parenting
Coordination erode. Where the benefits that can be
bestowed by a properly qualified Parenting Coordinator are
eroded, so does the justification for allowing such a third
party to intrude into the family in conjunction with their
family court litigation. Yet05 the qualifications required by
various jurisdictions vary. 1
The delegation of judicial authority is a "serious
issue" and the courts should therefore delegate its authority
- to the degree permissible - only to qualified
professionals.' 0 6 Any rationale for Parenting Coordination
offered in this Article deteriorates if the Parenting
Coordinator appointed is not adequately qualified: the
103

The AFCC Guidelines also provide that the Parenting Coordinator

shall "acquire and maintain professional competence in the parenting
coordination process" by regularly participating in educational
activities promoting professional growth. Id.Rather idealistically, the
Guidelines provide that a Parenting Coordinator "shall decline an
appointment, withdraw, or request appropriate assistance when the
facts and circumstances of the case are beyond the Parenting
Coordinator's skill or expertise." Id.
104 Sullivan, supra note 2, at 581.
105AFCC, Implementation Issues, supra note 3, at 552 ("some require[]
possession of a social science or mental health degree; others provide[]
that paraprofessionals, such as a court staff, could fulfill the function
provided adequate training was had;" "[i]n many jurisdictions,
attorneys serve as PCs").
106AFCC, Guidelines, supranote 9, at 165.

404

238

7.2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 405
teaching (or counseling) component of Parenting
Coordination is what tips the balance in favor of Parenting
Coordination, because that teaching (or counseling)
component is what broadcasts the benefits of Parenting
Coordination into the future. That component is also what
the judges, mediators, arbitrators, and special masters
cannot provide. The Parenting Coordinator's ability to
provide benefits are a significant part of the equation:
benefits of Parenting Coordination combined with
limitations on Parenting Coordination overcome the
arguments against Parenting Coordination considered in
this Article.
VII. Limitation on Parenting Coordination: Stage of
Divorce Litigation
May a Parenting Coordinator be appointed (1)
immediately upon the commencement of a divorce
proceeding, (2) after a court has entered a pendente lite
order establishing visitation during the pendency of the
divorce proceeding, or (3) only after a court has entered a
judgment of divorce that includes a final custody
determination and a parenting plan? When a parent, postdivorce, petitions the court for modification of the
previously-entered parenting plan, may a court immediately
appoint a Parenting Coordinator, appoint a Parenting
Coordinator after entering a pendent lite order on the
modification petition, or appoint a Parenting Coordinator
only after the court has entered a judgment on the
modification petition? Limiting the appointment to only
after the trial court has entered an order, and thus limiting
the Parenting Coordinator's role to implementing the preexisting court order, weakens arguments that Parenting
Coordination is an improper delegation of judicial
authority.
The AFCC Task Force's Guidelines indicate that
Parenting Coordination is proper only when there is already
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a parenting plan or court-ordered custody and visitation
arrangement in place.' 0 7 Parenting Coordination should be
limited to addressing compliance with an already-existing
court order. Where conflicts arise, the Parenting
Coordinator should first assist the parties in reaching an
agreement and, if they cannot, make a decision that is
consistent with the already-existing court order.'0 8 Thus,
the Parenting Coordinator is not truly free to take
independent action that might be strictly within the
province of the judiciary; instead, he is bound by the terms
of the order that the court has already entered and assists
the parties in their attempt to comply with the court
order. 1°9 For those reasons, appropriately timing the
Parenting Coordinator's appointment strips a layer from the
argument that Parenting Coordination is an improper
delegation of judicial authority.
Many states do not allow Parenting Coordination
until a court has already entered an order to guide the
Parenting Coordinator in his mission. In Oklahoma, which
has operated under enabling legislation longer than any
other state, the Parenting Coordination Act contemplates
The Task Force defines Parenting Coordination as assisting "highconflict parents to implement their parenting plan... ." AFCC,
Guidelines, supra note 9, at 165. It describes the objective of Parenting
Coordination as to "assist high-conflict parents to implement their
parenting plan, to monitor compliance with the details of the plan, to
resolve conflicts regarding their children and the parenting plan in a
timely manner, and to protect and sustain safe, health and meaningful
parent-child relationships." Id.
108 Id. at 171 (Guideline XI, stating that "A PC should attempt to
facilitate agreement between the parties in a timely manner on all
disputes regarding their children as they arise. When parents are unable
to reach agreement, and if it has been ordered by the court, or
authorized by consent, the PC shall decide the disputed issues.").
109 Telek v. Bucher, No. 2008-CA-002149-ME, 2010 WL 1253473 *5
(Ky. Ct. App. April 2, 2010) (holding that Parenting Coordination was
not an improper delegation of judicial authority because, among other
reasons, the trial court was "simply supervising the court's orders" to
ensure that the terms of its orders are carried out.).
107
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that a Parenting Coordinator will be appointed only after a
court order is in place - either pendente lite or final - and
that the Parenting Coordinator will assist in implementation
of that already-existing order or judgment." 0 Specifically,
the Act limits a Parenting Coordinator's authority to
"matters that aid the parties in," among other things,
"complying with the court's order of custody, visitation, or
guardianship.""' Given that the Parenting Coordinator's
decision-making authority is limited to those things that
will aid the parties in complying with orders that are
already entered, the statute does not indicate that a
Parenting Coordinator has a role when no orders have been
112
entered.

10 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.3 (West 2010).
1

112

Id
A pioneer of the Parenting Coordinator movement in Oklahoma

seems to interpret the statute differently but nevertheless concludes that
best practice would be to have a parenting plan in place before a
Parenting Coordinator is appointed. See Barbara Ann Bartlett,
Parenting Coordination: A New Tool for Assisting High-Conflict
Families, 15 OKLA. B. J. 453, 454 (2004) (available at
http://www.okbar.org/obj/articles_04/021404.htm).
This
author,
however, contends that it is not only "best practice," but necessary
under the statutory scheme. Consistent with that interpretation of the
statute, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals has stated that the "plain
language of the Act clearly limits the power and authority of a PC to
'aid' in the 'enforcement of the court's order of custody."' Fultz v.
Smith, 97 P.3d 651, 654 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004). Although the court
did not specifically state that the appointment of a Parenting
Coordinator cannot be made before the trial court has entered an order,
it reveals that such an appointment is not workable. If the Parenting
Coordinator's authority is limited to "aid" in enforcement of the court's
order, what decisions is the Parenting Coordinator to make in a
situation where no order exists? Even in a modification proceeding
where some order has been entered - the judgment of the initial divorce
proceeding, such as in Fultz, the trial court's appointment of a
Parenting Coordinator is pointless if his role is limited to "aiding" in
the enforcement of a court order because the focus of that litigation is
modify that very order.
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The Colorado Parenting Coordinator statute more
specifically indicates that a Parenting Coordinator's
appointment is proper only after the trial court has entered
an order." 3 It provides that a court may appoint a Parenting
Coordinator "at any time after the entry of an order
concerning parental responsibilities and upon notice to the
parties."1 4 Idaho, 11 5 Louisiana, 1 6 and Vermont 1 7 likewise
allow the appointment of a Parenting Coordinator only after
the court has entered an order establishing custody.
Some states do allow appointment of a Parenting
Coordinator prior to the court entering an order. For
example, Florida allows appoints a Parenting Coordinator

113

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-128.1 (West 2010) (stating that "at

any time after the entry of an order concerning parental responsibilities
and upon notice to the parties, the court may ... appoint a parenting
coordinator ....

") (emphasis added); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-

128.3 (West 2010) (stating that, in addition to the appointment of a
parenting coordinator, a court may "at any time after the entry of an
order concerning parental responsibilities ... the court may appoint a
") (emphasis added).
qualified domestic relations decision-maker ..
See also AFCC, Implementation Issues, supra note 3, at 540 ("PCs are
generally used in Colorado in post-decree high conflict parenting
situations where communication has been difficult and litigation
ongoing.").
114 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-128.1 (West 2010).
115 IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(l)(3) ("The appointment may be made at any
stage in the proceeding after entry of an order, decree, or judgment
establishing child custody.") (emphasis added).
116 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:358:1(A) (2010) ("[Tlhe court may
appoint a parenting coordinator in a child custody case for good cause
shown if the court has previously entered a judgment establishingchild
custody, other than an ex parte order.") (emphasis added). The purpose
of the limitation is to "prevent the court from using the parenting
coordinator process as a means of abdicating its responsibility o make
the initial custody determination." Griffith v. Latiolais, 32 So. 3d 380,
398 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (citing comments to the statute).
".. V.R.F.P. 4(s) (allowing a court to appoint a Parenting Coordinator
"[i]n an action under this rule in which parental rights and
responsibilities have been adjudicated") (emphasis added).
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"where an order is sought or entered." ' 1 8 Florida allows the
Parenting Coordinator to assist the parties in creating and
implementing the parenting plan." 9 Oregon also appears to
allow appointment prior to entry of a court order by
allowing a Parenting Coordinator to assist the parties in
creating and implementing a parenting plan. 12 Arizona's
rule is the same. 121 North Carolina only permits the
appointment before an order has been entered with consent
of the parties;122 without the parties consent, a Parenting
Coordinator can be appointed only after a custody order or
parenting plan has been entered. 123 In California, which has
operated without any enabling legislation for over sixteen
years,' 24 although the appointment of a Parenting
Coordinator typically occurs after a parenting plan has been
put in place, it has been reported that Parenting
Coordinators are sometimes appointed to manage the case
during its pendency, due to the lengthy period of time
1 25
required to reach a court decision in high-conflict cases.
118

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61-125 (West 2010).

"9 Id; see also supra note 86 referring to Parenting Coordinators
assisting in drafting of parenting plans.
120 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.425(3)(a) (West 2010).
121ARIz. R. FAM. L. PROC. 74(G) (allowing appointment "[pirior to,
simultaneously with, or after entry of a decree, judgment or custody or
parenting time order").
122N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-91 (West 2010) ("The court may
appoint a parenting coordinator at any time during the proceedings of a
child custody action involving minor children ... if allparties consent
to the appointment.") (emphasis added).
123 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-91 (West 2010) ("The court
may
appoint a parenting coordinator without the consent of the parties upon
entry of a custody order other than an ex parte order, or upon entry of
a parenting plan only if the court also makes specific findings ....")
(emphasis added). See infra Part VIII for a discussion of the findings a
court must make to appoint a Parenting Coordinator without consent.
124Shear, supra note 16, at 90.
125 AFCC, Implementation Issues, supra note 3, at
540. A child custody
evaluator is sometimes appointed along with the Parenting Coordinator.
See also Lindsley v. Lindsley, 2006 WL 157316 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
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Although some jurisdictions allow for appointment
prior to the entry of a court order, in its typical form,
Parenting Coordination comes after the trial court has
entered an order and a Parenting Coordinator assists the
parties in complying with and implementing the parenting
plan. 126 Significantly, confining the appointment to that
point in time - only after the trial court has entered an order
- and limiting the Parenting Coordinator's role to
implementing the pre-existing court order, while
counseling and educating along the way, allows Parenting
Coordination to address the problems that it was created to
remedy and protects against arguments that Parenting
Coordination is an delegation of judicial authority.' Thus,
the appointment is more likely to be sustained if the
appointment is made after the entry of a trial court's order.
VIII. Limitations on Parenting
Conditions Precedent to Appointment

Coordination:

The conditions precedent to appointment are
relevant in considering whether the appointment of a
Parenting Coordinator is an improper delegation of judicial
authority. Relevant conditions precedent to be discussed
Div. Jan. 23, 2006), referring to the appointment of a Parenting
Coordinator whose role came into play before the parties were divorced
and who worked with the parties to facilitate settlement of their divorce
and made a report to the court on which the court relied to make its
custody determination.
126 See AFCC's definition of Parenting Coordinator, supra
note 8; see
also Hayes, supra note 87, at 699 (two of the three major roles
identified in interviews with Parenting Coordinators in North Carolina
were implementation of the existing plan and compliance with the
existing plan).
127 While having someone assist the parties during the litigation work
through their disagreements and assist the parties in drafting a mutually
acceptable and detailed parenting plan certainly has value, that is not
Parenting Coordination in its classic form, see id, and, thus, is not the
"Parenting Coordination" that this Article addresses.
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here are consent to the appointment and trial court
findings. 28 Where the parties consent to the appointment,
their later grounds for objection to the appointment is not
well-founded. 129 Even where parties do not consent to the
appointment, if the trial court has made specific findings to
justify the appointment - such as a finding that the parents
are in high conflict or that the appointment of the Parenting
Coordinator is in the best interest of the children - the
additional "intrusion" into the family by appointment of the
Parenting Coordinator may be justified.
The Guidelines of the AFCC Task Force on
Parenting Coordination require that a Parenting
Coordinator serve only by court order or with consent of
the parties. 130 The Guidelines indicate that appointment is
proper when the parents are "high conflict."' 13' Although
the Guidelines do not specifically define "high conflict,"
they describe the Parenting Coordinator's role as "most
frequently reserved for those high-conflict parents who
have demonstrated their longer-term inability or
128

Some states make ability to pay a statutory condition precedent to

the appointment of a Parenting Coordinator. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 120.5 (West 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-91(b)
(West 2010). The requirement that only children of parents with the
ability to pay are to benefit from Parenting Coordination weakens the
argument that part of the justification for a Parenting Coordinator's
"intrusion" into the family is the state's obligation to ensure the best
interest of the children, see supra Part IV.D. Some states also consider
evidence of domestic violence in determining whether Parenting
Coordination is appropriate. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10128.1(2)(b) (West 2010), and In re Marriage of Rozzi, 190 P.3d 815,
819 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008) (indicating that evidence of domestic
violence could render Parenting Coordination inappropriate) with
IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(l) (indicating that evidence of domestic violence,
as well as mental illness of chemical dependence, make Parenting
Coordination a viable option).
129 It may be, however, in a jurisdiction that prohibits
arbitration of
child custody matters. See discussion at Part IV.C.
130 AFCC, Guidelines, supra note 9, at 169.
'3' id. at 165.

245

7.2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 412
unwillingness to make parenting decision on their own, to
comply with parenting agreements or orders, to reduce their
child-related conflicts, and to protect their children from
the impact of that conflict.' ' 132 Most Parenting Coordination
statutes are substantively in line with the recommendations
of the AFCC, requiring either consent or trial court findings
as precedent to an appointment.
Typically, a Parenting Coordinator may be
appointed where both parents consent to such appointment.
In all states with a Parenting Coordination statute, a court
may appoint a Parenting Coordinator even without the
consent of both parties. However, in all but one1 33 the
court must first make some specific findings that warrant
the appointment of the Parenting Coordinator. The findings
required vary among the states. However, they are similar
in that they all contemplate appointment of a Parenting
Coordinator when, contrary to the best interests of the
children involved, those children will be exposed to
persistent post-divorce parental conflict without the
appointment. Allowing the appointment of a Parenting
Coordinator only in those circumstances and when the
132

d.

Florida is the exception. Florida's Parenting Coordination statute is
significantly less restrictive than others in that it authorizes
appointment of the Parenting Coordinator on the court's motion - that
is, without the parties' consent - yet does not set forth any specific
findings that the trial court must make in order to justify the
appointment without consent of the parties. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61-125
(West 2010) ("[U]pon agreement of the parties, the court's own
motion, or the motion of a party, the court may appoint a parenting
coordinator and refer the parties to parenting coordination to assist in
the resolution of disputes concerning their parenting plan."). Florida's
statute became effective on October 1, 2009. Thus, it has not yet been
addressed by a Florida appellate court. Allowing appointment without
consent or some findings renders the appointment vulnerable to
challenge, because the rationale for the intrusion is lessened without
consent or a finding that the appointment is in the best interest of the
children.
133

412
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parents consent to the appointment diminishes the strength
of any argument that the appointment is an improper
delegation of judicial authority.
In Oklahoma, a court can appoint a Parenting
Coordinator with or without consent of the parties.' 3 4 For
the court to appoint a Parenting Coordinator without the
consent of both parties, two criteria must be satisfied. First,
the court must make a finding that the case is a "highconflict case."'1 35 A "high-conflict case" under the
Oklahoma Parenting Coordinator Act is
any action for dissolution of marriage, legal
separation, paternity, or guardianship where minor
children are involved and the parties demonstrate
a pattern of ongoing litigation, anger and distrust,
verbal abuse, physical aggression or threats of
physical aggression, difficulty in communicating
about and cooperating in the care of their children,
or conditions that in the discretion of the court
warrant the appointment of a parenting
coordinator. 136
Secondly, the court must also make a specific finding that
the appointment of a Parenting Coordinator is in the best
interest7 of the minor child or children involved in the
case. 13

134

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.3(A) (West 2010).

135OKLA.

STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.3(B)(1) (West 2010)..

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.2(2) (West 2010)..
137 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.3(B)(2) (West 2010). North
136

Carolina's Parenting Coordination statute is very similar to
Oklahoma's. It allows appointment with consent of the parties and
allows appointment without consent of the parties only upon specific
findings that the case is "a high-conflict case" and that the appointment
of the Parenting Coordinator is in the best interest of the children. N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-91 (West 2010).
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Similarly, in Colorado, a court can appoint a
Parenting Coordinator with or without consent of the
parties. 138 Absent consent of the parties, a Colorado court
may appoint a Parenting Coordinator only if the court finds
that (1) the parties have "failed to adequately implement
the parenting plan;" (2) mediation is inappropriate or has
been attempted and was unsuccessful; and (3) the
Coordinator is in the best
appointment of the Parenting
39
1
children.
the
of
interest
Likewise, in Louisiana, a Parenting Coordinator
may be appointed with 14 or without consent of both
parties. Absent consent of both parties, a Parenting
Coordinator may be appointed for "good cause." 14 1 There is
"good cause" for appointing a Parenting Coordinator when
a trial court determines that one or both of the parties (1)
are unable or unwilling to make parenting decisions with
one another without assistance of others or insistence of the
court, (2) are unable or unwilling to comply with parenting
agreements and orders, (3) have demonstrated an ongoing
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-128.1 (West 2010). As discussed
in infra Part IX, Colorado provides for appointment of a Parenting
Coordinator with decision-making authority and a Parenting
Coordinator without decision-making authority. A Parenting
Coordinator without decision-making authority may be appointed
without consent upon the findings discussed here. COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14-10-128. 1 (West 2010). However, a Parenting Coordinator
with decision-making authority can be appointed only with consent of
the parties. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-128.3(1) (West 2010).
139 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-128.1(2)(a)(I)-(II) (West 2010);
138

see also In re Marriage of Rozzi, 190 P.3d 815, 819 (Colo. Ct. App.
2008) (recognizing that, if the parties do not agree to the appointment,
the court must make certain findings before the appointment can be
made).
140 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:358.1(A) (2010) ("The court shall
make
the appointment on joint motion of the parties.").
,41 Id. ("On motion of a party or on its own motion, the
court may
appoint a parenting coordinator in a child custody case for good cause
shown if the court has previously entered a judgment establishing child
custody, other than an ex parte order.").
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pattern of unnecessary litigation, (4) refuse to communicate
or have difficulty in communicating about and cooperating
in the care of the children, and (5) refuse to acknowledge
the right of the other parent to have 42and maintain a
continuing relationship with the children.'
In Idaho, reference to a Parenting Coordinator may
be made with the parties' consent143 or when the trial court
has found that either (1) the issues appear to be intractable
or have been subject to frequent re-litigation, (2) the wellbeing of a minor child is placed at risk by the parents'

inability to co-parent civilly, or (3) other exceptional
circumstances require44 such appointment to protect the
child's best interests.1
The Texas Parenting Coordination statute is more
restrictive than the other Parenting Coordination statutes.

Other

statutes

allow

appointment

of

a

Parenting

Coordinator with both parents' consent even without the
142 LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 9:358.1(A) (2010), Comment (c); Palazzolo

v. Mire, 10 So. 3d 748, 779 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (citing LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:358.1(A) (2010), Comment (c)).
143 IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(1)(3) ("The court, upon agreement of the parties
or after having found on the record that the circumstances specified in
[IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(1)(2)] are present, may appoint a Parenting
Coordinator in any action involving custody of minor children.").
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717D (current through the end of the 2010
Second Reg. Sess. of the 60th Legis.) provides statutory authorization
for court appointment of a Parenting Coordinator. However, criteria
and standards for qualifications, selection, appointment, termination of
appointment, and duties and responsibilities of a Parenting Coordinator
are set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court, id., which the court has done
in IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16.

144 IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(l). Arizona similarly provides that a court may
appointing a Parenting Coordinator if the court finds any of the
following: (1) that the parents are persistently in conflict with one
another; (2) a history of substance abuse by either parent or family
violence; (3) that there are serious concerns about the mental health or
behavior of either parent; (4) that a child has special needs; or (5) that it
would otherwise be in the children's best interests to appoint the
parenting coordinator. ARIZ. R. FAM. L. PROC. 74.
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trial court finding that, for example, the parents are high
conflict or that appointment is in the "best interest of the
children."' 145 The Texas statute prohibits appointment even
with consent of the parties unless the trial court makes
certain findings. Under the Texas statute, the court "may
not appoint a parenting coordinator unless the court makes
specific findings that" (1) the case is a high-conflict case or
there is good cause shown for the appointment and (2) the
appointment is in the best interest of any minor child in the
suit.

14 6

California is also restrictive regarding when a
Parenting Coordinator 47 can be appointed. Whereas Texas
requires a trial court's findings (consent of the parents
alone will not suffice), California requires consent from the
parents (trial court findings alone will not suffice). In
California, Parenting Coordination may be used only when
the parties consent.1 48 Parenting Coordination was at one
145

See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-128.1 (West 2010)

(requiring a trial court to make findings absent agreement of the
parties); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.3(B) (West 2010) (requiring a
trial court to make findings if a party objects); ARIZ. R. FAM. L. PROC.
74(A) ("parents may agree to use a Parenting Coordinator... subject to
approval by the court"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:358.1(A) (2010)
("The court shall make the appointment on joint motion of the
parties.")
146TEx. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 153.605(b) (Vernon 2009) (emphasis

added).
147 AFCC, Implementation Issues, supra note 3, at 537 (stating that
Parenting Coordination in California is not called "Parenting
Coordination;" professionals who fulfill the Parenting Coordinator role
are called "special masters."). The statute that is relied upon as
providing authority for the Parenting Coordination role is California's
special master statute, id., which has broader application than just to
Parenting Coordination. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 730 (West 2011).
148 Ruisi v. Thieriot, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
Although the holding of Ruisi v. Thieriot might be interpreted more
narrowly, courts have subsequently interpreted it as a bar to
appointment without the consent of both parties. AFCC,
Implementation Issues, supra note 3, at 537; Coates et al., supra note 3,
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time widely used in California without consent, although
has never been authorized by statute. However, once a
court addressed the issue, it was determined that Parenting
Coordination could not occur without consent of the
parties. 149 The appointment depends on California's special
master statute, which does not allow reference to a special
master to the extent needed to fulfill the role of Parenting
Coordination without consent of the parties. 5 ° For
example, a Parenting Coordinator must necessarily
interpret existing court orders. The court viewed
interpretation of existing orders as a question of law, which
5
cannot be referred to a special master without consent.1 1
Appointment of a Parenting Coordinator also assumes that
the Parenting Coordinator will address disputes that are, at
the time of the appointment, unknown. California's special
master statute, however, does not provide authority to refer
unknown future disputes to a special master.' 52 Thus, the
court determined that the appointment of a Parenting
Coordinator, who would interpret a court order and address
future disputes, could not stand without consent of the
parties.153 The California situation demonstrates that, when
the authority to appoint a Parenting Coordinator is lacking,
circumstances surrounding the Parenting Coordinator's
appointment and role must be adjusted to compensate for
the lack of authority.
at 249.
"4 Ruisi, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766; AFCC, Implementation Issues, supra
note 3, at 537.
' Ruisi, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 774 (stating that the distinction between
reference to a special master with consent and reference without
consent is "carefully preserved in the statutes in order to comply with
the constitutional mandate").
151 Id. ("The trial court has no authority to refer questions of law ...
Disputes involving interpretation of the existing custody orders, for
example, may present questions of law.").
152 Id. ("The trial court has no authority to compel a reference of
unknown future disputes.").
153 Id.
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Where the parties consent to the appointment, their
ground for objection to the appointment is not wellfounded. Even where parties do not consent to the
appointment, if the trial court has made specific findings to
justify the appointment, such as a finding that the parents
are in high conflict or that the appointment of the Parenting
Coordinator is in the best interest of the children, the
additional intrusion into the family by appointing a
Parenting Coordinator may be justified. However, as
demonstrated by the California example, without an
enabling rule or statute, this is less likely to be true. Thus, a
court seeking to appoint a Parenting Coordinator with or
without an enabling statute is well advised to condition
appointment of a Parenting Coordinator on either the
consent of the parties or some factual findings of the trial
court that would justify appointment of the Parenting
Coordinator.
IX. Limitation on Parenting Coordination: Review
by Appointing Trial Court
The appointment of a Parenting Coordinator is more
likely to constitute an improper delegation of judicial
authority if the Parenting Coordinator exercises decisionmaking authority because decision making is the essence of
the judicial power.' 54 However, as discussed in Part V
above, the practical benefits of Parenting Coordination
dissipate as the Parenting Coordinator's decision-making
authority decreases. Thus, jurisdictions seeking to
implement an effective Parenting Coordination program
must find a balance. To maximize the benefits of Parenting
Coordination, the Parenting Coordinator should have some
degree of decision-making authority; on the other hand, the
Parenting Coordinator cannot be granted so much decisionmaking authority that the grant constitutes an improper
154

See supra note 71.
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delegation of judicial authority. There must be adequate
opportunity for review by the trial court.
Assigning the final decision-making authority to a
Parenting Coordinator is an improper delegation of judicial
authority; the parties must have the opportunity for the trial
court to review any decision of the Parenting Coordinator.
On the other hand, if the Parenting Coordinator's decision
has no binding effect and is subject to a lengthy and tedious
review process, one of the primary benefits of Parenting
Coordination - expeditious resolution of conflict - is
sacrificed. Thus, a legal and effective Parenting
Coordination program must strike a balance between
review that is adequate but is not so burdensome as to
render Parenting Coordination futile.
A. Review Required
Of the six states with a statute or court rule that
allows a Parenting Coordinator to have decision-making
authority, 55 five of them require that the Parenting
Coordinator's decision be subject to review by the trial
court. The statutes or court rules of three of them Arizona, 156 Colorado, 157 and North Carolina 158 - provide a
155Arizona,

Colorado, Florida, Idaho, North Carolina, and Oklahoma

have statutes or court rules allowing for decision-making by the
Parenting Coordinator. Louisiana, Oregon, Texas, and Vermont have
Parenting Coordination statutes, but they do not allow for decisionmaking authority.
156 In Arizona, a Parenting Coordinator may make a decision only when
a "short-term, emerging, and time sensitive situation or dispute" arises
that requires an "immediate decision for the welfare of the children and
parties." ARIZ. R. FAM. L. PROC. 74(G). In that situation, the Parenting
Coordinator's decision is temporary but binding. Id. It is, however,
subject to review and entry of an appropriate order at "the judge's
earliest opportunity." Id.
157 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-128.3(1) (West 2010). Colorado
allows the appointment of "decision-maker" upon consent of the
parties. Id.
The decision-maker has "binding authority" to resolve
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mechanism for judicial review of the Parenting
Coordinator's decision. Although Idaho's rule 159 and
Oklahoma's statute 16° do not specifically provide a
disputes regarding implementation or clarification of a preexisting
court order. Id. His decisions are immediately effective. Id. § 14-10128.3(3). However, a party may request that the trial court modify the
decision-maker's decision after a de novo hearing. Id. § 14-10128.3(4)(a). The court has discretion as to whether to grant the de novo
hearing. See id. § 14-10-128.3(4)(b).
158 North Carolina's Parenting Coordination statute allows the court to
authorize the Parenting Coordinator to "decide issues regarding the
implementation of the parenting plan that are not specifically governed
by the court order and which the parties are unable to resolve." N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-92 (West 2010). The Parenting Coordinator's
decision is binding until court review, but the parties may request an
"expedited hearing" to review a Parenting Coordinator's decision. Id. §
50-92(b) (West 2010).
159 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16 makes clear that the appointment
of a Parenting Coordinator does not "divest the court of its exclusive
jurisdiction to determine fundamental issues of custody, visitation, and
support...." IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(l)(5). However, it also allows the
Parenting Coordinator to make some decisions. See, e.g., IDAHO R. Civ.
P. 16(l)(1) (stating that the Parenting Coordinator "will make decisions
or recommendations as may be appropriate when the parties are unable
to do so"). While the trial court may designate that some decisions of
the Parenting Coordinator shall be reviewed by the court before taking
effect, Rule 16 does not specifically provide that any and all decisions
of the Parenting Coordinator may be reviewed by the trial court.
However, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified in Hausladen v. Knoche,
that the language of Rule 16 does not give a Parenting Coordinator
judicial powers of decision making. 235 P.3d 399, 403 (Idaho 2010).
Instead, "the judicial function of final decision-maker remains with the
court and is not delegated." Id.
160 The Oklahoma Parenting Coordination statute, similar to the Idaho
Rule, see supra note 153, specifically states that the appointment of a
Parenting Coordinator does not "divest the court of its exclusive
jurisdiction to determine fundamental issues of custody, visitation, and
support . . . ." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.3 (West Supp. 2011)).
However, the Oklahoma statute also allows the Parenting Coordinator
to make some decisions, id. § 120.3(A) (allowing appointment of a
Parenting Coordinator to "decide disputed issues"), some of which
shall be reviewed by the trial court before taking effect. Id. §
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mechanism for review therein, appellate courts of those
states have held that the Parenting161
Coordinator's decision
court.
trial
the
by
reviewed
be
must
Challenges to the appointment of a Parenting
Coordinator as an improper delegation of judicial authority
have been successful to the extent that the Parenting

120.3(C)(3). However, the Oklahoma statute does not specifically
provide that all decisions of a Parenting Coordinator are reviewable;
nevertheless, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals has held that a
Parenting Coordinator's decision is conditional and temporary subject
to the court's review, noting that the trial court has the "ultimate
responsibility" as the arbiter of a child's best interest in custody
matters." Fultz v. Smith, 97 P.3d 651, 655 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004).
161 Florida is the only state whose statute provides for a Parenting
Coordinator to have decision-making authority but does not yet require
the opportunity for judicial review of the Parenting Coordinator's
decision. Florida's Parenting Coordination statute appears to allow the
Parenting Coordinator to have decision-making authority. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 61.125(1) (West Supp. 2011) (allowing the Parenting
Coordinator to "with the prior approval of the parents and the court,
mak[e] limited decisions within the scope of the court's order").
However, the statute provides no mechanism for judicial review of the
Parenting Coordinator's decision. See id.§ 61.125. However, Florida's
statute has been effective since only October 1,2009, and no Florida
appellate court has yet considered the issue. It is likely that a Florida
court considering the issue would hold that the Parenting Coordinator's
decision is not immune from judicial review. Cf Martin v. Martin, 734
So. 2d 1133, 1136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a court order
allowing a mediator absolute authority to establish a visitation schedule
for the parties must be stricken because the trial court could not
"delegate its judicial authority to ultimately resolve the issue and settle
disputes between the parties"). Martin v. Martin might, however, be
distinguishable from a Parenting Coordination case that may appear
before a Florida court in that the decision of the mediator in Martin
initially resolved the conflict whereas a Parenting Coordinator's
decision should be limited to resolving conflicts regarding a preexisting
court order. See Martin, 734 So. 2d 1133. Nonetheless, a holding that
the Parenting Coordinator's decision is completely immune from
review would be inconsistent with the decisions of other jurisdictions
addressing the same question. See, e.g., Hausladen 235 P.3d at 403;
Fultz, 97 P.3d at 655.
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Coordinator's decision was perceived to be final - not
subject to court review. A Parenting Coordinator's decision
should be subject to court review even where the parties
consent to the Parenting Coordinator's authority to make a
decision that is not reviewable by the court. 162
None of the five states discussed above that require
review by the trial court of any decision by the Parenting
Coordinator have considered the question of whether a
party could agree to the Parenting Coordinator's decision
being final - in other words, waive the right to review by
the trial court. However, it is the court's role to ultimately
safeguard the best interest of the children.' 63 Thus,
abrogation of that responsibility to any non-judicial
designee is probably not proper, be it by statute, by the
court's own decision, or by agreement of the parties.
In a state with a Parenting Coordination statute that
does not provide for decision-making authority, it has been
held that consent of the parties could not permit a Parenting
Coordinator to have decision-making authority without
court review; however, consent of the parties could permit
a Parenting Coordinator to have decision-making authority

162

Another consideration not addressed in this Article is what the

standard of review for a Parenting Coordinator's decision should be. At
least one court has indicated that it should be de novo. See Fultz, 97
P.3d at 654 ("The Act, in our view, clearly anticipates the trial court's
de novo consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case...
."). Review is de novo by statute in Colorado. See supranote 157.
163 See, e.g., Martin v. Martin, 734 So. 2d 1133, 1136 (Fla. Ct. App.
1999) ("While a trial court can order the parties to mediate the issue of
visitation, it cannot delegate its judicial authority to ultimately resolve
the issue and settle disputes."); Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 198 P.3d 406,
410 (Okla. Civ. App. 2008) ("Requiring [the Parenting Coordinator's]
recommendations to be viewed 'as orders of the Court' constitutes an
improper delegation of judicial power to the parenting coordinator and
is contrary to the parents' due process rights under the Oklahoma and
U.S. Constitutions." (citing Conaghan v. Riverfield Country Day
School, 163 P.3d 557 (Okla. 2007))).
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with court review. 164 In Heinonen v. Heinonen,16 5 the
Oregon Court of Appeals held that a trial court cannot
delegate final decision-making authority to a Parenting
Coordinator, even with consent of the parties.166 In
Heinonen, the parties entered into an agreement that
allowed the Parenting Coordinator to make decisions but
did not provide for the trial court's review of that decision.
Instead, the agreement provided that issues such as
visitation conflicts, interpretation of the clauses of the
parties' divorce decree, and scheduling conflicts not
anticipated by the decree "shall be within the province of
the [Parenting Coordinator] to resolve."' 167 The Oregon
Court of Appeals determined that allowing the Parenting
Coordinator to make a final decision would deprive the trial
court of its statutorily-mandated authority to determine
issues of child custody and visitation time as well as the
modification thereof. 168 An Oregon trial court's authority
is "wholly statutory," and no statute authorizes the trial
court to delegate that authority to a Parenting
Coordinator. 169 Thus, the delegation of final decisionmaking authority was impermissible even though the
parties had agreed to it. The court further reasoned that the
delegation would conflict with the legislature's policy that
the court develop a parenting plan and that the court

164

Heinonen v. Heinonen, 14 P.3d 96 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).

165 Id.

166

The Oregon statute does not use the term "Parenting Coordinator,"

but allows a court to appoint one to serve in that role. See OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 107.425(3)(a) (West 2010) (stating that a court may
"appoint an individual or a panel or may designate a program to assist
the court in creating parenting plans or resolving disputes regarding
parenting time and to assist parents in creating and implementing
plans").
parenting
67
1 Heinonen, 14 P.3d at 97.
8
16
Id.at 99.
169

Id.; see also supra note 63.
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and visitation in the best interest of the
modify custody
70
children. 1
However, in a later case, where the trial court would
review the Parenting Coordinator's decision - the trial
court had the ultimate decision-making authority - the
Oregon court held that the trial court could delegate initial
71
decision-making authority to the Parenting Coordinator.1
In Polacek v. Polacek,172 the parties entered into an
agreement to allow visitation "only as recommended by"
the Parenting Coordinator. 173 However, the agreement also
stated that a party had the option to challenge an adverse
recommendation and that the final decision rested with the
court. 174 The Oregon Court of Appeals held that that
agreement did not improperly delegate authority of the
designee because the final decision
court to a non-judicial
1 75
rested with the court.

B. Binding or Stayed Pending Review

170

The court did note, however, that nothing would prevent the parties

from entering into an agreement to use a mediator or arbitration to
reach a joint agreement as a result thereof and to stipulate into court
their joint decision. Heinonen, 14 P.3d at 99 n.3. However, whether
such a stipulation should be incorporated remains within the providence
of the court to decide. Id. It would still be within the role of the court to
ensure that the parties' agreement is consistent with the best interest of
the child. Id.
171 Polacek v. Polacek, 222 P.3d 732 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
172 id.
173

The recommendations were actually made by the child's therapist.

"Parenting Coordinator" is used here for consistency. See supra note
166 and accompanying text explaining that Oregon's statute does not
use the term "Parenting Coordinator," yet allows the court to appoint
someone to serve in that role; see also Kirkland, PC Laws, Rules and
Regulations, supra note 8 (discussing problems regarding inconsistency
of nomenclature across jurisdictions).
174 Polacek,222 P.3d, at 735.
175 id.
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Another consideration is whether the Parenting
Coordinator's reviewable decision is immediately effective
or is stayed until a prescribed time period for "appeal" to
the trial court has expired or the trial court has reviewed the
Parenting Coordinator's decision. It could be argued that,
where a Parenting Coordinator's decision is immediately
effective, it has the force and effect of a trial court order, if
only for a short time. In some circumstances, that "interim"
decision could effectively be the final decision. For
example, if a Parenting Coordinator makes a decision
regarding an upcoming visitation weekend and that
weekend comes and goes before the trial court review. In
such a situation, the Parenting Coordinator's decisionmaking authority is arguably an improper delegation of
judicial authority.
The Oklahoma Parenting Coordination statute
provides that certain types of decisions made by a
Parenting Coordinator are "immediately effective" and
76
some require court approval before coming into effect.'
Perhaps somewhat contrary to its own statute, which allow
some decisions to be effective without review, the
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals has held that treating a
Parenting Coordinator's recommendation as an "order of
the court" constitutes an improper delegation of judicial

76

43, § 120.3(C) (West 2010) (providing that a
court order appointing a Parenting Coordinator shall specify which
1 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.

"determinations will be immediately effective and which will require
an opportunity for court review prior to taking effect"). Idaho's
Parenting Coordination rule also provides that some types of Parenting
Coordinator decisions are effective without previous court review.
IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(l)(8) (stating "decisions with respect to matters
submitted under [Rule 16(l)] 5(B) will be effective when
communicated to the parties. Recommendations under [Rule 16(l)]
5(C) will be effective fourteen (14) days after submission to the
court.") The North Carolina statute provides the same, but allows for a
party to petition the court for "expedited" review. N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 50-92(b) (West 2010).
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power to the Parenting Coordinator.17 7 In some
circumstances, an immediately effective recommendation,
although subject to review, could be the functional
equivalent of an order of the court. 78 Thus, allowing the
Parenting Coordinator to make such a determination may
actually constitute an improper delegation of judicial
authority.

1 79

A Kentucky court has impliedly rejected a similar
argument.' 80 In Telek v. Bucher, a father argued that the
appointment of a Parenting Coordinator was essentially an
order to participate in binding arbitration and that the
appointment constituted an improper delegation of judicial
authority to a third party.181 The trial court had ordered the
177

Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 198 P.3d 406, 410 (Okla. Civ. App. 2009).

Although the Kilpatrick court did not directly address the provision of
the Parenting Coordinator statute that allows for a court order to
designated certain parts of a Parenting Coordinator's recommendations
to be "immediately effective," the court said that requiring the
Parenting Coordinator's recommendations to be viewed "'as orders of
the Court' constitutes an improper delegation of judicial power to the
parenting coordinator, and is contrary to the parents' due process rights
under the Oklahoma and U.S. Constitutions."
e.g., hypothetical at supra p. 401.
178
179 See,
See Fultz
v. Smith, 97 P.3d 651, 654 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004) (stating
that the Act clearly makes any decision of the Parenting Coordinator
"conditional and temporary subject to the court's review on timely
objection."). However, that seems to disregard the language of the
Oklahoma statute that allows at least some decision of the Parenting
Coordinator to be immediately binding, at least until court review,
which will apparently take about twenty days.
180 Telek v. Bucher, No. 2008-CA-002149-ME, 2010 WL 1253473
(Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2010).
181Id. at *5. A similar argument was rejected by a Tennessee court.
Nesbitt v. Nesbitt, No. M2006-02645-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 112538
(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2009). The wife in Nesbitt argued that the
Parenting Coordinator was a "substitute Judge who is authorized to
make recommendations, effective immediately as Orders, which violate
the most fundamental constitutional rights." Id. at *6 (quoting the
wife's argument). The appellate court, however, interpreted the order
appointing the Parenting Coordinator as simply allowing the Parenting
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parties to "participate in Parenting Coordination."',8 2 The
father argued the process was essentially binding
arbitration because he was forced to abide by the Parenting
Coordinator's determination to which he objected during
the period of time that it would take to obtain a final
decision from the court. 183
The court did not squarely address the father's
argument. Instead, it was convinced that the Parenting
Coordinator was "simply supervising the court's orders" to
ensure that the terms of its orders are carried out.' 84 The
court emphasized that the Parenting Coordinator is to make
a decision that complies with the pre-existing orders of the
court and that such decisions are to be made only 1 in
85
instances where the parties cannot reach an agreement.
In addition, where a party disagrees with the Parenting
Coordinator's determination, he can seek a final
determination from the court.' 86 Because the Parenting
Coordinator would make decisions that were consistent
with the court's order and the trial court could review the
decision, the court was not apparently troubled by the fact
that the parties would be bound by the Parenting
Coordinator's decisions in the interim. 187
C. Expediency

Coordinator to make recommendations, not decisions, and thus did not
find the Parenting Coordinator's responsibilities to impose on the
court's authority. Id.
182 Telek, 2010 WL 1253473 at *5.The court described a Parenting
Coordination as "a type of counseling service for parents who are
unable to communicate or reach agreements regarding the day-to-day
arrangements of their children." Id.
custody
8
1 3 Id.
184

Id. (referring to the guardian ad litem's argument).

185

Id.

186

Id.
Id.

187
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Perhaps the court in Telek recognized that, if the
Parenting Coordinator's decision has no binding effect, one
of the primary benefits of Parenting Coordination,
expeditious resolution of conflict, is sacrificed. Of course,
the trial court's review must be meaningful, but the
Parenting Coordination process must be meaningful as well
if the process is to be useful. If a Parenting Coordinator's
decision is subject to a stringent review process, its utility
is questionable at best.
For example, the review provision of the Oklahoma
statute discussed in Part IX.B. above appears to be
inconsistent with one of the purposes of Parenting
Coordination, which is to facilitate expedient conflict
resolution. Although a decision of a Parenting Coordinator
l
is binding on the parties until further order of the court, 8
the statute provides that decisions of the Parenting
Coordinator "shall be filed with the court within twenty
(20) days."' 1 89 Objections to the Parenting Coordinator's
decisions or recommendations should be filed within ten
days,190 and responses to the objections filed ten days
thereafter. 19' Then, the court shall review the objections
'1 92
and responses and "thereafter enter appropriate orders."
The trial court's review of the Parenting Coordinator's
recommendation or decision is de novo.193 Given the period
188

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.4(B) (West 2010) ("Any decisions

made by the parenting coordinator authorized by the court order and
issued pursuant to the provisions of the Parenting Coordinator Act shall
be binding on the parties until further order of the court.").
189 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.4(A)
190 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.4(C)(1). The court may order
objections to be filed within a different time period. Id.
'99 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.4(C)(2).
192 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.4(D).
193Fultz v. Smith, 97 P.3d 651, 654 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004) ("The Act,
in our view, clearly anticipates the trial court's de novo consideration of
all the facts and circumstances of the case, grants discretionary
authority to the trial court to accept or reject the PC's decision, and
permits the trial court to enter 'an appropriate order' as the
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for objection and the de novo review, this process does not
provide for particularly expedient resolution of conflict.
D. Balance
A balance must be struck between review that is
sufficiently meaningful that the Parenting Coordinator's
decision-making authority does not usurp judicial powers
but is sufficiently limited so that the utility of the Parenting
Coordinator process is not diminished to the point of being
futile. Given the fine line between "too much" and "not
enough" decision-making authority, the question is raised
whether the benefits of Parenting Coordination warrant
walking that line. To answer that question, compare the
situation of high-conflict parents with irreconcilable
differences regarding a minor change to the visitation
schedule for a soon-upcoming holiday with and without the
benefits of a Parenting Coordinator. Would these highconflict parents, who cannot reach an agreement with the
assistance of the Parenting Coordinator, be better situated if
they were to avoid the Parenting Coordination process
altogether? The answer is probably "no."
The Parenting Coordination process provides the
parents with a better possibility for resolving the conflict.
Without the Parenting Coordination process, the highconflict parents who could not reach an agreement with the
assistance of the Parenting Coordinator are not likely to
reach an agreement if left to their own devices. Instead,
they will have to resort to the court and wait. They will not
likely get a decision from the trial court sooner than they
would have gotten a decision from a Parenting Coordinator.
In contrast, with the Parenting Coordination process, the
parents will have some decision made in a timely manner.
Because it increases the likelihood of agreement and allows
circumstances of the case warrant, whether in agreement with or
contrary to the decision of the PC.").
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for expedient decisions, even with the required review, the
Parenting Coordination process is superior to the
alternative, a court decision that could come so late as to be
meaningless.
Although one of the parties will be bound by an
adverse decision until the court reviews it, one of the
parties will be aggrieved and bound by the court decision if
the parties were to initially go to court, assuming their issue
could even get before the court in time for a meaningful
decision to be made. One might argue that allowing a
Parenting Coordinator's decision to be binding pending
appeal, and the possibility that the matter about which the
parents are in dispute may pass during the pendency, the
review of the Parenting Coordinator's decision is likewise a
court decision that comes so late as to be meaningless. That
argument is perhaps legitimate. But, as set out above, the
same is true without the Parenting Coordination process;
the parties may not be able to get before a judge before the
matter in dispute passes. Thus, either with or without
Parenting Coordination, a decision may be made by the
trial court so late that that decision is not meaningful. In
contrast, with the Parenting Coordination process, there is
at least some decision made by some neutral party in a
manner that it sufficiently timely as to be meaningful.
"Staying" the effectiveness of a Parenting Coordinator's
decision until the parties can go before the court for
approval undermines the role of the Parenting Coordinator,
which is to facilitate expedient resolution of conflicts.
The judicial review component of the Parenting
Coordination process is necessary to uphold the Parenting
Coordination process. However, any decision by the
Parenting Coordinator should be binding pending review in
order to fulfill one of the primary purposes of Parenting
Coordination: to reach decisions in a timely manner to the
benefit of the parents and their children.
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X. Further Limitations on the
Coordinator's Decision-Making Authority
A. Consent to the
Decision-Making Authority

Parenting

Parenting

Coordinator's

Another means of protecting against a challenge to
a Parenting Coordinator's decision-making authority is to
require that the parties consent - beyond the mere
appointment of the Parenting Coordinator - specifically to
the Parenting Coordinator having decision-making
authority. 194 Some jurisdictions allow the Parenting
Coordinator to have decision-making authority only with
the parties' specific consent to the Parenting Coordinator's
decision-making authority. In Colorado, what it calls a
"Parenting Coordinator" is not authorized to make
decisions' 95 but, in conjunction with its Parenting
Coordinator statute, Colorado authorizes the appointment
of a "domestic relations decision-maker" who is in essence
196
a Parenting Coordinator with decision-making authority.
A "decision-maker" can be appointed only with the consent

194

Cf Allison Glade Behjani, Delegation of Judicial Authority to

Experts: Professional and Constitutional Implications of Special
Masters in Child-Custody Proceedings, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 823, 835
(2007) (offering as a possible solution to constitutional problems
associated with having special masters involved in custody matters
allowing reference to a special master only with the parents consent to
the reference).
195 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-128.1 (West 2010);
see In re
Marriage of Dauwe, 148 P.3d 282, 285 (Colo. App. 2006) (holding that
provision of court order that purported to give the Parenting
Coordinator authority to "resolve the differences between the parents
when they cannot agree" granted decision-making authority to the
Parenting Coordinator and was contrary to Colorado's Parenting
Coordination statute).
196 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-128.3 (West
2010).
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of the parties.' 97 In Florida, a court is prohibited from
granting a Parenting Coordinator any decision-making
98
authority without the consent of the parties.1
In Oregon, even though the Parenting Coordination
statute does not provide for the Parenting Coordinator to
have decision-making authority, a court has allowed a
Parenting Coordinator to make decisions if the parties
99
consent to it. Oregon's Parenting Coordination statute'
does not grant the Parenting Coordinator decision-making
authority; however, in Polacek v. Polacek,2 °° the parties
agreed to allow visitation "only as recommended by" the
Parenting Coordinator 2° ' and the court upheld this decisionmaking authority because, in part, of the parties' consent to
that authority.
Pennsylvania, which does not have a Parenting
Coordination statute, has also allowed the use of a
Parenting Coordinator to make decisions with the consent
of the parties. In Yates v. Yates, the trial court delegated to
the Parenting Coordinator "only ancillary custody disputes,
such as determining temporary variances in the custody
schedule, exchanging information and communication, and
coordinating [the child's] recreational and extracurricular

197

Id. ("at any time after the entry of an order concerning parental

responsibilities and upon written consent of both parties, the court may
appoint a qualified domestic relations decision-maker and grant to the
decision-maker binding authority to resolve disputes between the
parties as to implementation or clarification of existing orders...").
198FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.125 (West 2010) (allowing the Parenting
Coordinator to, "with the prior approval of the parents and the court,
mak[e] limited decisions within the scope of the court's order of
referral").
199 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.425(3)(a) (West 2010).
200In re Marriage of Polacek, 222 P.3d 732, 735 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
201 See supra note 170.
202 The court's decision was also based on part on the fact that the
Parenting Coordinator's decision was subject to review by the
appointment trial court. See supra Part IX.A.
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activities., 20 3 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania
determined that allowing the Parenting Coordinator to
make decisions about those issues was not an improper
delegation of judicial authority in part because the parties
had consented to the decision-making authority of the
Parenting Coordinator. 204
Requiring the parties' consent in order for the
Parenting Coordinator to have decision-making authority is
not always necessary. However, such a requirement will
weaken a subsequent argument that granting decisionmaking authority to the Parenting Coordinator was an
improper delegation of judicial authority. Thus, where
specific statutory or rule-based authority is lacking, such a
requirement may be prudent.
B. Limiting the Decision-Making Authority to
Specific Issues
Limiting a Parenting Coordinator's decision-making
authority to very specific "minor" issues can also protect
against an argument that granting the Parenting
20 5
Coordinator decision-making authority is improper.
Where the issues on which a Parenting Coordinator may
make a decision are minor or "ancillary" to the court's
20 6
order, his decision-making authority is less problematic.
Some statutes limit the issues on which Parenting
Coordinators may have decision-making authority. Others
recognize that some issues should not be decided by a
Parenting Coordinator but leaves it for a trial court to
203 Yates v. Yates, 963 A.2d 535, 540 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008).
204 i.

205 See Behjani, supra note 194, at 835 (offering as a possible solution

to constitutional problems associated with having special masters

involved in custody matters allowing reference to a special master only
regarding "small factual disputes").
206 See, e.g., Yates, 963 A.2d 535.
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delineate the issues on which the Parenting Coordinator
may have decision-making authority.
The Idaho Rule providing for Parenting
Coordination lists matters in which a Parenting Coordinator
may or may not make a decision. It gives examples, "[b]y
way of illustration and not limitation," of what matters a
trial court may authorize a Parenting Coordinator to
determine. A Parenting Coordinator in Idaho may be
granted the authority to make decisions regarding: (1)
time, place, and manner of pickup and delivery of the
children; (2) child care arrangements; (3) minor alterations
in parenting schedule with respect to weeknight, weekend,
or holiday visitation that do not substantially alter the basic
time share allocation; (4) participation by significant others
and relatives in visitation; (5) first and last dates for
summer visitation; (6) schedule and conditions of telephone
communication with the children; (7) manner and methods
by which the parties may communicate with each other; (8)
approval of out-of-state travel plans; and (9) any other
issues submitted for immediate determination by agreement
of the parties. 20 7 In contrast, a Parenting Coordinator may
not be authorized by a court order to make decisions on
certain issues. On the following issues, a Parenting
Coordinator may make only recommendations to the court:
(1) which parent may authorize counseling or treatment for
a child; (2) which parent may select a school; (3)
supervision of visitation; (4) submission to a custody
evaluation; (5) appointment of an attorney or guardian ad
litem for a child; and (6) financial matters including child
support, health insurance, allocation of dependency
exemptions and other tax benefits, liability for particular
expenditures for a child.20 8
A legislature or court rule establishing a list such as
the above indicates that the rule-making body has
207 IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(i)(5)(B).
208 IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(i)(5)(C).
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preemptively made some determination as to those kinds of
issues that would constitute an unlawful delegation of
judicial authority and those that would not. Another
interesting aspect of Idaho's Parenting Coordinator rule is
the language that prefaces the above lists and generally
describes a Parenting Coordinator's decision-making
authority. Idaho allows Parenting Coordinator to make
decisions only insofar as necessary to serve the best
interest of the rule. The rule provides that:
The Parenting Coordinator will make such
decisions or recommendations as may be
appropriate when the parties are unable to do so.
The goal of the Parenting Coordinator should
always be to empower the parents in developing
and utilizing adaptive parenting skills so that they
can resume the parenting and decision making role
in regard to their own children. When it is not
possible for the parents to agree, the Parenting
Coordinator shall provide only the amount of
direction and service required in order to serve
the best interest of the child by minimizing
the
2 9
0
parties.
the
between
conflict
of
degree
This provision quite wisely strikes a balance: it
grants Parenting Coordinator decision-making authority,
thus achieving the benefits of Parenting Coordinator, but
professes to go only so far as necessary to promote the best
interests of the children. Thus, this limitation perhaps
insulates the rule from a challenge that it improperly
delegates judicial authority to a Parenting Coordinator.
Arizona's rule of court allowing for a Parenting
Coordinator appointment also limits the issues on which a
Parenting Coordinator may make a decision, but that
limitation is to exigent circumstances. Arizona's rule does
209 IDAHO R.

CIv. P. 16(i)(1) (emphasis added).
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not grant the Parenting Coordinator any decision-making
authority outside of the following provision, which allows
for decision making in times of exigency:
When a short-term, emerging, and time sensitive
situation or dispute within the scope of authority
of the Parenting Coordinator arises that requires
an immediate decision for the welfare of the
children and parties, a Parenting Coordinator may
make a binding temporary decision. 210
Like Idaho's rule, this achieves some balance of granting
enough decision-making authority for effectiveness but not
so much as to constitute an improper delegation of judicial
authority, although in a different way.
Rather than specifying the issues on which a
Parenting Coordinator may make a decision, some
jurisdictions require specification, but leave it to the trial
court to delineate which issues may be decided by the
Parenting Coordinator. Oklahoma is one example; it
provides that:
The parenting coordinator shall not make any
modification to any order, judgment or decree;
however, the parenting coordinator may allow the
parties to make minor temporary departures from
a parenting plan if authorized by the court to do
so. The appointment order should specify those
coordinator is
matters which the parenting
21
authorized to determine. 1

210

ARIz. R. FAM. L. P. 74(G). The decision

is subject to review. Id.

("The decision shall be submitted to the assigned judge with a copy to
the parties (or counsel, if represented) in a written report that shall
document all substantive issues addressed and the basis for the decision
for review and entry of any appropriate orders at the judge's earliest
opportunity.").
211 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.3(C)(3) (West 2010).
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Specifically limiting the issues on which the
Parenting Coordinator may make a decision is wise. Either
the legislative body or court establishing the Parenting
Coordination program should limit the issues, striking a
balance between not allowing the Parenting Coordinator to
make decisions that are invasive of the trial court's domain
but are merely ancillary to the decision that the trial court
has already made and allowing the Parenting Coordinator
to make decisions on enough issues that his role is
meaningful and provides the benefits that Parenting
Coordination is intended to convey. Whether the issues on
which a Parenting Coordinator may make a decision are
specifically limited by statute or court rule or by the order
for appointment, limiting the Parenting Coordinator's
decision to issues that are ancillary to and within the scope
of the already-existing trial court order is wise. Narrowing
decision-making authority of the Parenting Coordinator
protects against argument that it is an improper delegation
of judicial authority but at the same time allows Parenting
Coordination to bestow the benefits as intended.
XI. Conclusion
Parenting Coordination has the potential to bestow
substantial benefits on parents, children, and the court
system. However, the appointment does pose potential
problems regarding improper delegation of judicial
authority. A Parenting Coordination program can be
viewed as a serious governmental intrusion into the day-today matters of a parent-child relationship if the role is not
properly circumscribed. The role should be properly limited
so that Parenting Coordination can bestow the benefits that
it intends but also does not constitute an improper
delegation of judicial authority.
Where the parameters of the role have not been set
out in advance, lawyers, and perhaps even judges, might
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not understand the Parenting Coordinator's role or how a
Parenting Coordination program should operate within the
existing constraints of the law. The potential
misunderstanding contributes to the vulnerability of the
appointment. A holding of invalidity could have
implications not only for the instant appointment, but for
the future of Parenting Coordination in that jurisdiction.
A jurisdiction that seeks to implement a proper and
legal program, or a trial court judge who seeks to appoint a
Parenting Coordinator without statutory or rule-based
authority, must carefully consider limitations that are
necessary or desired in the given jurisdiction so that
Parenting Coordination can provide parents, children, and
the state the benefits it offers. A Parenting Coordination
program must achieve an appropriate balance between
various legal aspects of a Parenting Coordination program
including: the stage in litigation at which appointment will
be allowed; under what conditions appointment will be
allowed; whether the Parenting Coordinator will have
decision-making authority; the reviewability of the
Parenting Coordinator's decisions; and the limitations on
the Parenting Coordinator's decision-making authority.
Achieving the appropriate balance will mitigate the
argument that the appointment is an improper delegation of
judicial authority. However, the balance is a delicate one;
Parenting Coordination will lose its utility if a proper
balance is not achieved. For example, the Parenting
Coordinator should have a sufficient degree of decisionmaking authority that Parenting Coordination is not merely
another hoop for the parents to jump through on their way
to court, yet not so much that the appointment is improper.
In addition, the appointment must be limited to qualified
professionals or else one of the essential components of and
rationales for Parenting Coordination - guiding the parents
with a goal of avoiding future conflict - is eviscerated.
Furthermore, the legal permissibility of a Parenting
Coordination program will depend on whether the
438
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Parenting Coordinator appointment is authorized by statute,
court rule, or must rest on some other authority such as the
trial court's inherent authority. For example, where
Parenting Coordination is specifically authorized by a
state's statute, it might be properly ordered and the
Parenting Coordinator might have decision-making
authority without consent of the parties. In contrast, where
Parenting Coordination is not authorized by a statute or
court rule, a jurisdiction would be wise to allow the
Parenting Coordinator to have decision-making authority
only with consent of the parties. Those limitations should
increase in degree where the basis for the authority is lesser
in degree. Weighed against the benefits to the children of
divorce, whose best interests the state is obligated to
protect, and the state itself, the balance tips in favor of
Parenting Coordination.
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STUDENT ESSAY

.No CHAMPION

FOR CHILDREN: TENNESSEE'S RULE

40A

AND THE APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS AD LITEM
IN CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS

Austin Elizabeth Kupke
I. Introduction
On February 17, 2009, the Tennessee Supreme
Court adopted a provisional rule to be used in child custody
cases in all courts in the State of Tennessee.' The rule, Rule
40A, concerns the "Appointment of Guardians Ad Litem in
Custody Proceedings" and dictates the appointment, role,
powers, duties, rights, limitations, and costs of guardians ad
litem in limited types of cases "including but not limited to
divorce, paternity, domestic violence, contested adoptions,
and contested private guardianship cases." 2 Rule 40A is
provisional in that it was passed with the intention of it
lasting only a limited time while the mechanics of the rule
were evaluated and commented on by the3 general public
and members of the bench and private bars.
Guardians ad litem are individuals, frequently
lawyers, whose "role generally is to assist the court in
protecting [a] child's best interests rather than to advocate

'Press Release, Administrative Office of the Courts, Supreme Court
Adopts Provisional Rule for GuardiansAd Litem in Parenting Cases
(Feb. 17, 2009),
http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/OPINIONSiTSC/RULES/2009/GAL%20Pro

visions.pdf (on file with author).
2 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40A.

3 In Re: Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 40A (Apr. 30, 2010),

http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/OPfNIONS/TSC/RULES/proposals/2009/Or
der/o20Extending%2OComment/o20Period%20and%2OExp%20Date%
20of/o2ORule4OA.pdf (on file with author).
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the child's wishes." 4 In Tennessee, guardians ad litem are
appointed by the court in situations where the rights of the
child cannot be fairly represented by the legal counsel of
her parent(s) or the State (in dependency, neglect or child
abuse cases).5 Before Rule 40A was provisionally enacted,
other statutory provisions guided and managed the6
appointment of guardians ad litem in child custody cases.
Supreme Court Rule 40 controlled child dependency,
cases, and continues to control these types
neglect, or abuse
7
today.
of cases
Rule 40A was passed with the intention of reducing
the number of guardians ad litem appointed by the courts
and to more clearly delineate the duties of a guardian ad
litem once appointed.8 Additionally, the Supreme Court
passed Rule 40A in an effort to control the actions of
guardians ad litem and subsequently "reduce the overall
costs to the parties" when a guardian ad litem becomes
involved in a child custody case. 9 The actions taken by the
Supreme Court, however, destroy the very important role of
a guardian ad litem in a custody proceeding.
4 Barbara Ann Atwood, Representing Children: The Ongoing Search
for Clearand Workable Standards, 19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L.

183, 196-97 (2005) (citing ABA Child Custody Pro Bono Project,
Appointment Laws in Divorce Cases (Aug. 2003)).
5 Higgins v. Higgins, 629 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); TENN.
SUP. CT. R. 40. See generally Walton Garrett, When Should a Guardian
ad Litem be Appointed in a Custody Case?, TENNESSEE FAMILY LAW
LETTER, Nov. 1992, Vol. 7 No. 1, at 14 (hereinafter "Garrett, When
Should GuardianAd Litem Be Appointed? ").
6 See TENN. CODE ANN. §37-1-149 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. §36-4132 (2010); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 13.

7 TENN. SUP. CT.

R. 40; see also Leslie Kinkead, Supreme Court Rule
40A-Not to be Confused with Rule 40, TBA FAMILY SECTION
NEWSLETTER (Mar. 2009),
http://www.tba.org/sections/JuvenileLaw/newsletters/j uvenilelaw-enews 032009.htm#Anchor-Fourth- 11481.
8 Press Release, supra note 1.
91d.
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This note will show that the provisional passage of
Supreme Court Rule 40A was a reactionary move to limit
guardians ad litem in response to a rising distrust of them in
custody proceedings. The result is a rule that weakens the
role of guardians ad litem and vitiates their ability to
advocate for children to the extent that the position is
almost moot. While the role of guardian ad litem is
inherently fraught with challenging issues of definition and
delegation of responsibility,' 0 it is an essential function of
the legal system and of child advocacy. Rule 40A, in all
practical application, "takes the teeth" out of the guardian
ad litem appointment and frustrates the representation of
the party that has the most to gain or lose in custody cases:
the child. If children are to have adequate protection during
the trials of custody proceedings, guardians ad litem must
be left with the tools necessary to advocate for them as
their attorneys.
II. Development of the Law
While children in delinquency proceedings have a
due process right to legal representation in court, "the
[Supreme] Court has not recognized a comparable right to
counsel for children in other civil contexts."' 1 Many states
have laws that ensure representation for children in abuse
and neglect proceedings, due to the passage of federal
legislation aimed at protecting children in those
situations. 12 For child custody cases, however, the question
10 Atwood, supra note 4, at 183-86.
11Id.at 187 (referencing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)). In In re Gault,
a juvenile was arrested and adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court
without, amongst other things, counsel. The Supreme Court held that
the child's 14 th Amendment rights had been violated as a result. In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
12See generally Atwood, supra note 4, at 188-89; Tara Lea
Muhlhauser, From "Best" to "Better": The Interests of Children and
the Role of a GuardianAd Litem, 66 N.D. L. REv. 633, 633-36 (1990).
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of when children need or should have legal representation
is left to the discretion of the judges who oversee their
cases.13 Supreme Court Rule 40A is the rule that now
controls this function of the legal system in Tennessee.
Before Rule 40A was passed, the Tennessee Code
as well as the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure
controlled the apointment of guardians ad litem in child
custody cases.' In relevant part, Rule 17.03 of the
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure states
[t]he court shall at any time after the filing of the
complaint appoint a guardian ad litem to defend an
action for an infant or incompetent person who
does not have a duly appointed representative, or
whenever justice requires. The court may in its
discretion allow the guardian ad litem5 a reasonable
fee for services, to be taxed as costs.'
Additionally, the Tennessee Code provides that "in an
action for dissolution of marriage involving minor children,
upon its own motion or upon the motion of either party, the
court may appoint a guardian ad litem for any minor child
of the marriage.1
The appointment of a guardian ad litem in child
custody cases arises out of the duty of a judge to rule in the
best interests of a child. 17 Generally, because children are
13 Walton

Garrett, Representation of Children in Custody Cases, 7

TENNESSEE FAMILY LAW LETTER, Apr. 1987, Vol. 1 No. 6, at 9
(hereinafter "Garrett, Representationof Children"); see Atwood, supra
note 4, at 193.
14TENN. CODE ANN. §37-1-149 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. §36-4-132

(2010); TENN. R. Civ. P. 17.03.
15TENN. R. Civ. P. 17.03.
16§36-4-132.

17 See Roy T. Stuckey, GuardiansAd Litem as Surrogate Parents:

Implicationsfor Role Definition and Confidentiality,64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1785, 1788-89 (1996) (citing State ex rel. Bird v. Weinstock, 864
S.W.2d 376, 384 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
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not parties in custody litigation, they do not require legal
representation; the presumption is that the parents are in the
best position to advocate for their own child and see that
his or her best interests are protected.' 8 For this reason,
Tennessee case law dating back to 1918 rejects the
necessity of guardians ad litem where a parent of a child
can adequately speak for the child's interests. 19 Without an
agent like the guardian ad litem, however, the court may
not always know whether it has all of the requisite
information to determine which parent will provide the best
care for the child, even if his or her parents are advocating
for him or her.20 While the parents are party to these
procedures, there is a legitimate concern that the necessary
information must be "untainted by the parochial interests of
the parents."'21 Traditionally in Tennessee, in order to
ensure that the proper information is garnered, the judge
22
may in her discretion appoint a guardian ad litem.
Case law in the state of Tennessee indicates the
importance of judges utilizing their ability to appoint
guardians ad litem when appropriate. In the 1981 case
Higgins v. Higgins, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee
recognized that the trial court judge had not relied upon the
system of using a guardian ad litem at the trial level of a
custody case. 2 ' The trial judge had refused to hear
testimony from three minor children whose parents were
getting divorced and arguing over their custody. 24 This
judge awarded full custody of the children to their father,
with whom the two daughters had considerable trouble
1S

19

20

Garrett, Representation of Children, supra note 13, at 9.
Kenner v. Kenner, 201 S.W. 779, 783 (Tenn. 1918).
Stuckey, supra note 17, at 1788-89.

21 Id

See Garrett, When Should GuardianAd Litem Be Appointed?, supra
at 14; see also TENN. CODE ANN. §37-1-149 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN.
§36-4-132 (2010); TENN. R. Civ. P. 17.03.
22

23 Higgins, 629 S.W.2d at 22.
24

Id.
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living. 25 On appeal, the custody decision was reversed. The
appellate opinion acknowledged the trial judge's
"commendable desire to protect [the children]" from
testifying on their behalves but nonetheless found that "the
rights of the children were not properly represented" by
their parents whose "intensely hostile attitudes" prevented
them from being sufficient advocates. 26 The appellate court
called for a complete evidentiary retrial with instruction to
appoint a guardian ad litem for the children so that their
best interests would be protected.27 Such precedent makes
clear the importance of children having a voice in the legal
arena of custody battles.
When a guardian ad litem is appointed, the costs
incurred are generally to be billed as court costs to the
parties to the legal suit. 28 Rule 17.03 of the Tennessee
Rules of Civil Procedure dictates that the fee for guardians
ad litem should be "reasonable. 29 In Tennessee, courts
have often looked to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8,
Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5 for determining
what constitutes a "reasonable" fee for a guardian ad litem,
directing the court to consider such factors as "time and
labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly," as well as "the fee
customarily charged in the
30
locality for similar services.'
In Keisling v. Keisling, which was decided in 2005,
the court turned to another Tennessee case from 1980,
Connors v. Connors, to determine a reasonable fee for a

25 id.
26

27
28

id.
Id.
JANET LEACH RICHARDS, RICHARDS ON TENNESSEE FAMILY LAW

§8-

7 (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2008) (1997). In some counties, however
retainers are paid up front.
29

TENN. R. CIV. P. 17.03.

30

TENN. SUP. CT. R. 8, RPC 1.5.
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guardian ad litem. 3 ' There, trial judge appointed the
guardian ad litem in the Keislings' case due to the
"animosity" between the parents; this judge recused herself
during the trial, however, and was replaced by a judge who
immediately indicated skepticism towards the need for the
guardian ad litem's appointment.32 This judge held that the
guardian ad litem would only receive the $1,500 as
compensation even though her billed amount was
$15,825. 33 This was in part due to accusations that the
guardian ad litem had "charged an excessive rate" and had
not conducted the duties the family or the court expected of
a guardian ad litem.34
The appellate court remanded the issue of the
guardian ad litem's compensation to the trial court with
instructions to follow Connors and Tennessee Supreme
Court Rule 8, Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5. The
judge explained that serving as a guardian ad litem "is often
a difficult and delicate task" and that the guardian ad litem
must be "afford[ed] ...
leeway to investigate" what the best

interests of a child might be. 36 Still, the judge cautioned,
the potential for abuse of discretion, "as where the guardian
ad litem undertakes tasks or assumes a role that is overlyexpansive" 37 is considerable, and that discretion must be
kept in check.
" Keisling v. Keisling, 196 S.W.3d 703, 729-30 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)

Connors v. Connors, 594 S.W.2d 672 (Tenn. 1980)).
(citing
3
2Id.at 726-27. "The Court is going to treat you as counsel for the
children ....
There's a vast difference between a guardian ad litem on the
one hand and counsel for the children on the other hand . . .. I have no
interest in your duties as guardian ad litem, not at all, but I do have
some interest in your duty as counsel for the children." Id. (quoting J.
Inman).
at 727-28.
"
34 Id.
Id.at 728.
'5
Id.at 731.
36
Id.at 730.
37
Keisling, 196 S.W.3d at 730.
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The Keisling case illustrates two important issues in
the appointment of guardians ad litem in child custody
cases: defining reasonable compensation and establishing
what the appropriate boundaries are for guardians ad litem.
Supreme Court Rule 40A was developed with these two
concerns in mind.
Before Rule 40A, Rule 40 was the only Supreme
Court Rule managing the appointment of guardians ad
litem, but the rule was explicitly limited to juvenile court
neglect, abuse, and dependency proceedings. 38 Rule 40A
was passed under the authority of Tennessee Rules of
Appellate Procedure Rule 1, which defines the scope of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 39 The Advisory Comment to
Rule 1 explains that under the Tennessee Code §16-3402-§16-3-407, and §16-3-601, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee is empowered to establish "rules of practice and
procedure in all courts" of Tennessee.4 0 The Tennessee
Supreme Court may maintain control over procedure in the
court system as a part of the separation of powers doctrine,
which is included in the Tennessee Constitution.4 '
According to Buck Lewis, the President of the Tennessee
Bar Association, Rule 40A was enacted by the Tennessee
Supreme Court because "using guardian ad litems [sic] in
litigation is really more of a court (or) judicial
to have an opportunity to
function...the court wanted
42
issue.",
the
on
express itself
Rule 40A was adopted as a provisional rule with
original effective dates of May 1, 2009 through April 30,
38

TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40.

39 TENN. R. APP. P. 1.
40

Id. at Advisory Comment (referencing TENN. CODE. ANN. §16-3-

402-§ 16-3-407 (2009), and TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-3-601 (2009)).
41 TENN. CONST. art. 11,
§1.
42

Bill Dries, High Court Takes a Conservative Stance on GALs,

Feb. 26, 2009,
http://www.memphisdailynews.com/editorial/Article.aspx?id=41081
(quoting Buck Lewis, President of the Tennessee Bar Association).
MEMPHIS DAILY NEwS,
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2010, which was intended as a time to solicit comments
"regarding the operation, effect, and efficacy of this rule. 43
On April 30, 2010, the date the rule was set to expire, the
court issued an order extending the effective date of the
rule until December 31, 2010 and asking "the bench, the
bar, and the public" to submit written comments regarding
Rule 40A to a clerk of the Tennessee Appellate courts.44 In
August of 2010, the Tennessee Supreme Court established
a Rule 40A Work Group to parse the provisional rule and
consider the written comments that were received in
response to the court's solicitation for comment. 45 The
Work Group submitted a report of their findings on
December 15, 2010, as a new proposed Rule 40A that
addressed some of the group's concerns. 46 On December
21, 2010 the Tennessee Supreme Court again extended the
effective date of Rule 40A. Finally, the court filed another
order explaining the progress of the rule and again
extending the deadline for the rule "until further notice of
the Court" on January 21,201 1.48 The court, in conjunction
with the order, posted the Work Group's proposed revision
of 40A. 49 The purpose of this order was to extend the
period for public comment until March 14, 2011 so that the

43

TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40A §12.
44 In Re: Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 40A (Apr. 30, 2010),

http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/OP1NIONS/TSC/RULES/proposals/2O09/Or
der/o2OExtending%20Comment/o20Period%20and%20Exp%2ODate%
20of'%o2ORule40A.pdf (on file with author).
45 Press Release, supra note 1.
4
6

id.

47 In Re: Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 40A
(Dec. 21, 2010),

http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/OPfNIONS/TSC/RULES/2009/Order/ 2OExt
ending%20Eff/o2ODate%2ORule%2040A.pdf (on file with author).
48 In Re: Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 40A (Jan. 21, 2011),

http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/OP1NIONS/TSC/RULES/2009/Rule%2040A
.%20Final%20Comment%20and%20Extension%200rder. 1.21.11 .pdf

file with author).
(on
49/Id.
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bench, bar, and50 public could respond to the Work Group's
proposed rule.
The response to Rule 40A in the past few years is
reflected in the comments received by the court since the
original rule was passed in February of 2009. These
comments, which are on the Tennessee Supreme Court's
website, indicate what the future of Rule 40A might look
like.
III. Current Policy
Keisling, discussed above, is one of many cases in
Tennessee that indicate the tension that can arise when the
duties of a guardian ad litem are not elucidated. The
language of the release by the Administrative Office of the
Courts dated February 17, 2009 that accompanied the
adoption of Rule 40A makes clear that 40A was passed in
an effort to gain control of certain by-products of guardian
ad litem appointments. The release quotes Tennessee
Supreme Court Justice Janice Holder as saying "[t]he
guidelines outlined in Rule 40A should result in a reduction
of the frequency of appointments of guardians ad
litem... [and] give those appointed as GALs clearer
direction about the duties a GAL must perform as well as
limitations on a GAL's involvement in a case.", 51 Justice
Holder also states that Rule 40A "should reduce the overall
costs to the parties of a GAL's involvement in their case." 52
To these ends, Rule 40A contains language that
restricts the appointments of guardians ad litem in custody
proceedings. Section 3 of Rule 40A urges that "[c]ourts
should not routinely appoint guardians ad litem in custody
proceedings. Rather, the court's discretion to appoint

50

id.

51

Press Release, supra note 1.

52

id
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guardians ad litem shall be exercised sparingly." 53 Some
have conjectured that this provision was a response to a
contention that guardians ad litem "were being used
excessively" and that "there was an appearance the Judges
were simply rubber stamping the Guardians Ad Litem
opinions." 54 One response 5 to the limitations of Section 3,
which guides guardian ad litem appointments, is that it
conflicts directly with the discretion of the judge as
outlined in the Supreme Court's very own Rule 13, which
ad litem in
dictates that the court "shall" appoint a guardian
56
proceedings to terminate parental rights.
In addition to limitations on the appointment of
guardians ad litem, there is the most drastic, and most
criticized, alteration to the traditional role of guardians ad
litem: Section 9. Section 9 controls "Participation in
Proceeding" and radically changes the abilities of guardians
ad litem in practice. 7 Traditionally "[a]t trial the guardian
[h]e or
ad litem functions as if the child had party status ...
she may make opening and closing statements, call,
examine, and cross-examine witnesses and make
motions. 58 Under the proposed Rule 40A, however,
Section 9(a)(4) provides that "a guardian ad litem may not
53 TENN. SUP. CT.

54

R. 40A §3(b).

David E. Caywood, TBA Family Section Newsletter, New Guardian

Ad Litem Rule 40A (Mar. 2010),
http://www.tba.org/Sections/FamilyLaw/newsletters/Family_032010.ht
m.
55 Comment from Williamson County Bar Association, Inc. in response
to call for comment on Rule 40A (Feb. 24, 2010),
http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/OPINIONS/TSC/RULES/2009/CommentsSC%20Rule40A.pdf (on file with author).
56 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 13 §l(d)(2)(D) (mistakenly cited in comment as
Supreme Court Rule 17(d)(2)(D)) (emphasis added). This provision
also violates judicial discretion per the Tennessee Code and the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. TENN. CODE ANN. §36-4-132
(2010); TENN. R. Civ. P. 17.03.
57 Caywood, supranote 54.
58 Garrett, Representationof Children,supra note 13, at 10.
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take any action that may be taken only by an attorney
representing a party[;j" this includes "making opening and
closing statements, examining' 9 witnesses in court, and
engaging in formal discovery."
Many of the comments received in response to Rule
40A express concern about the tension the rule creates
between a lawyer's ethical duty to represent his or her
client adequately and the parameters of the guardian ad
litem created by Rule 40A. The Williamson Bar
Association reacted to Rule 40A with concern, stating "[a]n
attorney appointed as a guardian ad litem can only carry out
their [sic] duty if sufficiently empowered to protect a
child's best interest." 60 Yet others reacted to the provisional
rule with appreciation for tighter restrictions on the role of
guardians ad litem. In the words of one private investigator
who specializes in domestic cases and child custody,
guardians ad litem pre-Rule 40A would "abuse" their
positions, which in his opinion they frequently did not
understand or fulfill. 6 ' Rule 40A, according to him and
another handful of commenters, appropriately limits the
guardian ad62 litem's ability to frustrate child custody
proceedings.
IV. Analysis

59 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40A §9(a)(4).
60 Comment from Williamson County Bar Association, Inc. in response

to call for comment on Rule 40A (Nov. 18, 2010),
http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/OPINIONS/TSC/RULES/2009/CommentsSC%20Rule4OA.pdf (on file with author).
61 Comment from Mitchell E. Davis in response to call for comment on
Rule 40A (Nov. 18, 2010),
http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/OPINIONS/TSC/RULES/2009/CommentsSC%20Rule4OA.pdf (on file with author).
62

id.
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There is some support to indicate that the creation
of Rule 40A was a "push back" of sorts against guardians
ad litem following certain legislative and judicial events.
One highly publicized Tennessee case in 2007, In re
Adoption of A.MH., involved a young Chinese-American
girl whose foster parents sought to terminate her biological
parents' parental rights and adopt her. 63 The case went to
the Tennessee Supreme Court, where Justice Barker's
opinion openly criticized the guardian ad litem in the case,
casting doubt on her basis for decisions concerning the
between the
child and her handling of the relationship
64
daughter.
their
and
biological parents
Another case decided at the trial court level before
the passage of Rule 40A was Andrews v. Andrews, in which
a couple engaged in a bitter divorce suit had a guardian ad
litem appointed whose costs over the course of her
representation of the child added up to over $160,000.65
The case was decided at the trial level in December 2008,
and the opinion of the judge decries the "weighty" part that
the guardian ad litem played throughout the divorce
proceedings. 66 In the appellate opinion, decided after the
63

In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793 (Tenn. 2007); see also

Dries, supra note 42.
61 In re A.MH. at 803-804. The Court here rejected the foster parents'
argument that irreparable damage to the child's relationship to her
biological parents had occurred due to the length of time since she had
seen them, lamenting "the only evidence of substantial harm arises
from the delay caused by protracted litigation and the failure of the
court system to protect the parent-child relationship throughout the
proceedings." Id. at 812. See also Bad Cop News, The Supreme Court
Scolds Judge Robert L. Childers Instead of Removing Him from the
Bench (Jan. 28, 2007),
http://badcopnews.wordpress.com/2007/01/28/tennessee-supremecourt-scolds-judge-robert-l-childers-instead-of-removing-him-fromthe-bench/.
65 Andrews v. Andrews, No. W2009-00161-COA-R3-CV, 2010
Tenn.
App. LEXIS 553, *35 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2010).
66
Id. at *67.
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adoption of Rule 40A, the court affirmed the trial court's
ruling awarding the guardian ad litem only $7,500, a
fraction of what she charged and, having the benefit of
Rule 40A,
makes a point to reference Rule 40A in so
67
ruling.
In addition to these two cases heard directly before
the passage of Rule 40A and regarding the overinvolvement and costly services of guardians ad litem, the
House of Representatives in Tennessee was also busy with
the roles of guardians ad litem. 68 In 2007 and 2008,
Tennessee's General Assembly introduced two bills that
automatically appointed guardians ad litem for children in
custody proceedings, and two bills were introduced that
aimed at delineating the roles and costs of guardians ad
litem. 69 Rule 40A was therefore introduced at a time when
the Tennessee legislature was already taking action to
address some of the complicated nuances of the role of
guardians ad litem.
There is no doubt that the role of the guardian ad
litem is difficult to navigate. At the most basic level a
guardian ad litem can be described as an "investigator,
champion, and monitor." 70 While the fluidity of the
guardian ad litem role makes it difficult to define and has
led to some unfortunate results, there is no reason to, as one
67

1d. at

n.31.

Dries, supra note 42.
69 H.B. 319, 105th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007), 2007 Bill
68

Text TN H.B. 319 (LEXIS); H.B. 2820, 105th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess.
(Tenn. 2008), 2007 Bill Text TN H.B. 2820 (LEXIS); H.B. 3284, 105th
Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Tenn. 2008), 2007 Bill Text H.B. 3284
(LEXIS); H.B. 2904, 105th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Tenn. 2008), 2007
Bill Text H.B. 2904 (LEXIS).
70 Muhlhauser, supra note 12, at 638 (citing Fraser, Independent
Representation for the Abused and Neglected Child. The Guardian Ad
Litem, 13 CAL. W.L. REV. 16, 28-30 (1976); Guggenheim, The Right
to be Represented But Not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation
for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76, 100 (1984) (citation errors are the
author's)).
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commenter on Rule 40A says, "thr[o]w the baby out with
the bathwater. ' , 7 1 While the Supreme Court has a vested
interest in seeing that all functions of the court operate
justly and efficiently, and Rule 40A was an attempt to
remedy some of the problems that had been brought to the
Court's attention, the effect of Rule 40A is that children
have no advocate to speak for their interests in those
instances where parents are too embroiled in their own
disagreements to know what is best for the child.
Rule 40A, Section 3 weakens the power and
responsibility of judges in custody cases, where
traditionally it has been solely within their discretion to
recognize the situations where the child needs
representation. Rule 40A, Section 4, which concerns how
guardians ad litem are appointed, gives parties to the suit
the power to appeal the appointment of a guardian ad
litem. 72 This provision frustrates the discretion of the court

by allowing parties who the judge may feel cannot
represent the interests of the child to challenge that judge's
appointment. If efficiency is truly a goal of Rule 40A, this
section also allows for a process that can take days as
parties file motions to have the appointment of a guardian
ad litem struck down. 73 Finally, the language of Rule 40A,
Section 3 does not leave enough to the discretion of the
judge. The rule provides sixteen suggested conditions for
when a guardian ad litem may be considered,74 with no
language giving the judge the discretion to find
71Comment from Andrew Cate et al. in response to call for comment
on Rule 40A (Nov. 18, 2010),

http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/OPINIONS/TSC/RULES/2009/CommentsSC%20Rule4OA.pdf (on file with author).
72

TENN.SUP. CT. R. 40A §4(e).
73 Comment from Hickman County Bar in response to call for comment

on Rule 40A (Feb. 24, 2010),
http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/OPINIONS/TSC/RULES/2009/CommentsSC%20Rule4OA.pdf (on file with author).
74 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40A §3(c).
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appointment otherwise appropriate. In giving such specific
instances, the challenge to the appointment of a guardian ad
litem is too easily made.
Most harmful to children, however, is Section 9 of
Rule 40A. Not only is the guardian ad litem prevented from
calling witnesses or filing motions, but the report of the
guardian ad litem, which traditionally has been provided to
the court after the guardian ad litem has done an
investigation into the best interests of the child, "shall not
be provided to the court" unless the parents to the suit
It is easy to envision the situation where both
consent.
parents see unfavorable or embarrassing information in the
guardian ad litem's report, perhaps particularly in the
circumstances where the report and representation for the
child is most needed, and thus refuse to consent to the
report being submitted to the court. Without this report, the
guardian ad litem has absolutely no means of presenting the
child's best interest to the court.
The guardian cannot call witnesses such a
psychologist or teacher, and cannot speak in court unless
called as a witness by one of the parties, 76 who again, may
wish to limit the voice of this neutral third party who has
had access to their child. Even if the guardian ad litem is
called as a witness, he or she is still prohibited from
relaying information obtained from third parties due to
inadmissibility of hearsay evidence. 7 Without the ability to
file motions on behalf of children in custody settings, even
when the guardian ad litem is aware of something that must
be done for his or her client, he or she must appeal to one
party's attorney or the other, nullifying the neutrality that a
guardian ad litem should have in custody proceedings.7 8
75 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40A §9(d).
76 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 40A §9(0.
77 Id.;
78

Toms v. Toms, 98 S.W.3d 140, 144 (Tenn. 2003).

Comment from Linda B. Hall in response to call for comment on

Rule 40A (Nov. 29, 2010),
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The revisions proposed by the Rule 40A Work
Group cut back some of the restrictions that Rule 40A
placed on the role of the guardian ad litem. Most
importantly, the proposed alterations insist on viewing a
guardian ad litem as an attorney and not a "special master"
or "witness." 79 The Work Group's directive that a guardian
ad litem be a lawyer for the child ensures that the guardian
ad litem can act in the child's best interest and assuage the
concerns that a child's voice is not being heard in
proceedings that drastically affect the child's life. During a
time when a child is likely be upset, nervous, and torn
between the interests of his parents and his own interests, it
is vital that the child have a separate entity who can
advocate on the child's behalf beyond submitting a onedimensional report and without needing to be called as a
witness whose testimony may be barred by the rules of
evidence.
V. Conclusion
In conclusion, although Rule 40A attempted to step
in and control a very important function in child custody
cases, the appointment of guardians ad litem, the Court
took the concerns and criticisms of the position too far. The
problems with Rule 40A stem from reacting too much to
the "few spoiled apples" in guardian ad litem appointments,
and does not consider the sensitive nature of the guardian
ad litem position. While the role of guardians ad litem may
need a more clearly defined position, that position must be
some form of an attorney for the child, with no less than
full array of powers and abilities that any attorney would
have to represent his or her client. Hopefully, with further
comment from the legal community, the Supreme Court
http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/OPNIONS/TSC/RULES/2009/CommentsSC%20Rule4OA.pdf (on file with author).
79 In Re: Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 40A, supra note 48, at page 9.
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will amend Rule 40A to better serve the most vulnerable
party in child custody cases: the child.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL

IN RE: TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT RULE

40A

No. M2009-01926-SC-RL2-RL
The Supreme Court of Tennessee
ORDER
On February 17, 2009, this Court adopted Rule 40A
of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee as a
provisional rule, effective from May 1, 2009 through April
30, 2010. On April 30, 2010, the Court filed an order
extending the effective date of provisional Rule 40A
through December 31, 2010, and soliciting written public
comments concerning the provisional Rule.
On August 2, 2010, the Court filed an order
appointing the Rule 40A Work Group. The order stated that
the Work Group was "charged with reviewing and studying
provisional Rule 40A and all public comments thereon and
providing to this Court by no later than December 15, 2010,
a written report containing the Work Group's
recommendations for amendments designed to improve, to
clarify, or to refine the language and efficacy of Rule 40A."
On December 15, 2010, the Work Group submitted its
report and recommendations to the Court.
On December 21, 2010, the Court filed an order
extending the effective date of provisional Rule 40A
through April 1, 2011, in order to allow the Court sufficient
time to consider the Work Group's report and
recommendations. On January 19, 2011, the Work Group
submitted to the Court a supplemental report, as well as
several suggested modifications to its proposed revision of
Rule 40A.
On January 21, 2011, the Court published the Work
Group's modified revision of Rule 40A and solicited
written comments from the bench, the bar, and the public.
In that order the Court also extended the effective date of
458
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provisional Rule 40A until further order of the Court. The
deadline for submitting written comments was March 14,
2011.
After considering all of the written comments
received during this process, and after considering the Rule
40A Work Group's original report and recommendations,
and the Work Group's supplemental report, the Court
hereby adopts amended Rule 40A as set out in the attached
Appendix to this order. The original version of Rule 40A
was adopted as a provisional rule. The revised Rule 40A set
out in the Appendix is adopted as a permanent rule. The
revised rule shall take effect on September 1, 2011, and
shall apply to all proceedings pending on or filed after the
effective date.
The Court expresses its gratitude to the members of
the Rule 40A Work Group for their invaluable service to
the judiciary and to the public in the development of the
revised rule. The Court also acknowledges the important
contributions made by those who submitted written
comments concerning the proposed revisions. Although the
Court did not incorporate into the revised rule the substance
of all the individual comments submitted during the publiccomment periods, all of the comments assisted the Court in
its consideration of the various aspects of the proposed
revisions.
The Clerk shall provide a copy of this order to
LexisNexis and to Thomson Reuters. In addition, this order
shall be posted on the Tennessee Supreme Court's website.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
PER CURIAM
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APPENDIX
Amended Rule 40A, Rules of the Tennessee Supreme
Court
Rule 40A. Appointment of Guardians ad Litem in Custody
Proceedings
SECTION 1. DEFINITIONS
(a) "Custody proceeding" means a court proceeding, other
than an abuse or neglect proceeding, in which legal or
physical custody of, access to, or visitation or parenting
time with a child is at issue, including but not limited to
divorce, post divorce, paternity, domestic violence,
contested adoptions, and contested private guardianship
cases.
(b) "Abuse or neglect proceeding" means a court
proceeding for protection of a child from abuse or neglect
or a court proceeding in which termination of parental
rights is at issue.
(c) "Guardian Ad Litem" means a licensed attorney
appointed by the court to represent the best interests of a
child or children in a custody proceeding.
Commentary
Under revised Rule 40A it is now possible for the same
attorney who is appointed as a Rule 40 guardian ad litem to
follow a case and be appointed to represent the child as a
Rule 40A guardian ad litem in subsequent proceedings
(e.g., a termination of parental rights case in Juvenile Court
followed by a contested adoption between competing
grandparents in Chancery Court).
SECTION 2. APPLICABILITY
This Rule applies to all guardian ad litem appointments in
custody proceedings pending on or filed after the effective
460
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date of this Rule. On or after the effective date of this Rule,
licensed attorneys appointed as guardians ad litem under
the prior Rule 40A may be re-appointed under the terms of
this Rule.
SECTION 3. GUARDIAN AD LITEM APPOINTMENTS
(a) Consistent with Tennessee Code Annotated section 364-132, in a custody proceeding the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem when the court finds that the child's best
interests are not adequately protected by the parties and that
separate representation of the child's best interests is
necessary. Such an appointment may be made at any stage
of the proceeding.
(b) Courts should not routinely appoint guardians ad litem
in custody proceedings. Rather, the court's discretion to
appoint guardians ad litem shall be exercised sparingly. In
most instances, the child's best interests will be adequately
protected by the parties.
(c) In determining whether appointing a guardian ad litem
is necessary, the court should consider:
(1) the fundamental right of parents to the care,
custody, and control of their children;
(2) the nature and adequacy of the evidence the
parties likely will present;
(3) the court's need for additional information
and/or assistance;
(4) the financial burden on the parties of appointing
a guardian ad litem and the ability of the parties to
pay reasonable fees to the guardian ad litem;
(5) the cost and availability of alternative methods
of obtaining the information/evidence necessary to
resolve the issues in the proceeding without
appointing a guardian ad litem; and
(6) any alleged factors indicating a particularized
need for the appointment of a guardian ad litem,
including:
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(i) the circumstances and needs of the child,
including the child's age and developmental
level;
(ii) any desire for representation or
participation expressed by the child;
(iii) any inappropriate adult influence on or
manipulation of the child;
(iv) the likelihood that the child will be
called as a witness or be questioned by the
court in chambers and the need to minimize
harm to the child from the processes of
litigation;
(v) any higher than normal level of
acrimony indicating the parties' lack of
objectivity concerning the needs and best
interests of the child;
(vi) any interference, or threatened
interference, with custody, access, visitation,
or parenting time, including abduction or
risk of abduction of the child;
(vii) the likelihood of a geographic
relocation of the child that could
substantially reduce the child's time with a
parent, a sibling, or another individual with
whom the child has a close relationship;
(viii) any conduct by a party or an individual
with whom a party associates which raises
serious concerns for the safety of the child
during periods of custody, visitation, or
parenting time with that party;
(ix) any special physical, educational, or
mental-health needs of the child that require
investigation or advocacy;
(x) any dispute as to paternity of the child;
and
(xi) any other factors necessary to address
the best interests of the child.
462

296

7.2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 463
(d) If the court concludes that appointing a guardian ad
litem is necessary, the court should endeavor to appoint a
person with the knowledge, skill, experience, training,
education and/or any other qualifications the court finds
necessary that enables the guardian ad litem to conduct a
thorough and impartial investigation and effectively
represent the best interests of the child.
SECTION 4. APPOINTMENT ORDER
(a) Appointment of a guardian ad litem shall be by written
order of the court.
(b) In plain language understandable to non-lawyers, the
order shall set forth:
(1) the reasons for the appointment, focusing upon
the factors listed in Section 3(c) of this Rule;
(2) the specific duties to be performed by the
guardian ad litem in the case;
(3) the deadlines for completion of these duties to
the extent appropriate;
(4) the duration of the appointment; and
(5) the terms of compensation consistent with
Section 11 of this Rule.
(c) The court shall provide in the appointment order as
much detail and clarity as possible concerning the guardian
ad litem's duties. Providing such specificity will assist the
parties in understanding the guardian ad litem's role and
will enable the court to exercise effective oversight of the
guardian ad litem's role.
(d) There is no right to a peremptory challenge of a
guardian ad litem. Allegations that a guardian ad litem
appointment is unnecessary, that a particular appointee is
unqualified or otherwise unsuitable, or that an appointee is
or has become biased should be raised without delay and
should be addressed by trial courts through motion practice.
Any appeal from a trial court's decision on such a motion
shall be prosecuted pursuant to Tennessee Rules of
Appellate Procedure 9 and 10.
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Commentary
The omission of the original Section 4(d) (conflicts of
interests) from revised Rule 40A does not mean that a
guardian ad litem may ignore a conflict of interest. On the
contrary, a guardian ad litem who runs afoul of the conflictof-interest provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct
is subject to appropriate disciplinary action.
SECTION 5. DURATION OF APPOINTMENT
Appointment of a guardian ad litem continues in effect only
for the duration provided in the appointment order or any
subsequent order. If no order specifies the duration of the
appointment, the appointment shall terminate automatically
when the trial court order or judgment disposing of the
custody or modification proceeding becomes final.
SECTION 6. ROLE OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM
(a) The role of the guardian ad litem is to represent the
child's best interests by gathering facts and presenting facts
for the court's consideration subject to the Tennessee Rules
of Evidence. (See Section 8 of this Rule.)
(b) The guardian ad litem shall not function as a special
master for the court or perform any other judicial or quasijudicial responsibilities.
SECTION 7. ACCESS TO CHILD AND INFORMATION
RELATING TO CHILD
(a) Subject to subsections (b) and (c), when the court
appoints a guardian ad litem in a custody proceeding, the
court shall issue an order, with notice to all parties,
authorizing the guardian ad litem to have access to:
(1) the child, without the presence of any other
person unless otherwise ordered by the court, and
(2) confidential information regarding the child,
including the child's educational, medical, and
mental health records, any agency or court files
involving allegations of abuse or neglect of the
464
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child, any delinquency records involving the child,
and other information relevant to the issues in the
proceeding.
(b) A child's record that is privileged or confidential under
law other than this Rule may be released to a guardian ad
litem only in accordance with that law, including any
requirements in that law for notice and opportunity to
object to release of records. Information that is privileged
under the attorney-client relationship may not be disclosed
except as otherwise permitted by law of this state other than
this Rule.
(c) An order issued pursuant to subsection (a) must require
that a guardian ad litem maintain the confidentiality of
information released, except as necessary for the resolution
of the issues in the proceeding. The court may impose in an
order of access any other condition or limitation that is
required by law, rules of professional conduct, the child's
needs, or the circumstances of the proceeding.
SECTION 8. DUTIES/RIGHTS OF GUARDIAN AD
LITEM
(a) The guardian ad litem shall satisfy the duties and
responsibilities of the appointment in an unbiased,
objective, and fair manner.
(b) A guardian ad litem shall:
(1) conduct an investigation to the extent that the
guardian ad litem considers necessary to determine
the best interests of the child, which can include,
but is not limited, to ascertaining:
(i) the child's emotional needs, such as
nurturance,
trust,
affection, security,
achievement, and encouragement;
(ii) the child's social needs;
(iii) the child's educational needs;
(iv) the child's vulnerability and dependence
upon others;
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(v) the child's need for stability of
placement;
(vi) the child's age and developmental level,
including his or her sense of time;
(vii) the general preference of a child to live
with known people, to continue normal
activities, and to avoid moving;
(viii) the love, affection and emotional ties
existing between the child and the parents;
(ix) the importance of continuity in the
child's life;
(x) the home, school and community record
of the child;
(xi) the willingness and ability of the
proposed or potential caretakers to facilitate
and encourage close and continuing
relationships between the child and other
persons in the child's life with whom the
child has or desires to have a positive
relationship, including siblings; and
(xii) the list of factors set forth in Tenn.
Code Ann. § 36-6-106.
(2) obtain and review copies of the child's relevant
medical, psychological, and school records as
provided by Section 7.
(3) within a reasonable time after the appointment,
interview:
(i) the child in a developmentally
appropriate manner, if the child is four years
of age or older;
(ii) each person who has significant
knowledge of the child's history and
condition, including any foster parent of the
child; and
(iii) the parties to the suit;
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(4) if the child is twelve (12) years of age or older,
seek to elicit in a developmentally appropriate
manner the reasonable preference of the child;
(5) consider the child's expressed objectives
without being bound by those objectives;
(6) encourage settlement of the issues related to the
child and the use of alternative forms of dispute
resolution; and
(7) perform any specific task directed by the court.
(c) If the child asks the guardian ad litem to advocate a
position that the guardian ad litem believes is not in the
child's best interest, the guardian ad litem shall:
(1) fully investigate all of the circumstances
relevant to the child's position, identify every
reasonable argument that could be made in favor of
the child's position, and identify all the factual
support for the child's position;
(2) discuss fully with the child and make sure that
the child understands the different options or
positions that might be available, including the
potential benefits of each option or position, the
potential risks of each option or position, and the
likelihood of prevailing on each option or position.
(3) if, after fully investigating and advising the
child, the child continues to urge the guardian ad
litem to take a position that the guardian ad litem
believes is contrary to the child's best interest, the
guardian shall take all reasonable steps to:
(i) subpoena any witnesses and ensure the
production of documents and other evidence
that might tend to support the child's
position; and
(ii) advise the court at the hearing of the
wishes of the child and of the witnesses
subpoenaed and other evidence available for
the court to consider in support of the child's
position.
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SECTION 9. PARTICIPATION IN PROCEEDING
A guardian ad litem appointed in a custody proceeding is
entitled to all rights and privileges accorded to an attorney
representing a party, including but not limited to the right
to:
(a) receive a copy of each pleading or other record filed
with the court in the proceeding;
(b) receive notice of, attend, and participate in each hearing
in the proceeding, including alternative dispute resolution
proceedings, and take any action that may be taken by an
attorney representing a party pursuant to the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Commentary
Current Rule 40A differs from the prior rule in that the
guardian ad litem now functions as a lawyer, not as a
witness or special master. The guardian ad litem does not
prepare a report for the parties or the court, nor does the
guardian ad litem make a recommendation to the parties or
the court concerning custody. Specifically:
(1) A guardian ad litem may not be a witness or
testify in any proceeding in which he or she serves
as guardian ad litem, except in those extraordinary
circumstances specified by Supreme Court Rule 8,
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7.
(2) A guardian ad litem is not a special master, and
should not submit a "report and recommendations"
file a pre-trial
court but may
to the
brief/memorandum as any attorney in any other
case. The guardian ad litem may advocate the
position that serves the best interest of the child by
performing the functions of an attorney, including
but not limited to those enumerated in Supreme
Court Rule 40(d)(7).
(3) The guardian ad litem must present the results of
his or her investigation and the conclusion
regarding the child's best interest in the same

468

302

7.2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 469
manner as any other lawyer presents his or her case
on behalf of a client: by calling, examining and
cross examining witnesses, submitting and
responding to other evidence in conformance with
the rules of evidence, and making oral and written
arguments based on the evidence that has been or is
expected to be presented.
CUSTODY
EXPEDITING
10.
SECTION
PROCEEDINGS
To the extent possible, courts shall expedite custody
proceedings in which guardians ad litem have been
appointed, using available technological and electronic
means to speed the process and to minimize costs.
SECTION 11. GUARDIAN AD LITEM FEES AND
EXPENSES
(a) The guardian ad litem shall be compensated for fees and
expenses in an amount the court determines is reasonable.
In determining whether the guardian ad litem's fees and
expenses are reasonable, the court shall consider the
following factors:
(1) the time expended by the guardian;
(2) the contentiousness of the litigation;
(3) the complexity of the issues before the court;
(4) the expenses reasonably incurred by the
guardian;
(5) the financial ability of each party to pay fees and
costs;
(6) the fee customarily charged in the locality for
similar services; and
(7) any other factors the court considers necessary.
(b) Concerning the allocation of the fee among the parties,
the court may do one or more of the following:
(1) order a deposit to be made into an account
designated by the court for the use and benefit of
the guardian ad litem;
469
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(2) before the final hearing, order an amount in
addition to the amount ordered deposited under
paragraph (1) to be paid into the account;
(3) equitably allocate fees and expenses among the
parties; and
(4) reallocate the fees and expenses at the
conclusion of the custody proceeding, in the court's
discretion, if the initial allocation of guardian ad
litem fees and/or expenses among the parties has
become inequitable as a result of the income and
financial resources available to the parties, the
conduct of the parties during the custody
proceeding, or any other similar reason. Any
reallocation shall be included in the court's final
order in the custody proceeding and shall be
supported by findings of fact.
(c) The appointment order shall specify the hourly rate to
be paid to the guardian ad litem. If an initial deposit is
deemed appropriate by the trial court, the appointment
order shall state the amount of deposit, the date of deposit,
and the account or location in which the deposit shall be
made. The order shall also state whether periodic payments
may be drawn from the initial deposit.
(d) If an initial deposit is required and the trial court deems
that periodic payments may be drawn from the initial
deposit, the trial court shall:
(1) provide the manner in which withdrawals may
be made;
(2) require notice to the parties of the withdrawal,
including a statement of services rendered,
supported by an affidavit; and
(3) provide a reasonable opportunity to object to the
fees charged before the withdrawal is made.
(e) To receive payment under this section beyond the
amount in the initial deposit, if any, the guardian ad litem
must complete and file with the court a written claim for
payment, whether interim or final, justifying the fees and
470
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expenses charged and supported by an affidavit. Any
objection to the guardian ad litem's fee claim shall be filed
within fifteen days after the claim is filed.
(f) Failure to object to a statement regarding periodic
payments does not constitute a waiver of any objection to
the reasonableness of the guardian ad litem's total fees. The
guardian ad litem shall file a final written claim for
payment within thirty days of the entry of the final order.
Any objection must be filed within fifteen days after the
guardian ad litem's final written claim for payment is filed.
(g) If no objection is timely filed, the court shall file a
written order approving the claim, or portion thereof,
determined to be reasonable and related to the duties of the
guardian ad litem.
(h) If an objection is timely filed, the court shall conduct a
hearing and thereafter file a written order denying the
claim, or approving the claim, or portion thereof,
determined to be reasonable and related to the duties of the
guardian ad litem.
(i) The guardian ad litem must seek court approval before
incurring extraordinary expenses, such as expert witness
fees. Any order authorizing the guardian ad litem to hire
expert witnesses must specify the hourly rate to be paid the
expert witness, the maximum fee that may be incurred
without further authorization from the court, how the fee
will be allocated between the parties, and when payment is
due.
SECTION 12. APPEALS BY GUARDIAN AD LITEM
The guardian ad litem shall not initiate an appeal.
Notwithstanding the foregoing sentence, the guardian ad
litem may appeal the trial court's ruling on any matter
adjudicated under Section 4(d) and also may appeal the
trial court's ruling following a hearing specified in Section
11 (h). Upon appeal of the matter by one of the parties,
however, the guardian ad litem shall have the right to
receive notice of the appeal and may participate in the

305

7.2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 472
appeal as any other party, including but not limited to,
filing briefs, motions and making oral arguments.
SECTION 13. EFFECTIVE DATE
The original version of this rule was adopted as a
provisional rule and governed all custody proceedings, as
defined in Section 1(a) of the rule, from May 1, 2009,
through August 31, 2011. This revised rule is adopted as a
permanent rule. The revised rule shall take effect on
September 1, 2011, and shall apply to all proceedings
pending on or filed after the effective date.
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